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IN THE CHAIR: Mr. WALTER BEHRENDT 
President of the European Parliament 
The Sitting was opened at 11  a.m. 
The Chairman (G).- The Sitting is  open. 
1. 0 pening o j  the Joint Meeting 
The Chairman (G). -The 18th Joint Meeting of members of 
the Consultative As,sembly of the Council of Europe and members 
of the European Parliament is  open. 
May I  remind you  that the  Rules  of  Procedure  which  will 
apply are those  agreed jointly by the  Bureau of the Consultative 
Assembly  of  the  Council  of  Europe  and  the  Bureau  of  the 
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I  would  ask those members  who  wish to  speak  to put their 
names on the list of speakers in Room A  93. 
The purpose of the Joint Meeting is  to hold an exchange of 
views between the members of the two AssembHes. without taking 
a vote. 
2.  The function of an enlarged Community in the 
European context 
The Chairman (G).- The agenda now brings us  to a discus-
sion of "the function of an enlarged Community in the European 
context". 
I  call  Mr.  Frydenlund,  Rapporteur  for  the  Political  Affairs 
Committee of the Consultative Assembly. 
Mr.  Frydenlund,  Rapporteur  for  the  Political  Affairs  Com-
mittee of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe (G). 
- Mr.  Chairman, the  establishment  of  the  European  Economic 
Community  in  1958  did  more  than  initiate  a  dynamic  process 
among  the  member States.  The introduction  of  new  forms  and 
methods of co-operation between these member States also brought 
changes in the international system,  particularly at the  European 
level. 
Any enlargement of the Communities will undoubtedly make 
them a still more dynamic factor in international politics. 
But, Mr. Chairman, it is  not enough to  state that an enlarged 
Community  will  have  substantial  repercussions  on  the  outside 
world.  We  must also  be quite clear as  to the kind of repercus-
sions it will have, and we must also ask what function an enlarged 
Community  is  to  fulfil,  for  example,  in  the  broader  European 
context.  This  is  the  question  we  are  to  discuss  today  at  this JOINT  MEETING  OF 8  JUNE  1971  9 
Joint  Meeting  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  of 
Europe Consultative Assembly. 
Properly speaking, the presentation of this report calls for an 
apology on my part for not keeping strictly to the stated subject. 
Instead of answering the question what the function of an enlarged 
Community in the European context should be, I  have asked new 
questions,  questions  about the  substance  of  that Community, its 
socio-political  aims,  and  also  about  its  institutional  structure, 
about the ways in which political will  is  shaped inside  the Com-
munity.  I have done so because the more I worked on the report, 
the clearer it became to me that the substance of this Community 
and its future structure will  be decisive as regards the part it will 
be able to play in international politics and consequently that the 
function  of  an  enlarged  Community in  the  European  context  is 
itself  a  function  as  it  were  of  its  own  substance  and  its  own 
structure. 
The question is  not simply what effect  an enlarged Commu-
nity will have on the world outside, but also how the Community 
itself will manage to face up to the reactions it has sparked off. 
The policy pursued by an enlarged Community which is  the 
most significant trading  power in the  world will  decisively  affect 
the fortunes  of  the  developing  countries.  Moreover, the  consol-
idation  and  enlargement  of  the  Community  must  necessarily 
influence  the  European policies  of  the  super-powers.  That also 
means, however, that the Community must ask itself what attitude 
it is  to  take towards  Eastern Europe, and also  how it views  the 
European  scene  as  a  whole.  But the  Community  also  bears  a 
responsibility to those countries which, while belonging to We,stern 
Europe,  cannot  become  Members  of  the  Community,  either 
because  they  wish  to  maintain  their  neutrality  or  because  they 
cannot prove the democratic legitimacy  demanded by the  Treaty 
of Rome. 
I was also struck during the preparation of my report by the 
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woven.  For example, the way in which the neutral EFTA coun-
-tries  are  to  be associated  with  the Community will  depend  not 
least on whether  the  rapprochement  between  the  two  halves  of 
Europe  continues.  But  the  form  which  future  relationships 
between Eastern and Western Europe will take are in turn closely 
bound up with the question of what form the relationship between 
an  enlarged  Community  and  the  United  States  will  take. 
This will  have to  be part of a  negotiated agreement between the 
United States  and the Soviet Union. 
However, the negotiations between these two super-powers are 
themselves influenced by  the progress  of integration in EEC and 
the possible enlargement of the Community.  Under the pressure 
of  this  move  towards  integration  in  Western  Europe,  the  two 
super-powers  must reach agreement, first  on their future  roles  in 
Europe  and  ~secondly  on  a  common  European  solution  which 
also takes their own interests into account;  they must decide how 
the dynamics of the Community can, so  to  speak,  be channelled 
into a direction acceptable to  both the super-powers. 
I  have  attempted to  demonstrate  how integration  inside  the 
Community,  the  rapprochement  between  Eastern  and  Western 
Europe,  and the  relationship  between  the  two  super-powers  are 
mutually  interdependent.  It  appear~s  today  that  simultaneous 
developments  are  under  way  in  all  these  areas  and  that  these 
developments might well  proceed in the same direction. 
In the first  place,  the  super-powers  a1:1e  negotiating  together, 
at  the  so-called  SALT  talks,  about  arms  controls.  And  the 
NATO Conference which has just ended in Lisbon suggests  that 
talks  about mutual troop reductions in Europe are also  going  to 
take place. 
Secondly, a process of rapprochement between the two halves 
of  Europe  has  been  under  way  for  some  years,  and  it  is  es-
sentially the outcome of a conscious policy on the part of the EEC 
member  States.  The  convening  of  a  conference  on  European 
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States.  But concrete  preparations for  such a  conference  depend 
on the success achieved in the current negotiations on Berlin. 
Thirdly,  the  Community is  on the  point of  consolidating its 
own  integration,  enlarging  its  membership  and  al~so  extending 
co-operation to  the field  of  foreign  policy-all of  which may  be 
regarded as acknowledged preconditions for a further, active policy 
towards  Eastern Europe. 
This whole development, which is  leading towards a  turning 
point in  the history of Europe, compels  us  again  to  consider the 
function  of  the  enlarged  Community  in  this  larger  European 
context,  for  the  events  which  confront  us  today  call  for  an 
overall conception. 
The best answer to that question is, I believe, contained in the 
speech which the Federal Chancellor, Willy Brandt, made at the 
Hague Summit Conference in December 1969. 
I quote: 
"The integration of Western Europe should be viewed in the 
context  of  Europe  as  a  whole.  For  the  European  Community 
does  not see  itself as  a  club for  self-sufficient Europeans, but as 
an ordered unit  in  this  part of Europe, which needs  an organic 
link with the East European States.  In the final  analysis, all the 
peoples  of  Europe bear a  joint responsibility  for  the  peace  and 
development of our continent." 
I  am  convinced,  Mr.  Chairman,  that this  is  the  right  way. 
And the  indications  are that in the long  term, it may also  be  a 
possible way. 
In  the  report  before  you,  as  I  mentioned  earlier,  I  have 
raised  questions  about  the  future  substance  of  the  Community 
and the way in which political will  is  shaped inside it.  Not the 
least  of  my  reasons  for  doing  so  is  that these  questions  will  be 12  CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
debated very keenly.  indeed pas,sionately, in  the  candidate coun-
tries, and becaus~e the answers to them may be of great significance 
in respect of the enlargement itself.  There is no point in denying 
that certain  sections  of the population in  the  applicant  countries 
are averse  to  membership  of  EEC.  But their  resistance  derives 
in part from uncertainty as to what the Community actually is and 
will  become,  and  what  it will  mean  to  the  lives  of  individuals. 
Those representatives  of  the  EEC ·member States  assembled 
here  are  hardly  likely  to  understand  this  problem.  For  them, 
EEC is  part of their everyday political environment.  Over more 
than thirteen years they have amassed experience on the value of 
its  integration  to  all  the  States  involved,  and  there  is  all-party 
agreement in their countries on the advantages which that integra-
tion has brought with it.  In the applicant countries, the situation 
is  different in  this respect.  This is  a  psychological  reality which 
must be  taken into  account if it is  to  be  overcome.  This  EEC, 
this  edifice,  has  been built up piece by piece by yourselves.  But 
our  own  people  are  faced  with  the  prospect  of  going  into  a 
Community which has  been constructed by others, mostly as  the 
result of hard bargaining among the present member States.  I am 
not saying,  Mr.  Chairman, that you should change  this  Commu-
nity,  this  edifice,  in  order  to  facilitate  our  entry,  although  the 
outcome  of the present negociations  may be  of  decisive  import-
ance.  Nor do I intend to suggest that these internal difficulties in 
the applicant countries will not be overcome.  This is  very largely 
a  matter of  information.  I  make  that comment,  Mr.  Chairman, 
becaus~e we  need  answers  to  the  questions  asked  in  the  report. 
We  must be able to  explain  to  our younger  generation  that the 
society which they dream of creating in a national framework can 
only be achieved in a  broader European context,  that the future 
substance  of an enlarged  Community  represents  a  socio-political 
alternative,  and  that  an  enlarged  Community  must  also  make 
democratic  control  possible  at  supranational  level,  which  would 
mean an international breakthrough for democracy;  but also that 
the  dynamics  of  Western  European integration  are  to  be  placed 
at the service of extending the basis of peace in Europe and made 
to contribute to solving the problems of the developing countries. JOINT  MEETING  OF 8  JUNE  1971  13 
These  are  very  exacting  demands,  Mr.  Chairman,  but  in 
reality they do no more than reflect the challenge with which the 
Community is  already faced. 
May  I  conclude  with  another  quotation  from  a  speech  by 
the German Federal Chancellor at the Hague Summit Conference. 
He said: 
"Without  Britain  and  the  other  applicant  States,  Europe 
cannot become what it can and ought to be."  (Applause.) 
The Chairman (G).- Thank you, Mr. Frydenlund. 
I call Mr. Giraudo, drafter of the working paper prepared on 
behalf  of  the  Political  Committee  of  the  European  Parliament. 
Mr.  Giraudo,  Rapporteur of the  Political  Committee of the 
European  Parliament  (I).  - Mr.  Chairman,  first  of  all  let  me 
congratulate Mr. Frydenlund on his  full,  thoughtful and coherent 
report, and let me also, as the Rapporteur presenting the working 
paper of the Political Affairs Committee of the European Parlia-
ment,  convey  our  since.fle  greetings  to  the  President  and all  the 
members  of  the  Council  of  Europe  Consultative  Assembly. 
I  should like, too, Mr.  Chairman, to  draw the attention of those 
present to  a  small last-minute slip in my working paper. 
As may be seen from a comparison of the English and French 
texts,  which  are  correct,  with  the  German,  Italian  and  Dutch 
versions,  the  last  three  paragraphs  of  point  7  in  these  three 
Languages  should, for the sake of logic,  be inserted at the end of 
paragraph 5. 
Let  me  now  point  out  that  the  working  paper,  in  this. 
extremely concise,  not to  say  meagre,  form,  is  intended to  serve 
two  purposes:  to  help  dispel  any  confusion  between  what  is 
desirable and what is possible in the immediate context of enlar-
gement, which we  hope is  now imminent;  and to  draw attention 
to the fundamental consequences of enlargement both inside and 
outside  the  Community. 14  CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
We all know what is  desirable:  the political union of Europe, 
the final  objective of the current process of building the Commu-
nity.  But, as Mr. Sandys pointed out at this very meeting a year 
ago, unity  cannot be created;  it must grow.  It is  about growth 
that we  wish to speak today, taking the enlargement of the Com-
munity as a stage in this process, both in giving it greater political 
weight in Europe and in the world at larg,e,  and in bringing about 
an inevitable strengthening of internal structures. 
The theme, then, is  not the distant but the short and medium 
term objectives,  and, when  d1scussing  what is  probable, we  have 
stressed  what is  actually  possible,  and indeed  so  possible  as  to 
appear  necessary.  If we  are  to  have  a  responsiv~e  Community 
which  will  develop  and grow  organically  and not  mechanically, 
the  Community  must  first  and  foremost  prove  responsive  to 
itself.  This  means  that  the  Community,  responding  to  the  life 
force  inherent in  every  living  being,  should  try  to  fulfil  its  own 
identity, in  quantitative  and in qualitative  terms,  providing  ade-
quate  institutions  and  tools  for  the  further  development  of  its 
policies. 
Even if the Community, after the entry of the applicant coun-
tries,  will  still  not cover the  whole  of We8tern  Europe, and will 
still fall  far short of the Utopian ideal of a  continent-wide Com-
munity, it will nevertheless have to take firmer  steps  towards the 
establishment of its own institutional identity.  I  say it will  have 
to, because the entry of four democratic countries into a Commu-
nity which claims to be democratic and which makes democracy, 
as  a  system  and method,  the  sole  but essential  prerequisite  for 
the  accession  of  new  Members,  would  be  pointless  if  not trans-
lated into a  determined effort  to  match the  Community's institu-
tions  to its stage of development. 
When  Mr.  Malfatti  says  that the  hour  of  truth is  at hand, 
and adds that if Europe really means to be Europe, it will have to 
provide  its.elf  with  the  tools  needed  to  achieve  its  aims,  he  is 
drawing our attention and the attention of our governments beyond 
the  serious  monetary problems  of the  day  to  the  basic  question JOINT MEETING  OF 8  JUNE  1971  15 
of how far the system fits  the principles proclaimed at The Hague 
in December  1969,  and how far our institutions  fit  the nature of 
the system.  Of course, we  are aware that the Community devel-
ops  step  by  step pragmatically, and subject to  the  frequent  con-
flicts  of a multiple personality still too diversified and too sensitive 
to respond promptly and on every occasion to the higher calls of 
unity, even in matters already under common control.  But, as  I 
wrote in  the working paper, the inductive method has  a  logic  of 
its own and fosters de facto and de jure situations from which we 
cannot escape without depriving the pragmatic approach itself of 
any sense  and credibility.  And so,  to  reinterpret what Mr. Mal-
fatti  has  said,  I  would  say  that if democracy really means  to  be 
democracy, the exercise of powers beyond the control of national 
parliaments in matters of financial  impact or in measures placing 
obligations,  directly  and  individually,  upon  the  citizens  of  the 
different  member  States  cannot  continue  without  the  European 
Parliament's  control.  This  supervising  power  demanded  by  the 
European  Parliament  is  not  a  privilege  to  be  extracted  from 
governments  but a  right  and a  duty,  a  need which  governments 
must simply note and recognise, frankly  and objectively and with 
political realism, bearing in mind that certain modest but ~ffective 
powers  have  already  been  conferred  upon  the  European Parlia-
ment and that others  are to  be granted shortly  under the  agreed 
programme  (I  am referring  to  the  application  of  the  Treaty  of 
Luxembourg  and the  deadline  of  1  January  1975  by  which  the 
Community is  to  exercise  full  financial  autonomy). 
Enlargement as  such does not alter the nature of the institu-
tional problem, but does highlight the problem, since it  will add to 
the present internal Community reasons others such as  the demo-
cratic  and  parliamentary  consistency  of  the  applicant  countries, 
and  the  political  role  that,  from  several  angles,  including  dem-
ocratic consistency, will have to be assumed by a  Cm;nmunity _of 
235  million people.  ·  ' 
Long-term plans, such as the institution of a real Community 
government,  must  not  distract  our  attention  from  the  need  to 
reinforce  existing institutions.  · When  I  speak of existing  institu-16  CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
tions  I  mean.  apart  from  the  Parliament,  the  increased  powers 
required  by  the  Commission  and the  problem  of  unanimous  or 
majority decisions in the Council of Ministers. 
The  trend  towards  a  Community government,  leaving  aside 
theoretical projects for  a  federation or confederation, will  emerge 
more  clearly  as  the  powers  and  structure  of  the  European Par-
liament develop. 
I  wrote  in the  working  paper-and if  I  repeat it now,  it is 
because  it is  my  firm  conviction-that it is  through  this  steady 
equal growth of its parliament and government that the enlarged 
Community  will  be  able  to  consolidate  its  stability  and internal 
equilibrium;  its  institutional  structure  wiH  thereby  take  on  the 
characteristics of a  political entity, unique in itself and its  future 
and in the way in whkh it manifests itself in its dealings with the 
other countries of Europe and the world. 
Mr.  Hallstein  rightly  said  in  his  book  L'  Europe  lnachevee 
that integration  is  not a  static  fact  but a  process,  a  continuous 
creative  process  in  which  nothing  is  automatic but everything  is 
intrinsically linked, and every objective achieved points to others 
ahead, so  that this  challenge, as he calls it, this race  towards the 
future is  the most changing and yet the most constant factor in the 
building  of  the  Community.  And it  is  just  because  the  Com-
munity is  like  this,  complex in matter and method, just because 
it  contains  political  forc·e·s  in  tune  with  reality  yet  capable  of 
surpassing it, that the entry of the United Kingdom will make-I 
believe and hope-a decisive contribution to stability and political 
creativity.  Just how great is  this need for stability and creativity 
in EEC is  shown by  the current monetary crisis.  I  believe  that 
there is a way, perhaps even a  quick way, out of this  crisis given 
the political will to press on with economic and monetary union, 
resuming the debate, on the  14th of next month, not only to find 
a cure for the symptoms of the disease but to eradicate its causes. 
Indeed,  according  to  reliable  experts,  cutting  down  and  even 
eleminating the range of fluctuation between European currencies 
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a  few  months, if  only  there  were  a  genuine will  to  do  so.  Just 
what can be done given  the  political  will  is  shown  by  the  great 
step forwards in the Luxembourg negotiations yesterday. 
Mr. Chairman, in my speech so far I have confined myself to 
looking at the internal problems of the  Community and to fore-
casting the salutary pressure to find  solutions that may stem from 
entry of the applicant countries.  I must now point out that, if the 
Community is  responsive to itself because it aims to grow in area 
and institutional stature, it is also responsive now, and will be even 
more so  when  enlarged,  to  every  opportunity  of  co-operation in 
Europe  and  throughout  the  world.  We  may  well  repeat  what 
Mr.  Stewart  had  to  say  here  last  September,  namely  that  the 
increasing  unity  of countries  that are  democratic and prosperous 
presents  us  with  a  challenge  to  perform  our  duty  to  the  less 
prosperous  parts  of  the  world  and  to  seek  to  our  best  ability 
whatever relaxation of tension can be achieved between countries 
like  our  own  and  those  parts  of  the  world  which  live  under 
undemocratic forms  of government and which,  as far  as  we  can 
see,  are likely to live so  for some time. 
I  shall not take time now to analyse how the Community is 
to  perfom  its  duties  to  the  neutral  countries  of  Europe,  to  the 
Mediterranean countries and to the developing countries, whether 
or  not  they  be  associate  Members  of  EEC.  This  was  fully 
discussed in this same setting last September, and more than once 
since then at the European Parliament.  Mr. de la MaUme will be 
speaking on this subject when he presents an opinion later today, 
and  will  certainly  bring  to  bear  his  acknowledged  competence, 
concentrating, I  assume, on the EEC's relations with neutral and 
Mediterranean countries.  I  shall therefore  confine  myself  to  the 
observation  that this  binding  duty,  from  which  the  Community 
derives  the  highest  sense  of its  own  mission  in  the  world,  will 
become increasingly productive in its effects on those outside as the 
Community itself achieves reasonable conditions of security.  No 
one believes that the  enlarged Community either would or could 
aspire to engage in future in power politics.  But no one can deny 
it the right and duty to  achieve for  itself,  in Europe and in the 
Mediterranean, that measure of security, independence and initia-
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without which-as President  Kennedy said-we shall  not be lis-
tened to when we  come to speak with the powerful. 
In  my  working  paper  I  recognise  that  these  developments 
will  take  place  within  the  context  of  the  Atlantic  Alliance,  but 
point out that, by the very process of enLargement, the Community 
can become  an  equal partner, and,  reinforcing  by economic  and 
monetary  union  its  own  standing as  a  great power in  economic 
terms,  it will  be  able,  with  gradually increasing  commitment,  to 
achieve  integration  with  a  common  foreign  and  defence  policy. 
The refelience  to NATO and to the fact that the Community 
intends  to  continue as  an integral part of NATO are things  that 
some people---as the communist members will allow-do not like. 
They point to  another way.  With Mr.  Amendola, they  maintain 
that  in  the  interests  of  the  European  Community  our  political 
aim should be to bring EEC within the framework of the United 
Nations  as  a  regional organisation, cutting off  our Atlantic links 
and transforming  the  whole  Community into neutral  territory,  a 
no-man's-land, to  which Austria, Sweden  and even  perhaps  Fin-
land might eventually accede. 
But  the  way  the  communist  members  are  pointing  is  not a 
course  along  which we  can progress  or move  in  the  direction  of 
some objective, but an enclosure, and Britain would certainly set 
sail for the open sea rather than enter such an enclosure. 
The  Community's  Atlantic  commitments  do  not  prevent  it 
from  seeking,  now  and in  the  future,  its  own independence,  and 
with this independence from fostering  ev,ery  possibility and every 
opportunity to step up fruitful collaboration with the countries of 
Eastern  Europe.  Such  a  policy  will  take  effect  not  so  much 
through  bilateral  agreements  such  as  we  have  had  hitherto  as 
through multilateral agreements,  if,  as  we  hope, the cautious but 
encouraging conclusions  of the  NATO Ministers  in Lisbon meet 
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I  wrote  in  my  working  paper  that  with  the  entry  of  the 
United  Kingdom  and  the  other  applicant  countries  the  USSR's 
propaganda campaign against EEC would lose  much of its force. 
I hope that this will be so, in the interests of the Countries of Eastern 
Europe themselves and in accordance with the political realism of 
the  Soviet leaders,  who  should  not fail  to  note  the  interest  and 
appreciation  shown  by  other  communist  countries,  and  recently 
even  China, where EEC is  concerned. 
Mr.  Chairman,  as  I  near  the  conclusion  of  my  speech, 
may  I  draw your attention  and that of  the  representatives  from . 
the Council of Europe and the European Parliament to the situa-
tion  in  the  Mediterranean.  I  will  do  so  not  to  deplore  the 
impotence that has given us cause for  shame in recent years, but 
to  urge  a  new  awareness  of  the  responsibilities  that  Western 
Europe,  with  the  enlargement  of  the  Community,  will  have  to 
consider from  a  different level  of commitment,  enabling member 
countries to attain greater cohesion in order at last to achieve the 
general  policy  towards  all  the  Mediterranean  countries  already 
urged here so many times. 
In conclusion, to  express  some  optimism as  to  the future  of 
the  Community  after  enlargement,  I  should  like  to  repeat  the 
credit  side  of  some  predictions,  not  all  rosy,  that  I  read  in  a 
reliable Italian periodical a  few  days ago.  The substance of the 
credit side was  as  follows:  once  they  are inside the Community, 
the  British  will  be  far  more  active  than  is  assumed,  since  for 
many  of  them  the  main  interest  in  joining  the  Community  is 
political. 
Once they are Members they will want to make the commu-
nity  an  effective  entity,  and-the  article  continued-President 
Pompidou,  with  his  pragmatic  approach, will  become  convinced 
that French interests would be best served and safeguarded by a 
stronger European structure.  The same will apply to the Federal 
Republic of Germany,  which  will  shift  its  attention  increasingly 
to the building of Community Europe as  its Ostpolitik reaches its 
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progress.  And faster progress will indeed be made.  But, Ladies 
and Gentlemen,  this  last  expression  of  optimism was  not in  the 
article.  It is I who say this.  And I say so not to delude you and 
myself,  but  to  ~encourage  us  all  to  hope.  The  truth  of  these 
predictions  will  be  proved by  subsequent events-some of  them 
imminent, some  not  far  ahead  and others  more  distant,  but  all 
linked in a logical chain which is  the fruit not of our imagination 
but of  a  policy,  the  only  policy  still  capable  of  guaranteeing  a 
future  for  Europe.  (Applause.) 
The Chairman (G).- I call Mr. Darling, Rapporteur for the 
Committee on Economic Affairs and Development of the Consult-
ative  Assembly. 
Mr.  Darling,  Rapporteur  for  the  Committee  on  Economic 
Affairs  and  Development  of  the  Consultative  Assembly  of  the 
Council of Europe.  - The. four  reports 'which· we  are  discussing 
r~eveal a welcome degree of unanimity on many of the issues before 
this  Assembly.  I  think  that  it would  be  advisable  for  me  to 
assure the Assembly that there has been no collusion between the 
writ~ers  of  the  reports.  The  fact  that  we  have  this  degree  of 
unanimity is  extremely encouraging. 
When  the  Council  of  Europe's  Committee  on  Economic 
Affairs  and  Development  considered  how  best  to  arrange  its 
contribution to this important debate, it was  agreed that the com-
mittee's  report  should  be  prepared  and  presented  here  by  a 
United  Kingdom  r.epresentative.  The  reason  for  this  selection 
of a  British Rapporteur was· not merely that he might be able  to 
present  a  fresh,  an  outsider's  view-or should  I  say,  perhaps,  a 
temporary  outsider's  view?-of  the  Economic  Communities' 
achievements  and prospects, which in  itself  might be useful,  but 
that he could in a constructive way express the doubts about, and 
criticisms  of,  the  Communities'  structures  and  methods  that are 
now  projected  in  the  United  Kingdom  in  the  great  debate  on 
whether. or not Britain should become a partner in the Communities. 
For Britain, as  you  know,  Mr.  Chairman, is  deeply  divided 
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the United Kingdom must accept for membership are now nearing 
a conclusion in Lu:x<embourg  and in Brussels.  They have not yet 
been  published,  and are  not, in all  their details,  germane  to  our 
debate here.  We  are  ~concerned here with the broader issues  of 
association  and the future  of  Western  Europe,  internally  and in 
its external relations, which is dominated by an enlarged Economic 
Community. 
I  would nevertheless  begin by commenting, if  I  may, on the 
Brussels  negotiations, for  there is  a  feature  of  these negotiations 
which many of  us  in  Britain find  greatly  disturbing  and that is, 
as it seems to us, the absence of democratic parliamentary control 
over the  Communities' negotiators.  We  understand of course-
and this  has  already  been mentioned-that these  negotiators  are 
and must be Ministers and officials,  the Council of Ministers and 
the Commission, but although the terms that will be finally agreed 
must be approved or rejected by the United Kingdom Parliament, 
there  seems  to  be  no  provision  for  them  to  be  submitted  for 
scrutiny,  approval  or  amendment,  either  to  the  national  parlia-
ments of the Six or to the European Parliament here. 
Thus, to  us  in  Britain  the  relative  power of  the  Council  of 
Ministers and the Commission compared with the European Par-
liament's relative lack of authority appears  at present  at least to 
be a major weakness in the Economic Community's structure and 
perhaps  does  not  conform  to  the  spirit  of  the  Rome  Treaty. 
We  realise,  of course, that if  Britain becomes a  partner we  must 
conform with  the  rules:  we  must conform with what is  to us  a 
formidable  written constitution.  It will  be  a  strange  experience. 
We  manag,ed  to get along without a  written constitution  and we 
have not had much experience of writing constitutions.  We wrote 
one  in  1932  to  establish what was  then called  the  British  Com-
monwealth of Nations, the Statute of Westminster, but that consti-
tution  consists  of  twelve  short  paragraphs  over  three  pages  of 
print.  That was all that was  needed to establish this  association 
of  nations.  We  hoped  after  the  war,  in  our  pragmatic  and 
perhaps somewhat dogmatic manner, that in helping, for instance, 
to  create  the  Brussels  Pact, a  democratic ·united Europe  might 
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But  of  course  our  friends  and  neighbours  wanted  a  much 
stronger association and soon, in a matter of months, if the British 
Parliament  approves  the  terms  of  entry,  the  United  Kingdom 
will  be in this stronger association.  It is  fitting  therefore that we 
should  look  at  the  consequences  that  may  arise-and  I  hope 
would  certainly  be  brought about-in an Economic  Community 
that is  thus enlarged.  I  assume of course that if Britain goes  in. 
so  do  Denmark, Norway  and  Eire,  but  they  of  course  have  to 
decide  on their own  in their  own  negotiations. 
The  first  question  then  is  what  happens  to  the  remammg 
EFTA countries.  I  l~eave out Portugal,  because  until  she  has  a 
democratic parliament she  has  no place in a  democratic Europe. 
I  suggest  and I  believe  that the  European Parliament will  agree 
with this opinion expressed by the Council of Europe that Austria, 
Switzerland,  Iceland,  Sweden  and  Finland  should  continue  to 
develop  trade  r~lations  with  their  former  EFT  A  partners  who 
may be in the Community and, indeed, with all the Communities' 
Members, and that no barriers be set up to hinder their customary 
trading  arrangements.  Whether  this  association  between  the 
Communities and the neutral countries should take the form  of a 
free  trade  agreement  or a  customs  union  or some  other  special 
association is  a matter for mutual discussion.  But it is important 
that  the  principles  of  their  association  with  the  Communities 
should be fully accepted. 
It may  turn out-and I  think this  will  happen-that what I 
can perhaps  call  non-member  partnership  will  produce  common 
economic  and social  policies  with  the  Economic Community, so 
that  full  membership  with  the  right  to  share  in  policy-making 
decisions will  in time be a logical and not a difficult  step for  the 
neutrals  to  take.  But to  some  extent  at least  this  may depend 
on  improving  the  Communities'  relations  and  each  individual 
country's  relations  with  the  Eastern  European  members  of 
COMECON  to  remove  their  possible  hostility  to  such  a 
development. 
The extremely important question of East-West relations has 
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views  expressed  in  a  clear  resolution  which  asks  for  relations 
between  East and West for  political  and economic  reasons,  and 
those  views  have  been  reinforced  in  the  two  speeches  we  have 
just heard and in the four reports before you. 
I  now  wish  to  look  further  afield  as  each  of  the  previous 
speakers has done.  I  do  not need to  express  in forthright terms 
in this joint Assembly how essential it is  for the Economic Com-
munity to give  constructive aid to the developing countdes of the 
third  world  and  not  to  pursue  policies  which  will  impoverish 
them by denying them access to markets on which their livelihood 
largely or wholly depends.  Within our national and our collective 
economies  we  lose  little  by  adjusting  our  production  and  our 
markets to their needs, and we  stand to gain much in production 
and  export's  of  equipment  and  goods  as  they,  with  our  help, 
improve their living standards, and we  can adequately compensate 
those of our own people who may be affected by our helping these 
other  poorer  countries.  We  thus  have  a  humanitarian  interest 
and a  self-interest in aiding the developing countries. 
This is  not the place  to  argue the  claims  of  the  sugar-prod-
ucing countries and the rest of the poorer nations which look to 
Europe and to North America for  a  fair  share of Western  pros-
perity.  I  only  wish  to  say  that  we  have  a  moral  duty  to  help 
them and  that the  Economic  Community will  be  doing  a  great 
disservice  to  its  own  express  purpose  if  it  fails  fully  to  honour 
its commitments to  them. 
Nor  am  I  going  to  plead  here  on  behalf  of  three  richer 
countries-New Zealand, Australia and Canada-for access to the 
Community's markets, although they to a  large extent-and New 
Zealand almost totally-built up their economies to supply Britain 
with food and raw materials;  and it is  my own view that Western 
Europe has  much to  gain  from  its  continuing  to  maintain  these 
complementary economies on a wider scale. 
These three countries  have,  of course,  been immensely  ben-
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even  more  to  the  Western  world  by pursuing  political,  cultural 
and educational experiments from which every democratic nation 
can usefully learn many lessons. 
All the member nations of  the  Communities in the last two 
decades  have  had  to  work  out their  own  policies  for  balanced 
industrial  development,  providing  inducements  to  attract  indus-
tries to areas where work and incomes were greatly needed, seek-
ing to achieve balanced growth everywhere within their economies; 
and so  throughout Western Europe there has been a  rich field  of 
experiment  in  industrial  development  policies  which  the  Com-
munities' Members can usefully share, not only to find  improved 
solutions,  if  these  are  needed,  for  their  own  national  problems, 
but  also  to  create  policies  that  will  provide  something  like  a 
balanced development for Western Europe as a whole.  For one of 
the  Communities'  aims  must  surely  be  to  remove  pockets  of 
unemployment  or low-income  areas  wherever  they  may  be  and 
revitalise  them  so  that  everyone  can  have  a  good  standard  of 
living,  in  rural  as  well  as  urban  life,  and  something  nearer  to 
equality in educational opportunities, and with a determined drive 
against every kind of poverty everywhere. 
To help to  achieve  this  purpose we  need to  bring  our trade 
unions  actively  into  the  apparatus  of  government  of  the  New 
Europe  that  is  being  created.  They are  deeply  involved  in  the 
Communities'  economic  policies  and  decisions  which  are  taken, 
decisions  which  directly  affect  the  welfare  and  living  standards 
of the trade unions'  members;  and they have a  right to  be fully 
consulted  on  every  issue  on which  decisions  have  to  be  worked 
out. 
One such issue of immediate importance is that of the growth 
of  multi-national  corporations,  these  giant  industrial  and  com-
mercial enterprises which spread across national boundaries, which 
gained  an  important place  in  all  our economies  and which  will 
increasingly  influence  the  economic  performance  of  our nations. 
Each  of  our  countries  has  a  common  interest  in  this  matter. 
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contrary, we  should welcome the factories,  plants and enterprises 
built in our countries  by experienced,  expanding  and  successful 
companies  whose  headquarters  are  located  outside  our national 
boundaries. 
But there  are  grave  dangers  in  having  important sectors  of 
our economies  controlled  by remote groups  of  directors,  outside 
our  countries,  whose  decisions  are  influenced  by  factors  which 
may not immediately affect us  but can do great damage to  each 
of us. 
We have, therefore, a common interest in protecting our econ-
omies  from  such  adverse  decisions,  and  we  need  to  develop 
quickly  a  common  policy  for  the  legitimate  control  of  multina-
tional companies. 
Many people in my country believe that the Economic Com-
munity,  with  its  perhaps  inevitable  preoccupation  with  customs 
duties,  food  import levies,  common agricultural  policy,  and tax-
ation  and  monetary  policies,  is  a  kind  of  exclusive  club  for 
financiers,  industrialists and business tycoons, a  club from which 
working  people  and  their  claims  for  a  better  life  are  excluded. 
This,  of  course,  is  an  exaggerated  picture.  We  can  see  clearly 
from the Communities' figures  of high levels  of employment and 
wages and improvements in social welfare, that the working people 
have  benefited.  But the  evidence  of  the  Communities'  concern 
for the wellbeing of all people-workers, farmers, technicians, and 
business  executives alike-must be clearly demonstrated in deeds 
which  everyone  can  see.  Above  all,  as  has  been  mentioned 
already,  the  democratic  character  of  the  Communities  must  be 
proved in practice. 
A European Parliament that had no effective control over the 
policies and decisions of Ministers would be worthless, a mockery 
of  parliamentary government. 
Finally,  we  must  also  consider  our many European institu-
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often  duplicate  and  complicate  to  a  large  extent  each  other's 
work~ so  we  must  prepare  carefully.  We  must  work  together 
to do this with the proper scope for each of our institutions-the 
Council of Europe. Western European Union. the Atlantic Assem-
bly.  the Economic Commission for Europe and the rest-to pre-
vent overlapping activities and wasted efforts.  Although much of 
the work now done by some institutions may well be taken over by 
an enlarged European Parliament. we must recognise that not all 
the Western European countries will be members~  and they must 
not be shut out completely from what will become the major par-
liamentary body. 
I  can sum up briefly. in the words that appear in the report. 
that with the enlargement of the Communities I  believe  that the 
time has come to  harness the  idealism which  brought them into 
being  to  the  task  of  creating  a  truly  European  Europe  which 
embraces  the  finest  things  in  our  traditions,  our  civilisation:  a 
deep  concern for  the rights  of  every  individual,  concern  for  the 
quality  of  life,  concern  for  political  freedom,  for  democratic 
government, for justice, and for social equality.  (Applause.) 
The Chairman (G).- Thank you, Mr. Darling. 
I  call  Mr.  de  la  Malene,  Rapporteur  for  opinion  of  the 
Committee  on  External  Trade  Relations  of  the  European 
Parliament. 
Mr. de  Ia  Mal(me, Rapporteur for  opinion of the Committee 
on External Trade Relations of the European Parliament  (F).  -
Mr.  Chairman,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen,  the  union  of  a  number 
of European States in a Community is bringing about such a  far-
reaching  transformation  of  the  European  situation  that  all  the 
Europeans concerned would like to have a clear idea of the scope 
and significance  of these  changes. 
The  weight  of  an  enlarged  Community  in  international 
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are wondering as to its intentions and aims in order to have regard 
to them in the new balance of forces. 
This  transformation  of  the  situation  and  the  impact on  the 
outside world compel us  to make the difficult  attempt to capture 
a  moment  of  European  history  when  that very  history  is  being 
made. 
The  topic  for  our  exchange  of  views,  "The function  of  an 
enlarged  Community  in  the  European  context",  induces  us  to 
engage in long-term forecasting, a discipline which is  both ethical 
and  political.  Our  attention  has  to  concentrate  alternately  on 
"the  possible"  and  "the  necessary",  on  what  could  be  and  on 
what should be. 
From  what  we  know  of  the  present  Community  and  the 
existing international context, we  should arrive at as  accurate an 
idea as  possible of what an enlarged Community might mean in 
Europe and the world and what this enlarged Community ought to 
be.  These  two  aspects  recur  in  the  concept  of  political  aims. 
Although  it is  not  possible  to  pinpoint  any  specific  revolu-
tionary  change,  a  number  of  events  have  radically  altered  the 
order  established  in  international  relations  at  the  end  of  the 
second  world  war.  The growth  of  the  respective  forces  of  the 
continents  and  of  certain  States  has  provoked  crises  and  dis-
rupted equilibria.  The world  is  seeking  new equilibria and the 
enlarged Community is  part of this  European and world context 
now  being  redefined.  That is  why  it is  not  possible  to  find  a 
single answer to the question of its political aims. 
And that is  why no time must be lost by Europeans in dis-
cussing the role, functions  and responsibilities of Europe and the 
Community which is  "its most powerful expression".  The world 
in which we want to live, the society we wish to create, the Europe 
we are seeking to build also depend on Europeans.  It is high time 
Europeans  stated  their  own  aims  clearly,  defined  together  the 
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and in the  world,  and considered  the  conditions  in which it will 
take  part in  determining  its  future.  It is  no  longer  admissible 
that  the  Community  should  work  from  day  to  day  without  an 
overall  plan,  merely  acting  under  the  pressure  of  crises  and  of 
impulses  from  outside. 
The preparation by the Community of a coherent strategy for 
its  development in  Europe and the  world  is  an  urgent  necessity 
and a prerequisite for shaping the future. 
Havirrg  launched  the  movement  towards  European  unity 
based  on equality  and freedom,  Europeans  must at last  honour 
to  the  full  the  engagements  entered  into  among  themselves  and 
before  the  eyes  of  the  world.  To  do  so  they  must  strive  to 
equip the enlarged Community with structures capable of allowing 
it to play its rightful part. 
But, first,  what are the aims of European unification?  What 
are the attendant responsibilities? Is it possible to agree on these? 
It is  certain that the  enlarged Community will  become  aware  of 
its  European  and  world  responsibilities  all  the  more  rapidly  if 
the present Community is  able to define its own. 
In  December  1969,  at  the  Hague  Summit  Conference,  the 
Heads of State or Government of the Six  spoke  in  paragraph  3 
of a  "United Europe  capable  of  assuming  its  respo,nsibilities  in 
the world of tomorrow and of making a  contribution commensu-
rate  with  its  traditions  and  its  mission."  In  paragraph  4  they 
thought  it  essential  for  this  Europe  to  be  "true  to  its  friendly 
relations wfth outside countries, conscious of the role it has to play 
in  promoting  the  relaxation  of  international  tension  and  the 
rapprochement among all  peoples,  and first  and foremost  among 
those of the entire European continent". 
In the  Foreign Ministers' report on political  Europe, known 
as the "Davignon Report", more particularly in Part I. paragraph 2 
Europe is  called  upon to  prepare to  shoulder the responsibilities 
which its increased unity and its growing importance make it both 
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In the resolution it passed after discussing the report on the 
political  future  of the  European Community,  the European Par-
liament  invited  the  Foreign  Ministers  to  define,  as  a  matter  of 
urgency,  the  specific  role  which  a  democratic  and  independent 
Europe can and must play in the world. 
These rather formal  exhortations require to  be expressed in 
more explicit  terms.  This  opinion  will  seek  to  set forth  certain 
more  substantial  elements  in  the  committee's  particular  field  of 
reference. 
The enlarged Community will  not only have  functions  com-
mensurate with its  geographical dimensions, functions  in keeping 
with historical or cultural traditions, or necessitated by economic 
needs,  it  will  also  have  truly  political  functions,  i.e.  deliberate 
functions  developed  with  definite  aims  in  view.  What can  and 
should  that role  and  these  functions  be  in  the  different  spheres 
concerning the Committee on External Trade Relations? 
Certain  guarantees  will  be  necessary  with  respect  to  the 
neutral  European  States  which  will  remain  outside  the  enlarged 
Community.  These States  are  traditionally  close  to  us  and our 
ties  with  them  are  exceptionally  strong.  They  should  not  be 
penalised  for  having  preferred  to  retain  their  neutral  status. 
Europe needs  neutral  States.  They fulfil  an original function  in 
that they act as  a  connecting link between  Eastern and  Western 
Europe. 
For  that  reason  the  enlarged  Community  must  arrive  at 
specific  and favourable  arrangements  wi~h them,  guaranteeing  a 
satisfactory balance of the interests at stake. 
The  links  created  between  these  neutral  countries  and 
certain  candidates  for  the  Common  Market  (EFTA,  Nordic 
Council,  Nordic  Labour  Market  etc.)  should  not  be  broken 
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The development of  relations  with  the  countries  of Eastern 
Europe is  as  necessary  as  ever.  Progress  on the  common trade 
policy is  particularly desirable in this  sphere.  The improvement 
of economic relations  and the growth of trade should contribute 
to the development of the economy of the East European countries 
and consolidate detente in the hope  that,  in the near future,  the 
"cold peace" will  give  way  to  peace  based  on confidence.  The 
recognition, by the communist countries, of the Community as  a 
permanent  economic  and  political  reality  on  the  international 
scene  will  be  the  sure  sign  of  such  a  development.  Relations 
between COMECON and an enlarged Community could be prof-
itable for  both sides. 
It is  not inconceivable that the European Security Conference 
advocated  by  many  countries  may  one  day  be  matched  by  a 
European conference on economic relations. 
Stable  relations  between  the  enlarged  Community  and  the 
United States are vitally important.  The two main trade partners, 
which  will  also  be  the  two  foremost  economic  powers  in  the 
world,  have  a  fundamental  responsibility  in  the  development  of 
international economic  relations.  They must  consequently  work 
tirelessly  to  overcome  first  such  difficulties  as  may  occasionally 
arise in the different sectors and then reach an agreement on their 
long-term  policies  and options.  This  harmonisation of  attitudes 
can obviously be achieved only through permanent and institution-
alised  consultation  both  between  the  governments  and  between 
the parliamentarians. 
Recent events  have  revealed  a  change  of climate:  polemics 
now  seem  outdated.  American  support  for  the  efforts  towards 
European integration  is  assured  and the dialogue  now beginning 
seems to be one between equal partners. 
Together with Japan, Canada, Australia, the Union of South 
Africa and other important trade partners, the enlarged Commu-
nity  will  have  to  persevere  in  its  endeavour  to  promote  free 
economic  relations  throughout  the  world.  A  progressive  and •  ."  ~  l  '' 
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broadly based liberalisation  of  trade  is  a  fundamental  contribu-
tion to peace between nations. 
There too, it will be increasingly necessary not to be content 
simply with trade agreements but to reach real international eco-
nomic agreements. 
In order to  safeguard the supplies  of  energy  and raw mate-
rials  necessary  for  its  industrial  development,  the  Community 
will  have  to  work  out a  comprehensive  strategy to  save  it from 
depending  too  heavily  on specific  sources. 
In the international monetary and financial  field,  the respon-
sibilities  devolving  on  the  enlarged  Community will  be  as  clear 
as  they are important.  It will  have to  erect barriers against the 
influx of undesirable reserve currencies and take precautions with 
respect to the Eurodollar market.  The drawing up of Community 
measures  should  enable it to  increase  the  margin  for  manreuvre 
in its  economic policy. 
The  joint management  of  exchange  reserves,  the  setting  up 
of a  European reserve fund,  the progressive abandonment of  the 
role  of  the  pound  sterling  as  a  reserve  currency,  the  gradual 
reduction of daily fluctuation  margins for exchange rates between 
the currencies of the member States and,  lastly, the creation of a 
European monetary unit should help to  create "an individualised 
and  organised  economic  and  monetary  system".  Meanwhile,  a 
first  sign of solidarity is  apparent in short-term monetary support 
and medium-term financial  assistance.  Lastly, an enlarged Com-
munity, which will  be a  new pole of monetary equilibrium, must 
be  clear-sighted  and  courageous  enough  to  refuse  to  accept,  in 
its  turn,  the  dangerous  role  of  holder of a  new  reserve  currency 
with all the facilities and injustices that that can imply, particularly 
with respect to the third world. 
Our two  Assemblies  paid particular attention to  the  "future 
of  European  unification  and  action  by  Europe  for  a  policy  to 
benefit  the  developing  countries"  at  their  Joint  Meeting  last 
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The reports presented by MM. Amrehn, Vedovato, Triboulet, 
Bersani  and  Westerterp  gave  rise  to  a  debate  packed  with 
substance. 
It should be recalled that, for the present Community, world 
co-operation and regional co-operation in assistance for developing 
countries  are  in  no  way  mutually  exclusive  but  are,  on  the 
contrary, complementary. 
Thus the Community will be the first to introduce the system 
of generalised preferences for  finished  and semi-finished products 
from developing countries.  But at the same time it is  concerned 
about the  unfavourable  consequences  which  might result  for  the 
developing countries associated with it, and is  seeking to prevent 
such  consequences. 
By means of the second Yaounde Convention and the Arusha 
Convention, the Community improved marketing possibilities  for 
the products of the AASM (Associated African States and Mada-
gascar) and launched the  process  of industrialisation of the Afri-
can States. 
The association policy is tending to go beyond the tariff aspect 
and to  assume  an economic  bias.  It will  be  pursued as  long  as 
it  answers  the  wishes  of  the  associated  States  themselves,  and 
extended to all those States  which are in a  similar situation and 
would like to establish links with the Community. 
In addition to  these  association  agreements,  the  Community 
must intensify its participation in the world food aid programme, 
the  organisation of international markets  for  individual  products 
and the stabilisation of world prices for basic commodities. 
By means  of  a  series  of  association  and preferential  agree-
ments,  the  Community has  shown its interest in all  the  countries 
in  the  Mediterranean  area.  Clearly  all  these  relations  must  be 
strengthened and, above all, co-ordinated.  The European Parlia-
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report.  With respect to trade, it advocates a policy for individual 
products  and  not  only  for  individual  countries,  recommends  a 
development  aid  policy,  based  on  a  long-term  commitment  by 
the  Community,  and  hopes  for  increased  concertation  between 
the Community and the Mediterranean countries. 
In the Buenos  Aires  Declaration  the Latin-American States 
clearly  showed  their  intention  of developing  trade  and relations 
between  the  Community  and  the  South  American  Continent. 
The enlarged Community must respond favourably to that initia-
tive and enter into precise commitments, particularly with regar.d 
to  trade,  the  financing  of  development  aid,  and  science  and 
technology. 
It will  be  seen  from  this  survey  of  foreign  policy problems 
that,  in  anticipation  of  the  enlargement  of  the  Community,  the 
Europe  of  the  Six  is  strengthening  itself  as  an  individualised 
and  organised  political  and  economic  entity,  that  it  is  seeking 
to escape the influence  of other States  and economic forces,  that 
it  desires  to  shoulder  its  European  and  world  responsibilities 
and, in particular, to honour its commitments towards developing 
countries,  especially  the  associated  States.  It is  also  becoming 
clear  that in the  world  of  the  seventies  the  Community  can  no 
longer  confine  itself  to  pooling  merely  the  economic  and  diplo-
matic  procedures  of  the  past.  In  the  Community,  the  member 
States have already created jointly a set of new powers in sectors 
which were  formerly  "reserved".  There has been no transfer of 
power but a change of dimension. 
The  Community  is  the  new  dimension  of  the  European 
States.  It is  the Europeans' "new frontier". 
But this  enterprise calls for  the drawing up of a comprehen-
sive  strategy for  Community development. 
That  strategy  requires·  a  clear  doctrine  enabling  political 
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Then it requires a  determined and coherent policy (and that 
is  an act of  will).  The enlarged  Community  cannot be  merely 
an  aggregate  of  political  wills:  it must  be  the  expression  of  a 
new  political  agreement,  capable  of  producing  truly  European 
policies. 
Lastly, it requires a method, the Community method with its 
men and its institutions (and that is  an act of discipline). 
Although  it  is  generally  better  to  define  policies  before 
creating  the  institutions, it is  nonetheless  true  that some  institu-
tions favour the elaboration of a common policy and the rigorous 
implementation of that policy.  In the Common Market the Com-
munity institutions represent and defend the Community's "objec-
tive interests". 
Two priority aims emerge from that comprehensive strategy: 
the Community needs  a  decision-making  centre,  and it needs  to 
institutionalise the dialogue with its partners. 
The European Parliament's role,  in this connection, is  parti-
cularly  clear,  since  it is  through  its  debates  and  meetings  with 
outside partners  that it is  called upon to  influence  the  decisions 
of the executives, European public opinion and the public opinion 
of our partners.  (Applause.) 
The Chairman (G).- Thank you Mr. de la Malene. 
I  call  Mr.  Malfatti,  President  of  the  Commission  of  the 
European  Communities. 
Mr.  Malfatti,  President of the  Commission of the  European 
Communities  (/).  - Mr.  Chairman, Ladies  and Gentlemen,  the 
excellent reports introducing this debate illustrate Europe's charac-
ter  at this  stage  in  that they  refer  to  the  questions  that Europe 
will  have  to  answer  rather  than  to  certitudes  already  acquired. 
It is  indeed  a  fact  that Europe  and the  Communities  are  living 
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events  to  move  from  the  spectator's to  the  actor's  role.  In this 
context, today's meeting assumes  a  significance  that goes  beyond 
the basic theme of this  debate.  This is  borne out if we  consider 
what  a  privilege  it  is  to  be  able  to  discuss,  in  this  European 
setting,  a  subject  such as  that which appears  on today's  agenda. 
It is  a  privilege  because  it  is  rare  for  history  to  bring  us  face 
to  face  with problems  with implications  as  far-reaching  as  those 
of  the  function  of  an  enlarged  Community  in  the  European 
context.  This,  above  all,  is  why  today's  meeting  cannot  and 
will not serve merely for an abstract exchange of views, but for a 
valuable  confirmation  enabling  us  to  take stock  together  in  the 
light  of  the  action  that each one  of  us  will  be  able  to  perform 
in the exercise of his  functions. 
The Community  is  the  outcome  of  a  series  of  attempts  to 
fit  Europe to  today's  world-wide  scale  of international relations. 
The precariousness of a European balance based on rigidly nation-
al centres of power has thus given way to increasingly pronounced 
links  of interdependence  and interpenetration. 
Enlargement is  the natural outcome for this dynamic process. 
Since  it  will  bring  in  those  countries  of  Western  Europe  that 
declined  to  take  part in  the  ambitious  scheme  launched  by the 
Six,  enlargement  is  also  an  expression  of  the  success  of  the 
scheme itself.  Or rather, this success, by leading to enlargement, 
itself  contains  the  conditions  for  a  new  impetus  in  Community 
growth.  By  taking  in  Great  Britain,  Denmark,  Ireland  and 
Norway, the Community will  acquire the  crucial force  needed to 
return with fresh energy to the building of Europe. 
In order to seize the full potential of this opportunity, Europe 
should  stop  depending  on  outworn  patterns,  including  the  idea 
that there is a clear-cut distinction between economics and politics. 
In reality, the borderline between the two  is  growing fainter  and 
tending to disappear altogether.  Even foreign policy and defence 
policy  are  becoming  increasingly  dependent  on  decisions  in  the 
field of industrial and technological policy, for instance, in the field 
of foreign  trade  and  assistance  to  developing  countries,  as  well 36  CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
as on energy policies.  Increasingly evident, also,  are the limita-
tions of the national framework in solving the basic problems of 
QUr  countries.  Whether  we  need  to  ensure  a  high  growth  rate 
under stable conditions,  to be  active  participants  in  the  interna-
tional  monetary  system,  or  to  make  the  most  of  the  many 
opportunities  stemming  from  the  creation  of  a  single  enlarged 
market, it is  increasingly  true  that this  can be achieved  only by 
taking the process of economic interpenetration between member 
countries of the Community to its ultimate conclusion.  We  need 
to  establish  suitable  budgetary,  economic,  fiscal,  financial  and 
monetary policies  which claim to be not only national but Com-
munity-wide  in  their  thinking  and  application.  The  limitations 
of the customs union are now  clearly to be seen,  and traditional· 
techniques are not enough to  ensure optimum operation of what 
we  have  created.  The  process  of  development  therefore  needs 
to be taken  much further.  We  must be able  to  check,  day  by 
day,  whether-to  use  the  words  of  President  Pompidou-"The 
nations  of  Europe  are  really  determined  to  work  together  to 
achieve  genuine  unity,  first  in  the  economic  field  and  then, 
gradually, in other fields, without exception". 
This  process  does  not  concern  only  the  economically 
advanced  democratic  countries  of  Western  Europe,  since  the 
gradual union of these  countries  is  full  of significance  for  world 
politics.  We  thus  have two  paths along which we may go.  We 
may decline to acknowledge our own weight and responsibilities, 
drawing  back  within  narrow  national  limits,  and  regarding  the 
Community at most as  a  mere  tool for  increasing  our trade;  or 
alternatively, we may choose the path of political courage and set . 
ourselves the aim of exploiting politically the full  potential of an 
-enlarged  Community. 
The times in which we  live  and the originality of the Com-
munity process  challenge  us  to  seek  -on a  larger  than national 
scale-a positive, democratic and forward-looking response to the 
tensions,  anxieties  and  contradictions  inherent  in  our  highly 
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and economic strength we have achieved together stems the obliga-
tion to use this strength for the progress and peace of the world. 
The political aims  of the Treaty of Rome are not confined to an 
institutional problem to  be solved;  they  mark the  way to  make 
our  actions  more  consistent.  unified  and  far-sighted.  and  to 
enable us  to create a  Europe of security and peace, progress  and 
justice, development and stability.  A choice of this kind is not out 
of reach.  The British leaders have already said many times, in the 
course of negotiations for entry. that Great Britain is  prepared to 
go  as  far  as  existing  Members  of  the  Community  are  prepared 
to  go.  The Community  whose  enlargement  is  being  negotiated 
today has decided to transform itself within a decade into an eco-
nomic  and monetary union.  It is  thus  not a  static  Community 
stuck in the routine of an unfinished process.  No. it is  a forward-
looking  Community.  evolving  and  ever  gaining  in  strength. 
Obviously,  the  transformation.  strengthening  and enlargement of 
the  Community  means  solving  some  highly  technical  problems. 
But the nature of these problems remains political.  It is  a broad 
political  scheme  that is  needed  to  bind these  problems  together, 
to discover the links  between  them and to highlight  the  interde-
pendence  of  the  various  issues.  This,  too,  shows  the  academic 
nature  of distinctions  between  the  so-called  political-institutional 
approach  and  the  so-called  functional  approach  to  the  crucial 
problem of building Europe.  Just as it is purely academic to hold 
that the pace at which Europe is  built can be measured daily by 
conjectures of European constituent assemblies, so  it is  wrong to 
believe  that the  days  of  Europe  can  be  merely  a  succession  of 
discussions  and decisions  about disconnected  technical  and eco-
nomic  problems,  without  any  clear  overall  vision  to  guide  us. 
The course· that fits  the objective reality of what we  have already 
become and what we are about to achieve is to urge the strengthen-
ing of our general political vision and the search for  solutions to 
current problems by means of an overall political strategy enabling 
us  to put what we  have achieved to  the best possible use.  Only 
by  transforming  and  strengthening  the  Community  and  by  a 
forward-looking  policy on external relations  can we  consider the 
future not as  something predestined or accidental but as  the fruit 
and  outcome  of  our  own  coherent  efforts.  Without  general 
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We  must  also  refute  the  argument  that  there  was  a  clear 
vision  at the  outset,  but that  this  has  now  been  superseded  by 
the changing world situation.  There is no place for a  Europe of 
nostalgia;  we must work for a Europe of initiative.  This is  true 
today as it was yesterday.  Chancellor Brandt has written:  "Euro-
pean  policy  has  sometimes  been  defensive,  narrow  and  even 
negative.  But", he goes  on,  "the cold  war as  it was  once  seen 
has  given  way  to  new  relationships.  There  are  still  serious 
conflicts  that cannot  be  over<;ome  by  illusion.  But neither  can 
they be overcome by staying imprisoned in an outdated vision of 
the  various  problems.  We  must be  capable  of thinking  beyond 
today and seeing the tasks ahead." 
This is  why the process of European unification finds  confir-
mation  in  the  changing  world,  and is  itself  an important factor 
in this transformation.  If we  work to achieve ever stronger unity 
between  those  countries  of  Europe that today  share  the  greatest 
similarities  in  a  regime  of  freedom,  in  political  strategy  and in 
stages  of economic development, this  does  not mean that we  are 
against  the  prospect  of  detente,  of  new  and  better  relationships 
between  East  and  West,  and  of  strengthened  and  revived  rela-
tionships  within  NATO  and  especially  with  the  United  States. 
To those  who  accuse  the  Europe of  the  Six  of  being  a  Europe 
of  discrimination  and  cold  war,  it  is  easy  to  reply  that  it  was 
this  same  Europe  that  enabled  progress  to  be  made  towards 
detente  and it was  this  same Europe that prevented the  creation 
of a power vacuum, incompatible with an improving international 
order;  and it was  this  same  Europe that increased  our capacity 
for  commercial,  economic  and  technical  collaboration  with  the 
outside world;  it was this same Europe that turned its back, once 
and for all, on the blood-stained age of aggressive nationalism;  it 
was  this  same  Europe  that  introduced  a  new  element  into  the 
world situation without jeopardising the balance of power and the 
loyalty  to  alliances  which  are  the  basis  for  our mutual  security, 
and  without  denying  the  positive  functions·  and  specific  roles 
of those  European countries  that remain neutral  or non-aligned. 
Thus  the  building  of  Europe,  which  some  consider  a  thing 
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the  crucial  factors  in  the  future  of  the  world.  It is  in  this 
context that enlargement of the Community may change the face 
of Europe.  And we  should here consider the real nature of our 
Community, which is  an outward-looking Community, committed 
to  the  reinforcement of world  trade and vitally  interested in the 
future of the developing countries.  This our attitude, our nature 
and our choice of an outward-looking Community is demonstrated 
not  only  by  the  fact  that  we  are  on  the  way  to  concluding 
negotiations for  enlargement but also  by our readiness to discuss 
with other trade partners in order to strengthen international trade 
at  world  level.  Our  consideration  and  responsiveness  in  our 
relations  with the developing  countries  are demonstrated, finally, 
by  the  decision  that  we  have  been  first  to  take  among  the 
industrialised countries  of  the  world,  the decision  to  apply from 
I July a generalised preferential system in favour of the developing 
countries. 
One  of  the  foremost  responsibilities  of  the  Community  is 
to  establish  new  relations  with  the  EFTA  countries  that  have 
not applied for membership.  Now that the exploratory talks with 
each  of  these  countries  have  been  concluded,  the  Commission, 
of which I  have the honour to be President, is  committed to help 
in  the  search  for  concrete  solutions.  Before  the  month  is  out 
we shall be presenting our proposals to  the Council and therefore, 
for obvious reasons, I  cannot make any advance statements today. 
This problem dqes not concern only the Six, but must be discussed, 
by means of some suitable procedure still to be established, with 
the countries  that have applied for  membership.  I  am confident 
that we  shall arrive at a  solution that is  satisfactory for all, even 
if the problem is  more complex than it may appear at first  sight. 
It is  obvious  that the  role  of  the  enlarged  Community  will 
have to grow in the Mediterranean, where all European countries 
have a  specific  interest in stability and detente. 
Many Mediterranean countries are already asking the Europe 
of the Communities to make a concrete effort to help relieve  the 
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The trade agreements and agreements on association between 
the  Community and certain  Mediterranean  countries  are  only  a 
first  step  in  this  direction.  These  agreements.  far  from  being 
our destination, mark the beginning of a new chapter which must 
lead on to the development of far more incisive tools, expressing 
the Community's will  to  give  its  relations  with these countries  a 
political spirit. 
The Community which is  now being enlarged must define its 
relations  with  countries  of  Eastern  Europe.  We  must  convince 
the  countries  of the  East of  what they  themselves  stand to  gain 
from an increasingly thorough-going Community of Ten. 
The  new  climate  in  Europe  in  the  1960s  stems  from  the 
intensification of economic and trade relationships, and the Com-
munity,  as  a  driving  force  behind  trade  expansion,  has  played 
an important part.  The  1970s  should  mark the  stabilisation  of 
this  climate,  combining growth in trade and economic exchanges 
with  new  forms  of  co-operation  in  matters  of  common  interest. 
The Community's commitment to  establish fully  a  common 
trade policy  by  1 January 1973  serves  to  underline the fact  that 
the active presence of the Community is  now a  precondition for 
any  atmosphere  of  inter-European  co-operation.  This  is  con-
firmed by the objectives inherent in the strengthening of the Com-
munity and the new balance created by enlargement. 
The little  Europe of  the  Six,  in becoming  the  great Europe 
of the Ten, is  acquiring the stature and weight it needs if it is  to 
play its  full  part in European and world affairs.  As Mr.  Heath 
has said, it is  not just a matter of patching up the worn tissue of 
our continent or wiping out the old rivalries  that have led to so 
many disasters in the past.  We all have world-wide interests, and 
one of our common aims is the expansion and not the contraction 
of these interests. 
This brings  us  back, Mr. Chairman, Ladies  and Gentlemen, 
to  the  alternatives  I  mentioned  at the  beginning  of  my  speech. ----··--- :..~.~·- ·-·-·'-----~------=--- - \...:_~---- -·· --~---:__·--- _:_:--~~____:.!_  '-._.:Cc ___ _ 
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The Community  is  today  going  through  a  period  in which 
the doubts outweigh the certainties;  the changing situation makes 
it vital to clear up these doubts.  If we  fail  to settle them by our 
own free  will  and action, they will  be settled for  us  by the  stark 
force of events which has its own destructive logic.  The challenge 
before us today is  thus basically very simple.  An enlarged Com-
munity  could  give  Europe  a  role  to  match  its  aspirations,  its 
stature and its interests;  but mere possibility is not enough;  what 
we need is to exercise our will and to act accordingly. 
(Applause.) 
The Chairman (G). - Thank you Mr. Malfatti. 
We  shall  now  suspend  the  Sitting  and  resume  at  3  p.m. 
The Sitting is  suspended. 
(The  Sitting  was  suspended  at  12.45  p.m.  and  resumed  at 
3 p.m.) 
IN THE  CHAIR:  Mr.  REVERDIN 
President of the Consultative Assembly 
of the  Council of Europe 
The Chairman  (F).  - The Sitting is  resumed. 
The exchange of views between the members of the European 
Parliament and  of  the  Consultative  Assembly  of  the  Council  of 
Europe  continues. 
I  call  Mr.  Cantalupo. 
Mr. Cantalupo(/).- Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
I  think that Mr. Malfatti gave us  this morning, in a very. respon-
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discussing here today.  The news from Luxembourg this morning 
about  the  meeting  between  the  representatives  of  our  different 
governments and the representatives of the British Government is 
encouraging.  Another step forward has been made towards Brit-
ish entry into EEC, and this  at once broadens not only the eco-
nomic horizon, but also the political scope of the duty that we are 
taking, consciously, I  hope, upon ourselves.  The European Par-
liament must undertake specific  responsibilities,  because,  for  one 
reason, we rightly demand-as did the representative of the British 
Parliament this morning-increased parliamentary control over the 
progress of the general policy of enlargement of the Community. 
But if we wish to increase our powers of control, we must begin by 
exercising  these  powers.  The  less  the  European  Parliament  is 
endowed  with  statutory  powers  the  more  it  must  exercise  its 
moral  authority.  It must,  of its  own  accord,  make  up  with its 
own authority for  the lack of formal means for effective  control. 
Ladies  and  Gentlemen,  Mr.  Malfatti  repeated  this  morning 
a question he asked this Assembly in Luxembourg two weeks ago: 
"Does  Europe  really  mean  to be  Europe?"  We  must ask  our-
selves today not only whether we really want Europe, but whether 
we  want a  broader and more  powerful  Europe than the  one we 
have  succeeded  in  building  so  far.  For  the  negotiations  with 
Britain, which have been· encouraging up to  yesterday evening-
whioh  we  hope  will  become  even  more  so  as  they progress-so 
open up the  prospects  before us  that we  may soon  be overtaken 
by greater  responsibilities  even  before we  are  ready  to  shoulder 
them.  We  must make  an effort  and a  spurt to  make ourselves 
worthy  of  the  functions  soon  to  be  assigned  us.  The  entry  of 
Great  Britain  will  give  us  a  political  platform  at  world  level. 
Mr. Giraudo and the other three Rapporteurs were as one in high-
lighting  this  turning  point,  this  sudden  change  in  the  quality of 
the Community's life.  Our powers are proliferating, and we must 
ascertain  whether  our structures  are  adequate  to cope  with  the 
increase  in political  power  that is,  I  would  say,  about to  thrust 
itself upon us. 
This  problem  does  not  concern  only  the  relations  between 
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relationships already looming on the horizon between an enlarged 
Community of Ten, and later, we hope, of an even larger number 
of Members, and the States which will  probably stay outside the 
Community for many years to come and perhaps for ever. 
The Community is  developing virtually by geometrical rather 
than arithmetical progression.  These Joint Meetings are designed 
to  define  the  scope  of this  progression.  We should rather have 
had this debate after British entry into the Community.  However, 
in holding it today,  on the threshold of this  great event,  we  are 
spurred on to search our consciences and acknowledge our respon-
sibilities, as  is  our duty.  We must indeed ask ourselves whether 
we  are  ready  and  able  to  shoulder  all  the  responsibilities  that 
British  entry  will  place  upon  the  Six  existing  Members  of  the 
Community. 
This soul-searching is something that had to be done in some 
form or other.  Today is  only a  beginning, but we  hope that the 
operation will be continued at forthcoming sittings, where I  hope 
the atmosphere will be warmer than it is  today, in order that we 
may  really  move  on  towards  new  dimensions  for  which  new 
machinery  must  be  prepared.  We  must  go  into  the  matter  in 
greater  depth.  It is  not  enough  to  demand  greater  statutory 
powers  for  the European Parliament;  we  can  take these  greater 
powers for ourselves if we are able to perform our duties, even if 
the formal machinery is  not yet complete.  We  must thus recog-
nise that British entry raises three problems, two directly and one 
fairly directly.  The first concerns our relations with the countries 
that  will  be  joining  at  the  same  time  as  Britain;  the  second 
concerns  those  countries  whose  entry will  depend  upon  whether 
our political  approach will  be flexible  enough to  enable  them  to 
associate  in  a  different  form  from  Ireland  and  Denmark.  We 
must bear in mind those EFT  A  countries which cannot enter on 
the  same  terms  because  their  constitutional  structures  or  the 
international  nature  of  their  foreign  policy  prevent  them  from 
acting completely independently, because of the  neutralisation of 
some,  such  as  Austria,  and  the  neutrality  of  others,  such  as 
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We then have the problem of relations with the Mediterranean 
countries;  this  problem has  now  been clearly expressed in talks 
between  Members  of  the  Community.  Finally,  we  have  the 
problem of relations  with  the  countries  of  Eastern Europe, with 
what is  called the Soviet or Socialist world. 
British entry will open up whole new horizons on these prob-
lems not immediately but in the very near future.  It is thus right 
and necessary that the European Parliament should, from  today, 
come  to  grips  with  these  great issues  and  begin  to  make  some 
reply, not an immediate reply, but at least the beginnings.  Because 
the  Community's  trade  policy  is  acquiring  increasingly  political 
implications, we  must raise the issue in political terms. 
I am speaking, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Liberal Group 
in the European Parliament and the Liberal Group of the Council 
of  Europe,  which  decided,  at  a  joint  meeting  this  morning,  to 
express  their views with one voice;  it is  my honour to have been 
charged with this  task.  I  should like to state at once, on behalf 
of the two Liberal Groups, which are in full  agreement with each 
other, that we  are aware of the  tasks ahead.  Our point of view 
on the first problem is as follows:  As regards those countries that 
will  almost  certainly  follow  Britain  into  the  Common  Market 
--countries  of  northern  Europe-we feel  that  there  are  several 
problems to be solved, mainly economic and technical, i.e. practi-
cal problems, whereas  with the  countries  that will  probably join 
the  Common  Market at a  later stage-if ever-the problems  to 
be solved are political.  We must thus adopt two positions.  The 
first,  to  be  implemented immediately, is  to  make  every  effort  to 
ensure  that the  countries  which  are  now  linked  with  Britain in 
purely  economic  terms  but  which  retain  their  full  freedom  as 
independent  States  may join  the  Common Market with  the  cer-
tainty that they will  suffer no  economic losses.  The Community 
will  certainly  not  ensure  this.  We  shall  thus  be  faced  with 
complex,  important  and  difficult  negotiations,  but  negotiations 
that can  be  speedily  concluded  because  they  do  not  entail  any 
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As regards  the other countries,  such as  Austria, Switzerland 
and Sweden, highly serious problems of politics and international 
law are involved.  These are neutral countries and their neutrality, 
if it does  not limit their sovereignity,  nevertheless  requires  them 
to maintain a certain flexibility in international relations. For these 
countries  it is  not a  matter  of  finding  the  political  will,  but of 
seeing how far we wish their participation to go. 
With  respect  to  this  second  group  of  countries,  we,  as  the 
Liberal  Group,- call  for  the  adoption  of  a  very  flexible  attitude 
from  the  start,  because  we  feel  that we  should  not,  under  any 
circumstances,  shut  the  door  on  the  possible  accession  of  these 
countries.  They  cannot  join  today  because  their  neutrality-or 
neutralisation-denies them the freedom to do so;  but tomorrow, 
given a change in political conditions in Europe, they might be at 
full liberty to do so.  We must prevent the emergence of obstacles 
that  might  prove  insuperable  in  the  future;  to  create  such 
obstacles would be to fail in one of our main raisons d' etre, which 
is  the  liberal  expansion  of  the  full  potential  of  the  Common 
Market.  And our failure would be all the more serious because 
these countries, even if restricted by a neutral status laid down in 
their constitutions, are all countries with deeply rooted democratic 
systems,  so  that  there  would  be  no  ideological  or philosophical 
objection to  their accession. 
For these countries, we  must at all events establish economic 
conditions  which  would  enable  them  to  join  tomorrow  if  they 
wished.  We must broaden our horizons  as  far  as  possible  and 
make  sure  that  we  ourselves  raise  no  obstacles  to  the  widest 
possible expansion of the Community. 
There  is  another  problem  in  connection  with  the  Mediter-
ranean countries.  In this  case, I  am happy to remind the repre-
sentatives  here  that  only  four  months  ago,  in  the  matter  of 
relations  between  the  member  countries  of  the  Community  and 
all  the Mediterranean countries, especially those of North Africa 
and the  Middle  East, we  were  all  agreed  in  the  European Par-
liament on the need for the Western States  in the Community to 
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with respect to the Mediterranean countries, especially the recently 
independent ones.  A resolution of major importance was adopted 
unanimously  and  met  with  an  encouraging  response  from  the 
countries we  represent and from our governments;  we  have now 
learned that just one month ago the last session of the Council of 
Ministers in Brussels considered the need to  harmonise as  far  as 
possible the Mediterranean policies of Community member States, 
and decided that next· autumn a direct, a practical start would be 
made  with  measures  to  harmonise  our  countries'  policies  with 
respect to all the Mediterranean countries. 
I  hope  that  this  meeting  today  will  give  birth  to  a  still 
stronger wish to achieve a common Mediterranean policy, bearing 
in mind that the European Parliament decided here, two months ago 
-and none  of  our  governments  opposed  this  demand;  indeed, 
they  all  welcomed  it-to embrace  in  this  Mediterranean  policy 
countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, even though they 
have  no  immediate,  direct  geographical  interest  in  the  Mediter-
ranean,  because  their  membership  of  the  European  Economic 
Community,  which  has  a  general interest  in  the  Mediterranean, 
means that these countries, too, have an interest to justify common 
or joint action in the Mediterranean. 
Ladies  and  Gentlemen,  I  believe  that  the  events  of  a  few 
days ago in Egypt and the extraordinary speed and incomparable 
zeal with which Russia has  followed  up the spectacular rashness 
of certain Egyptian political circles, re-establishing its own military 
power in Egypt through an agreement directly associating Egypt in 
the  defence  of the  socialist  world-a step  not previously  taken 
in any other Mediterranean country-demonstrates the need and 
the urgency for  a  common Mediterranean policy by the  Western 
Mediterranean countries,  for  without  such  a  policy,  new  factors 
and new obstacles will emerge and some doors hitherto still open 
to us will very soon be closed. 
The case  of  Egypt demonstrates  a  threat and a  danger;  it 
demonstrates  Russia's  ability  to  act  very fast  in  turning  certain 
at first  sight negative  situations  to  its  own  advantage and to  the 
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Our situation in the Mediterranean today is  far more difficult 
than it was  a  month ago.  At the  forthcoming  meetings  of  the 
Council  of  Ministers  in  Brussels,  this  will  lend  force  to  their 
decision to consider in the autumn the need to establish a common 
diplomatic and economic policy for the Common Market countries 
with respect to  the recently independent Mediterranean countries. 
This is our second recommendation, because there can be no doubt 
that if  our Foreign  Ministers  have  recognised  the  need  for  this 
undertaking, it means  that what this  Parliament had to  say four 
months ago  was  realistic and had the force,  the interest and the 
influence  to  arouse  the  awareness  of the  six  governments.  This 
shows  that  in  certain  major  political  issues  the  European  Par-
liament, even if it has not been endowed with statutory powers of 
control, nevertheless enjoys sufficient moral and political authority 
to be able to direct governments towards  the Community's com-
mon interests. 
Our third point, Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, con-
cerns  the relations between EEC and Eastern Europe. 
Is  there  anything  new  here?  In theory  there  certainly  is. 
The Lisbon Conference  was  no  trifling  incident;  it would  be  so 
only  if  we  failed  to  follow  it up.  But the  statements  made  at 
Lisbon  by  almost all  NATO member States  are  rapidly gaining 
the ability to go their own separate ways, and we  must hope that 
they are sufficiently in tune with reality to  achieve at least some 
practical realisation.  We  should remember that the general idea 
of establishing relations between  Western Europe and the Soviet 
sphere is not a new one.  We had a long way to go at the outset 
from  an entirely negative  situation,  because  the  communist bloc 
has always declared relentless war on the Community, hoping for 
its  destruction and elimination,  always  seeking to  negotiate  with 
individual  member  States  but never  with  the  Community  as  a 
whole.  However,  with the  institution of the  Federal Republic's 
Ostpolitik towards Russia, the problem, theoretically at least, was 
expressed  in  terms  which  made  a  considerable  impact  in  thjs 
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Dr.  Scheel,  came  here  to  give  us  a  very  valuable  account  of 
Germany's  talks  with  Russia.  Germany  raised  the  problem  of 
the  Common  Market  in  very  clear  terms  in  the  course  of  its 
talks  with  the  countries  of  Eastern  Europe.  In  other  words, 
Germany  negotiated  as  a  member  State  of the  Community  and 
never  once  played  down  its  membership,  which  constitutes  its 
true  credential  for  negotiation  with  the  countries  of  Eastern 
Europe.  It is not a matter of securing Russian recognition of the 
Economic  Community,  but  of  finding  out  whether,  de facto-
if  not  de  jure-the  communist  countries  singly  or,  better  still, 
jointly are prepared to negotiate with the Community on economic 
matters.  The  new  situation  created  by  British  entry  may  also 
have  repercussions  here.  It is  my personal view,  though I  may 
be  mistaken,  that  the  evident  and,  so  far,  formal  change  in 
Russia's  language  with  respect  to  the  Community  is  a  direct 
result  partly  of  Federal  Germany's  Ostpolitik  and  partly  of 
British  entry,  which  means  that  Russia  must  abandon  all  hope 
of  the  EEC's collapse.  Russia  was  aware  of  this  at once,  and 
realised  that to  continue under these  circumstances  as  the  main 
opponent of the Community would be negative and fruitless,  and 
would be out of keeping with the general scheme of Russian rel-
ations with the West.  The problem, then, will reappear.  It was 
discussed  at  Lisbon.  In  Mr.  Giraudo's  report  there  are  hints 
and  suggestions-we  cannot  call  them  proposals-as  to  where 
talks  with  the USSR  might  be begun.  Mr.  Giraudo thinks  that 
this  might  be in  the  United  Nations  Economic  Commission  for 
Europe  in  Geneva,  where  the  UN virtually  becomes  European, 
at least  to some  extent,  and  maintains  contacts  with  European 
States  outside  the  UN  Assembly  in  New  York.  Alternatively, 
Mr.  Giraudo  suggests  GATT as  a  possible  setting.  I  think  we 
should be quite clear in our own minds here.  We Liberals held 
an exhaustive discussion on this problem this morning and agreed 
on the  following  principle:  de  jure  and de  facto  recognition  of 
the Community by the USSR must be the conditio sine  qua  non 
for  any development of our relations.  There can be no  ambiv-
alence on this  point.  It is  our profound conviction that Federal 
Germany  has  not  compromised  this  concept  in  any  way,  but 
rather  confirmed  it,  explicitly  and  radically,  so  that  we  now 
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I  must now  ask  a  question on behalf of the Liberals.  Are 
we  all. and are all our governments in Western Europe. convinced 
that we must act in agreement on this point. or is there any govern-
ment  that  believes  in  following  its  own  course?  There  are. 
perhaps.  European governments  that feel  they  may go  it alone. 
regardless  of  the  Economic  Community;  I  am  thinking  of  the 
doubts rightly underlined by Mr. Malfatti this morning.  We owe 
him a debt of gratitude for this self-criticism. in which we are in a 
way engaging here along with him.  Do we not feel  some anxiety 
lest one. of the six governments should embark upon independent 
action in this  most sensitive  field.  thus  jeopardising the interests 
of all the others? 
Inherent  in  the  question  "Does  Europe  really  mean  to  be 
Europe?" is  a  highly  specific  question with regard  to  the  Soviet 
bloc:  do  we  all  want to be  Western  Europeans  or do  we  wish 
to go every one his own way. weakening the others in the process? 
If this  is  how  matters  stand. it is  obvious  that there  can be no 
possibility  of  any  serious  progress  in  negotiations  between  the 
Community and the Soviet bloc. 
I  must raise one more crucial point on behalf of my Liberal 
friends:  if there were  to be negotiations-this problem has  been 
raised at Lisbon and the European Parliament cannot ignore it-
such negotiations  must proceed in  such  a  way  that they do not 
diminish  but rather increase  the  individuality.  sovereignty.  inde-
pendence and freedom  of the individual States of the  communist 
bloc.  If Russia were to negotiate on behalf of all the communist 
countries.  we  should  have  failed  the  liberal  purpose  of  this 
Parliament and its  liberal  raison  d' etre,  because  we  should  thus 
have facilitated the direct enslavement of some of these States to 
Russia.  To put it more  clearly.  we  must repeat  what we  have 
already said whenever this matter is discussed:  that such negotia-
tions. if they  are to  be conducted in  accordance with the liberal 
ideology on which the Common Market is  based and to which it 
owes  its  origins  and future.  must progress  in  such a  way  as  to 
give  gradual  freedom  to  the  countries  of  the  communist  bloc. 
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unit.  Otherwise we shall have indirectly and involuntarily acted 
in solidarity with Russia, cutting down the freedom  of what are 
today called the satellite States. 
This course entails considerable flexibility in our thinking and 
diplomacy"  These  are very  difficult,  long-term  operations.  But 
the leaders of our governments  and the leaders of the European 
movement  in  general,  the  Commission  of  the  European  Com-
munities, have demonstrated their ability to act flexibly, and we are 
therefore  sure  that  our  moral  authority  would  be  enhanced  if 
matters were stated frankly, without ambiguity, from the start. 
In this connection we  as  Liberals would say to the European 
Parliament that, for its part, no principle must be compromised by 
lack of caution, but the overall solidarity of the Western countries 
in showing  a  single  face  to  the  Soviet  world  must remain fully 
effective;  if not,  attempts  by  some State  or other to  turn  aside 
from  the  common  path, or desertion  by  certain  political  forces, 
would  diminish  our  authority,  unity  and  strength,  and  Russia 
would regain the hope of seeing us  disunited and divided, under-
mining the Common Market indirectly from outside before enter-
ing into negotiations  with it.  If there  is  any  time  that we  may 
act in this way, it is  the time when British entry will undoubtedly 
strengthen  our  authority  and  give  us  the  political  prestige  that 
we  have long coveted and are now on the point of winning. 
Thus everything is in a way bound up with the problem of a 
single,  overall  approach,  and  Mr.  Malfatti  was  quite  right  this 
morning in highlighting  this  overall view  of our policy,  whereby 
no  problem  is  purely  technical  but  all  are  problems  of  general 
policy.  In conclusion,  I  can  only  reaffirm  that we  must march 
on of one accord,  because, from  now  on,  any  division would be 
fatal  and would  jeopardise all  our positive  achievements  so  far. 
This  political  will  may  prove  to  have  the  strongest  constructive 
force  that Europe has  seen for  the  past fifteen  years. 
We must step up our solidarity and unity, obeying implicitly 
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Economic unity is only a preliminary and a  stage in the develop-
ment of political unity;  without this political unity, our achieve-
ments  of recent years  will  always  be  at risk.  The link between 
economic unity and monetary unity, i.e.  the harmonious develop-
ment of our economies, the greatest possible equalisation of social 
standards in the countries  of the Community,  the  elimination  of 
pockets  of poverty,  discrepancies  and vulnerable points,  open to 
attack  by  foreign  competition  and  internal  deviation,  all  these 
tasks  must  be  brought  together  within  an  overall  perspective 
which  holds  good  not  only  inside  the  Community  to  foster  a 
climate of unity between member States, but also outside, in order 
that  we  may  show  not  merely  a  single  face  but  a  solid  body, 
united and effective, which will  at last entitle us  to uphold once 
again our mighty ambition, for it is indeed a  mighty ambition to 
represent the world's third economic power. 
Either we  will  earn this right, with political unity, or we  will 
lose, together with our political freedom should this prove wanting, 
the very  fruit  of economic unity which we  are now  so  painfully 
achieving.  (Applause.) 
The Chairman (F). - The situation at present is that fourteen 
more speakers are on the list.  May I ask each of you to try and 
be  brief?  I  know  that this  kind of exhortation  seldom  has  any 
effect,  but if you wish  to finish  by 7  o'clock some  speakers  will 
have to make an effort to be concise. 
I  call Lord Gladwyn. 
Lord  Gladwyn.- Mr.  Chairman. if the new Community of 
the Ten-that is to say, the European Economic Community plus 
the  four  candidates-comes  into  existence  fairly  soon,  it  will 
clearly have  to  have some  kind of  special  relationship  with five 
Northern European industrialised and neutral States and with six 
Southern European developing  States.  Association with the first 
of these groups will no doubt take the form of some kind of free 
trade area, if the Russians should allow this in the case of Finland 
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With the second group, the association will presumably take 
the  form  of  specially  negotiated  relationships  permitting  some 
increase in goods  and services.  But in neither case  should  such 
associated countries, though they might well, I  suppose, be repre-
sented  in  this  Parliament  of  Europe,  though without  a  right  to 
vote,  be  permitted to  take  part in any  decision-making  process, 
for if this were permitted the entire possibility of creating a thing 
in  itself,  rather  than  a  collection  of  things, ·would  presumably 
disappear.  Should  the  Ten  make  unexpectedly  rapid  progress 
towards  a  monetary  union,  which  they  would  naturally  not  be 
able to do so long as the unanimity rule prevails, the five countries 
of the Northern group to which I  have referred will, however, be 
faced  with the sheer necessity of  actually joining the Ten, unless 
they are physically prevented from doing so. 
How could Norway,  for  example, be  a  member of a  mone-
tary union and Sweden not a member?  But, if the members of the 
Northern group  do  join the Community of Ten, they  will  presu-
mably  have  to  abandon  their  neutrality.  Obviously,  the  Six  of 
the Southern group cannot form part of a monetary union, as they 
are not even able to accept free trade exchanges with the Common 
Market. 
It looks, therefore, as  if in a few  years' time the Ten, if they 
come into  being,  will  be joined by Sweden,  even if  she does  not 
join at once, and subsequently, perhaps, by Switzerland.  But we 
can hardly count on Austria's and Finland's joining the extending 
European Economic Community for so long as East-West relations 
are  anything  like  what  they  are 'at  present.  I  daresay  Iceland 
may  elect  to  remain  outside  the  Community,  but  that  is  for 
Icelanders to say. 
The Southern group of  States,  apart from  not being  able  to 
stand the competition of industrialised States, will also be unable 
to join the  expanded EEC unless  they  have  democratic regimes; 
and, as we know, at the moment three or four are not so qualified. 
So we may perhaps assume that for practical purposes, and indeed 
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constructed  out  of  the  expanded  Community  of  the  Ten,  or 
perhaps of the Eleven, in various kinds of association with ten or 
eleven other European States. 
With the European States  to  the East-which, of course, do 
not include Russia, in spite of some people saying that they do-
the relations of the new  "Europe" will,  we  hope, be increasingly 
good;  I  think  they  probably  will  be  good.  But  it  cannot  be 
denied that the new Europe, if it comes into being, will have been 
formed  in  spite  of  all  the  efforts  of  the  Soviet  Government  to 
prevent its  formation  and that consequently,  for  a  time  at least, 
it will  be  unlikely  that any  kind  of  integration  with  the  States 
of Eastern  Europe will  be  possible,  or even  any  real  economic, 
not to  speak of course of any political,  association. 
Unless we contemplate the disappearance or grave weakening 
of the  Western Alliance,  this picture,  therefore, realistically con-
sidered, is  the position which we have to contemplate by, say, the 
end  of  the  present  decade-by about  1980.  In other  words,  it 
will come down to an inner "core" of eleven or twelve States, all 
increasingly integrated economically, and it is  to  be hoped politi-
cally,  and  what  one  might  call  an  outer  "rind"  of  nine  or  ten 
States in some kind of special relationship with it. 
With  this  in  mind,  how  should  we  then  best  proceed  to 
organise our extended Community?  Clearly, we  shall not be able 
to organise it at all as  a thing in itself, as opposed to  an alliance, 
or even as a confederation of totally independent sovereign States, 
unless we  all  agree on at least some limitation on our individual 
freedom of action. 
If the recent apparent agreement between the Prime Minister 
of  Britain,  Mr.  Edward  Heath,  and  the  President  of  France, 
Mr.  Pompidou,  is  to  be  taken  literally-! repeat,  if  it is  to  be 
taken  literally-the  prospects  of  such  agreement  are,  at  the 
moment,  dim.  For if  France  and  Britain  announce  in advance 
that the enlarged Community will,  in  the  last resort, rest on the 
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voting, with little or no emphasis on the role of the Commission 
and hardly  any mention  of increased powers  for  the  Parliament 
of  Europe, it is  evident  that no  progress  can  be  made  towards 
an economic, to say nothing of a monetary, union. 
But, Mr. Chairman, it is also evident that the simple extension 
of  the  European  Economic  Community  from  six  to  ten  and 
eventually,  no  doubt,  to  more  States,  will  in itself  oblige  Mem-
bers,  if  only  to  avoid  constant  and  recurring  crises,  with  an 
imminent  danger  of  a  collapse  of  the  whole  machine,  to  adopt 
techniques  transcending  the  unanimity  rule  even  on  decisions 
affecting  so-called  "vital  interests",  and,  indeed,  to  increase  the 
power of the European Parliament which at that point, of course, 
will obviously have to be directly elected.  It would be simple to 
effect such a reform as  this.  All that would be necessary would 
be  a  declaration  by  some  future  governments  in  Britain  and 
France that they had actually decided to abide by the terms of the 
Treaty  which  both  had  signed  and  which  henceforward  they 
intended to respect! 
There  will  be  new  elections  in France  and Britain  in  1973 
and  1974-probably in 1974  in Britain-and we  must hope  and 
believe that by that time experience in working an enlarged Com-
munity will  have resulted in  a  determination  to  take  the  plunge 
and to  establish some  genuine  authority,  even  if only  in certain 
narrowly delimited spheres.  And perhaps it may be said that in 
the  absence  of  such  a  decision  it will  not  be  possible  to  make 
much progress,  or indeed  any  progress,  in the  campaign  against 
pollution, or in favour of "participation", or indeed, in any direc-
tion  likely  to  enlist  the  sympathies  of  the  young  generation  to 
which  Mr.  Frydenlund  in  his  report  so  rightly  pays  such  great 
attention. 
There  remain  foreign  policy  and  defence.  Here  we  must 
surely all admit that, unless an extended Community can shortly 
devise  new  means  of  steamlining  its  various  national  policies, 
it may well  be  in grave danger in the  years  immediately ahead. 
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Americans should indeed withdraw the bulk of their Forces from 
Europe, the Soviet Union, pursuing disruptive tactics, playing off 
one Member of the  Community against  another,  is  likely,  I  am 
afraid, to have the ball at its  feet-unless,  that is,  the  extended 
Community can rationalise  and standardise its  forces  and invent 
the right means of co-ordinating its foreign policy as well.  There 
is no time now to elaborate on how this can be done, but I should 
hope  that there  would  be not too  great opposition in this  Joint 
Meeting  of  our  two  Assemblies  to  some  general  conception 
whereby an extended Western European Union should become, as 
it were,  the political and defence wing  of an extended European 
Economic Community-the membership after all being the same 
-and that the Assembly of Western European Union should even-
tually  be  merged  with  the  Parliament  of  Europe,  and  that  an 
independent Political Commission should be established to assist 
the  Ministers  in  the  whole  field  of foreign  policy  and  defence. 
These are not even "supranational" proposals-none of the things 
I  mentioned is  supranational at all-and we can surely hope that 
they  will  at least be  seriously  considered  when  and if  the  main 
decisions are taken as regards the enlargement of the Communities. 
In  the  meantime  I  am  sure  that  all  members,  or  potential 
members, of what will probably in some eighteen months' time be 
a  European  Parliament  of  ten  or  eleven  nations,  will  make  it 
absolutely  clear  in their  own  national  parliaments  that  only  an 
adherence  to  the  sense  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome  will  enable  an 
enlarged Community to  develop  as  a  Community or,  indeed,  to 
function at all in the years to come.  (Applause.) 
The Chairman (F). - I call Mr. Scelba. 
Mr.  Scelba  (/).  - Mr.  Chairman,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen, 
I  think  enlargement  would  lose  much  of  its  force  if ·the  Com-
munity were  to remain too rigid on matters now within its  pro-
vince.  This might lead to an increase in existing difficulties and a 
failure to settle the major problems still outstanding. 
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We  who  for  years  have  supported  the  enlargement  of  the 
Community,  and  especially  the  entry  of  the  United  Kingdom, 
have  always  held that British membership should give  the Com-
munity  the  strength  or  the  added  strength  it  needs  for  more 
resolutely  political  progress. 
At  the  Conference  in  The  Hague,  which  gave  new  vigour 
to Community policy, Heads of States and Governments reaffirm-
ed  their  faith  in  the  political  aims  of  the  Community,  their 
determination  to  complete  the  process  under  way,  and  their 
confidence  in its  ultimate success. 
The  whole  significance  of  the  European  Community  lies 
in  its  political  aims;  this  is  not only  stated  in  the  Treaties  of 
Rome but was solemnly declared at the Conference in The Hague, 
which  was  proposed  by  the  President  of  the  French  Republic. 
The  Conference  declared  that  the  progress  made  in  the  Com-
munity was  irreversible  in  view  of its  achievements  so  far,  and 
continued  that  to  declare  the  process  irreversible  meant  paving 
the way  for  a  united  Europe  capable  of  shouldering  its  respon-
sibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a  contribution 
commensurate with its traditions.  Ladies and Gentlemen, it is the 
purpose of the report now under discussion to clarify this function. 
When  we  speak  of  the  function  of  an enlarged  Community  we 
are not thinking of its economic relations with Finland or Sweden 
or  with  Greece  and  other  countries.  As  President  Pompidou 
has  said,  a  solution  to  these  technical  problems  will  always  be 
found,  given the will  to  do  so.  If we  wish  to  contribute to the 
further development of Community policy, we  shall have to speak 
of the  political function  of  the  Community in the  world,  as  was 
demonstrated  at  The  Hague.  The  enlargement  of  the  Com-
munity gives us  just this opportunity.  The enlarged Community, 
by its population, economic resources,  the scale of its  trade, and 
its cultural and political traditions, is  a super-power easily able to 
take its  pl~ce side by side with the two existing super-powers, the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union.  But  the  giant  will  have 
little weight if it cannot lend its  economic strength to  the  service 
of  peace  and  freedom,  which  are  the  aims  of  the  Treaties  of 
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In  order  to  encourage  our  leaders  to  carry  on  the  policy 
of The Hague, we  must seek out the reasons, which, with enlarg-
ement,  justify  political  unity.  We  do  not know  when  political 
unity  will  be  achieved  and we  therefore  do  not know  what the 
world  situation  will  be  at that  time.  I  shall  speak  of  political 
unity as if the process were set in motion today, and shall describe 
what Europe's role  would be at this  juncture.  The French Pre-
sident has said that Europe must be given a single voice.  This is 
not  just  a  need  for  1980,  1990  or  the  year  2000;  it is  a  need 
today. 
Of course,  if  we  wish  to give  the  Community a  function,  if 
we wish the Community to have a foreign  policy-because this is 
what  is  involved-we  cannot  leave  the  world  situation  out  of 
account.  The European Community was not born on virgin land 
and the  States  which  make it up are not devoid  of all  ties  and 
traditions.  The  situation  today  is  dominated  by  the  fact  that 
world events are decided more or less exclusively by the two super-
powers:  the United States and the Soviet Union.  The European 
member States of the Community, which although Members of the 
Community have conducted independent and sometimes divergent 
and even contradictory foreign policies, have virtually no influence 
on world affairs.  Some States have conducted a pro-Soviet policy, 
and this  has  not prevented  the  Soviet Union from  strengthening 
its grip on the heart of Europe.  Others have conducted pro-Arab 
or pro-Israeli policies, and this has not prevented the Soviet Union 
from  strengthening its  own position in the  Mediterranean  to  the 
detriment of the member States of the Community that border on 
the  Mediterranean  and which,  more than  any  other party,  have 
an interest in the Mediterranean situation. 
To be true  to  the  world situation, it must be said  that it is 
not  only  imperialist  interests  that  are  at  stake  in  the  conflict 
between  the  United  States  of  America  and  the  Soviet  Union. 
There  is  also  a  conflict  of  ideologies  in ·the  face  of  which  the 
European Community cannot remain indifferent or neutral,  since 
it cannot remain indifferent or neutral when  confronted with the 
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We  understand that communism is  not merely a  system  for 
the  Soviet  Union  but  is  also  for  export,  serving  to  impose  a 
neo-colonialist regime on countries with a long history of civilisa-
tion  in the  heart of  Europe to  weaken  the democratic States, or 
to extend the influence of the Soviet Union throughout the world. 
Nor can we  overlook the fact that without the United States' 
nuclear umbrella, the Soviet Union would not even have to make 
a  military excursion  in order to  subjugate the  States  of Europe; 
the mere threat of force would be enough. 
This  is  the  world  situation  which  cannot  be  overlooked  if 
we  are  to  steer clear of unrealistic  political  attitudes.  I  believe, 
however, that in spite of this  situation it is  possible for the Com-
munity to  pursue  an independent policy of its  own,  not directed 
against  anyone  else,  and  aiming  at  the  consolidation  of  world 
peace and freedom. 
The strength of a State consists merely of the material means 
at its  disposal.  A  European Community  of Ten would  have  a 
vast  potential  strength.  Especially  by the force  of  its  example. 
It can  indeed  serve  as  an  example  if  ten  States,  including  the 
major  democratic  States  of  Europe,  which  alone  have  shaped 
the history of the world in the past and which over the centuries 
have fought  against each other in cruel struggles  and wars,  have 
decided to live  together in a Community and to act as  one,  thus 
eradicating  any  possibility  of  conflicts  between  them,  such  as 
have occurred in  the past. 
This is  a feat which cannot fail  to  have repercussions in the 
world at large;  it is  an extraordinary feat for ten nations to unite 
in  the  conquest  of  peace.  Another  feat  which  cannot  fail  to 
have repercussions is the building of a Community by the peoples' 
own free  will;  this is  the difference between the European Com-
munity and the communist community, in which a  leading party 
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The  European  Community  by  its  very  raison  d'  etre  and 
make-up  cannot  conduct  a  policy  of  imperialism.  Since  it has 
no  military  force  comparable  to  that  of  other  States,  it  has  a 
direct  interest  in  a  policy  of  total  disarmament;  its  position 
is  thus  that  of  a  peaceful,  anti-imperialist  super-power  urging 
disarmament and a policy harnessing the resources now spent on 
arms  for  the  benefit  of  the  under-developed  peoples.  With  a 
policy like this, the Community can wield immense moral author-
ity in  the world and can bring in its  wake  all  nations interested 
in a policy of peace and progress. 
There  are  a  number  of  explosive  situations  in  the  world 
today.  What form could an independent policy by the European 
Community take  on the  world's  most  serious  current problems? 
To the forefront among these problems I would put disarmament. 
I  do  not  think  that  the  European  Community  should  follow  a 
policy  of  re-armament in  the  sense  of  arming  to  compete  with 
the two other super-powers.  I therefore view the idea of creating 
a  Franco-British  nuclear  pool  within  the Community with  some 
mistrust.  Indeed,  I  would  regard  it  as  dangerous  for  the 
Community. 
The  European  Community  should  ask  the  nuclear  powers 
to disarm.  The European Parliament agreed to  the Non-Prolife-
ration  Treaty  just because  it was  presented  as  a  preliminary  to 
nuclear disarmament by these States.  This is  why I  confess that 
when I hear talk of a Franco-British nuclear pool I am perplexed, 
because this wou~d also put the other countries of the Community 
at a  disadvantage. 
The second theme  of  Community policy  should be develop-
ment.  The European Community, with the means at its disposal, 
is  in  a  position  to  take  the  lead.  By  achieving  disarmament it 
could  increase  the  means  available  for  a  development policy  to 
benefit all countries.  We know that countries that have emerged 
from  the  ruins  of colonial  empires  are  more  interested  in nego-
tiating  with  the Community than with  the  ex-colonialist  powers, 
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States of Latin America are more  interested~they are continually 
making approaches-in negotiating with  the  Community than in 
negotiating with  the  United States  of America. 
The  European Community  can thus  conduct  a  great,  inde-
pendent policy for  the benefit of these States, to commit them to 
the struggle for peace and democracy. 
What  has  been  achieved  by  the  policy  of  member  States 
in  the  Mediterranean?  The  strengthening  of  the  Soviet  Union 
in  the  Mediterranean.  What  could  a  European  Community 
achieve in this area?  Ladies and Gentlemen, the European Com-
munity considered  as  a  whole,  like  Egypt and Israel,  hinges  on 
the  Mediterranean.  The  European  Community  has  the  utmost 
interest  in  peace  in  the  Mediterranean.  It  has  no  military 
stake in either Egypt or Israel, and has an interest in seeing that 
no outside  power intervenes  with a  policy  aimed  at limiting  the 
independence and freedom  of decision of the States bordering on 
the  Mediterranean.  I  can  perfectly  well  understand  why  Israel 
and  Egypt  refuse  to  have  Soviet  or  United  States  troops,  for 
different and opposite reasons, but there are grounds for thinking 
that  a  European  Community  intervening  to  guarantee  peace 
between  the  two  nations  would  be in a  different  position.  This 
is  a case in which the European Community really could conduct 
an independent policy directed  against nobody;  it would not be 
contrary to  the Soviet Union, unless  the  USSR  is  conducting  an 
imperialist  policy,  nor  to  the  United  States  of  America.  But 
political tools are needed for such a policy. 
Who  is  to  conduct  this  policy?  The  present  Community 
with  the  means  at  its  disposal  today?  No.  If  we  wish  the 
Community to  have  a  function  and if the Community wishes  to 
play a  part  in  world  events,  its  institutional structures  must  be 
geared to  the function it is  to  perform. 
President  Pompidou  has  recognised  that  the  Community 
needs  a  government,  and  has  rightly  said  that  a  government 
cannot function as  such unless its decisions can be made binding 
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The  only  difference  between  us,  perhaps,  is  that  President 
Pompidou envisages  this  for  his  grandchildren while  we  think it 
must be done today. 
We have had a meeting between Mr. Heath and Mr. Pompi-
dou in Paris-,  and the British Representative who spoke before me 
confirmed  the  rather  pessimistic  interpretation  that  has  been 
made  where  institutions  are  concerned.  Otherwise,  the  meeting 
was  encouraging.  The  French  President  and  the  British  Prime 
Minister  stated  that  their  views  on  institutional  problems  were 
identical.  I  do not know Mr.  Heath's views  on this  subject, but 
I  do  know  those  of  President  Pompidou;  it  would  thus  be 
interesting to know whether the President of the French Republic 
was converted to Mr. Heath's views or vice versa. 
There are grounds for  concern, and we  must hope that this 
aspect,  so  vital  to  the  Community's  development,  will  soon  be 
cleared  up.  Political  progress  can  never  be  achieved  unless  the 
European Community has a political will and institutions capable 
of expressing it. 
There has been a great deal of discussion about whether thh 
political  will  should  be  expressed  unanimously  or  by  majority 
voting.  I  have already said elsewhere  that this issue has, to my 
mind,  been over-estimated.  It is  obvious  that in principle  deci-
sions  should  be made by a  majority,  but we  know  that it is  a 
very  different  matter  in practice.  Today's  problem  is  not  how 
Community  decisions  are  to  be  taken,  but  whether  decisions 
are to  be taken at Community level  at all. 
An  example  will  make  this  clearer:  the  member  States 
of the Community conduct independent foreign  policies, conclud-
ing bilateral agreements.  It is in the Community's interest that the 
policy  of bilateral agreements  should cease.  If we  wish  Europe 
to  have  a  voice,  States  must  give  up  the  practice  of  signing 
bilateral agreements, and the European Community alone should 
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Once this  principle has  been established, I  believe  a  consid-
erable  step  forward  will  have  been  achieved.  The  matter  of 
whether the Commp.nity's international policy is  to be established 
unanimously  or  by  majority  vote  is,  at  the  present  stage,  of 
secondary importance.  Some  say the unanimity principle  would 
block  any  political  activity  by  the Community,  but  this  is  not 
true.  Even  after  the  Luxembourg  agreement,  when  it was  laid 
down that decisions must be  made unanimously, the Community 
progressed, because the  political  will  to progress  was  present on 
all sides.  When there is such a will, we will always achieve those 
compromise solutions that are the very essence of democracy. 
It is  impossible to believe that France, the United Kingdom, 
Germany and Italy would instantly  entrust  decisions  on  matters 
of vital interest to an unpredictable majority on some Community 
body.  Indeed, it is my personal feeling that such decisions would 
be  unjustified,  because  they  would  be  to  the  detriment  of  the 
whole Community. 
This  is  why  I  feel  that  the  unanimity  issue  should  not  be 
over-estimated  today;  what  seems  to  me  of  major  importance 
is  to  extend the  Community's  authority to all  those matters  that 
would give it a  political spirit, i.e.  to foreign  policy and defence. 
As  regards  defence  policy,  I  think  we  could  begin  with  a 
very  simple  matter by bringing  under the European Community 
everything  that  is  now  within  the  province  of  WEU.  Indeed, 
we should in general bring within the framework of the European 
Community all  subjects  now  within  the  province  of intergovern-
mental organisations.  Up to  now  WEU has  performed a  useful 
function  because  Britain  was  not  a  Member  of  the  European 
Community,  and  WEU  was  where  Europe's  military  problems 
were  discussed.  But  as  soon  as  Britain  joins  the  European 
Community, what possible justification  can there  be for  keeping 
up this organisation outside the  Community? 
But if we  really want to  progress,  we  must  try  to  translate 
into practice the decisions  taken at The Hague and to  give  birth 
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Only  then  will  we  have  a  European  Community  with  a 
single  voice.  and  only  then  will  we  have  a  Community  able  to 
perform a useful function in the world.  The voice of ten nations, 
with  all  their  traditions  and  moral  authority.  as  well  as  their 
materiel strength. cannot fail  to have an influence in the world at 
large.  and  we  have  confidence  in  the  European  Community. 
which does  not set out to  destroy our national identities.  When 
I  hear that with the unanimity rule the identity of our countries 
would  be  wiped  out.  I  do  not  think  much  of  the  arguments 
advanced by our opponents.  We do not believe that the identities 
of the nations of Europe are placed in jeopardy by a Community 
policy.  Quite  the  reverse; we  feel  that  these  national  identities 
will  be  enhanced  within  the  Community,  because,  through  the 
European Community, they can achieve what they can no longer 
do alone, and can once again make the weight of their strength and 
their traditions felt in world affairs.  (Applause.) 
The Chairman (F).  - I call Mr. Bjork. 
Mr.  Bjork. - I  believe  we  all  have  reason  to  welcome  the 
recent signs of progress towards a solution of problems connected 
with European economic integration.  A  major setback for these 
efforts  towards  integration  cannot  possibly  be  in  the  long-term 
interest of any member State of the Council of Europe.  Looking 
backwards  it might,  of course,  have  been  possible  to  find  some 
other framework for  closer co-operation and integration than the 
Treaty of Rome.  Some of the ideas underlying that Treaty have 
become less relevant than they were in 1957.  However that may 
be, we have to accept that further economic integration in Western 
Europe will in all probability be based on the Rome Treaty. 
In  this  connection  the  role  and the  position  of  the  neutral 
States become of particular significance.  Several references  have 
already been made to  this  problem in  the  discussion  and in the 
reports submitted to us.  I refer to the statement by Mr. Fryden-
lund that it should be possible to envisage a differentiated system 
of European integration which would enable neutrals to  take part 
in the economic unification, integrated as their economies already 
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implications.  I also take note of a comment by Mr. de la Malene 
that the  neutrals  fulfil  an original  function in that they  act  as  a 
connecting link between Eastern and Western Europe. 
Mr.  Darling  has  made  some  very  positive  and  encouraging 
statements  about  the  neutral  EFT  A  countries  and  the  need  to 
reach a reasonable agreement with them;  but he adds some ideas 
which may be worth further comment.  He says in paragraph 11 
of his original report: 
"Looking further ahead,  beyond the transitional  period, 
however,  one  may  justifiably  wonder  whether  the  EFT  A 
neutrals will continue to reject full membership of an enlarged 
Community.  As  the Communities  are enlarged and as  they 
progress  towards  an ever  more  all-embracing  economic and 
monetary  union,  their  influence  on  the  economies  of  the 
remaining  European  non-member  countries  will  inevitably 
become  increasingly  strong,  to  the  point  of  becoming 
overwhelming." 
He goes on to say this pressure may become so strong that the 
neutrals  will  be  able  to  maintain  their  economic  sovereignty  in 
name  only  and consequently  may one  day find  that they would 
be  better  served  if  they  were  full  Members  of  the  Community 
with a say in the decision-making processes. 
This reasoning, first of all, seems to be based on the assump-
tion that all the present Members of the Communities would wel-
come  the  full  membership  of  the  neutral  States.  This  is  .  an 
assumption that can hardly be accepted, especially after some of 
the interventions we  have heard in this debate.  It is an historical 
fact that EEC was  never meant for neutral countries.  From the 
outset its rather far-reaching political aims  were strongly stressed 
and those political aims were re-asserted in the Hague Communi-
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Even  though  the  plans  for  a  systematic  co-ordination  of 
foreign policies of member countries so far are not very ambitious, 
the  aim is  very  clear indeed and is  hardly  compatible  with the 
endeavours of neutral States  to  serve  as  a  link between Eastern 
and  Western  Europe and to  avoid aligning  themselves  with any 
particular power bloc.  All Members of an enlarged Community 
may not like to look upon themselves  as  a power bloc, but there 
seem to be considerable ambitions in that direction.  So  the prob-
lem of neutrals as  Members of the Communities is  a  problem of 
credibility.  If the neutrals  are believed to  be useful in relations 
between  East  and  West,  then  inevitably  they  have  to  keep  a 
certain distance even vis-a-vis States with which they share a com-
mon democratic ideology.  We are all well aware that such terms 
as neutral, neutrality, neutralism and neutralisation are sometimes 
used in  a  somewhat loose  manner,  but if we  mean by  a  neutral 
State a State which aims at neutrality in wartime-and that is the 
case  for  Sweden,  Switzerland  and Austria-then  such  a  policy 
implies certain obligations in peacetime.  Those obligations have 
already been defined by Sweden, Switzerland and Austria in con-
nection  with  the  first  round  of negotiations  in  the  early  sixties, 
and, together with the consequent reservations, are still valid. 
Mr. Darling makes the interesting point that in the long run 
the economic sovereignty of the neutrals may well be undermined. 
I should like to avoid a possible misunderstanding that the neutral 
States  of  Western  Europe  are  aiming  at some  sort of economic 
self -sufficiency  or  economic  isolationism.  That  certainly  is  not 
the case.  At least as  far as  Sweden is  concerned, we  have for  a 
long time aimed at a very open economic policy and at developing 
economic  relations  with  the  rest  of  the  world.  We  are  fully 
aware of the growing interdependence between industrial nations. 
This  interdependence  has  increased  all  through  the  post-war 
period  and  it  will  in  all  probability  become  even  stronger  in 
connection  with an  enlargement of the Communities.  It has  to 
be added that some of the aims of, for instance, the Werner Plan, 
or the plans for an economic and monetary union, are fully  com-
patible  and  even  identical  with  some  of  the  aims  pursued  by 
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with a  policy of neutrality.  As  Lord Gladwyn 4as  quite  rightly 
pointed  out, if  Sweden  were  to  join  a  monetary union it would 
then have to give up its policy of neutrality.  But growing econo-
mic  interdependence  may  have  varying  consequences  both  for 
neutrals and non-neutrals, and what Mr. Darling is  referring to is 
really  developments  in  a  very  long  perspective.  In  actual 
fact,  we  know  very  little  about  the  future.  We  do  not 
know how  the  enlarged  Communities  will  function.  We  do  not 
know whether  the  economic  and monetary union  will  become  a 
reality.  We do not know whether in the distant future there will 
be need for a revision of the Rome Treaty.  We do not know for 
certain what will  be the future links between political integration 
and co-ordination on the  one  hand and economic integration  on 
the other, and we  certainly do  not know at all  what will  be  the 
general  political picture of Europe in  the  next few  decades.  So 
there  is  ample  room  for  speculation  about  how  the  future  will 
influence the policies and the position of particular countries. 
But the  problem for  the  neutrals  today is  that they  have  to 
take a stand on the basis of present-day realities and on the basis 
of the ambitions and the declared aims of the Communities as they 
are  today.  Sweden,  Switzerland  and  Austria  have  come  to  the 
conclusion that, under the conditions as  we  now know them, full 
membership cannot be considered.  In the case of Sweden this is a 
conclusion supported by an overwhelming majority in the Swedish 
Parliament. 
Mr. Darling also pointed out that the neutrals may well have 
an interest in  taking  part in the  decision-making  process,  and I 
certainly would not deny that Sweden at least would like to  take 
part in  a  decision-making  process  in connection with  a  possible 
customs union with the Common Market.  At any rate, the prob-
lem of participation may well be raised later on for all the neutrals 
and it may become of interest not only for  the  neutrals  but also 
for the Members of an enlarged Community.  But it seems to me 
that it cannot be taken for granted that participation in decision-
making must necessarily be connected with full membership under 
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Of  course,  the  problem  of  decision-making  is  much  more 
far-reaching than the problem of neutral participation.  We have 
a much more general question as to the extent to which decisions 
taken within an enlarged Community will have the support and the 
understanding of the peoples concerned, and it seems  to me that 
this is one of the problems of the future which must be much more 
seriously  considered.  Really  fruitful  and  lasting  co-operation 
between the peoples of Europe cannot possibly be imposed from 
above by anonymous forces.  We know in the national context how 
important  it is  today  to reach  an  increasing  degree  of  popular 
participation in  the  decision-making  processes.  This is  true  for 
each of our nations.  It must also be true for Western Europe as a 
whole.  Only  with  the  full  consent  and  understanding  of  the 
peoples of Europe shall we be able to build the solid foundations 
for strong, flexible and open European society.  (Applause.) 
The Chairman (F). - I call Mr. Nessler. 
Mr.  Nessler  (F).  - Mr.  Chairman,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen, 
this is  very probably the last time that the Joint Meeting will  sit 
with its present membership.  The Council of Europe now repre-
sents  seventeen nations, and the  European Parliament represents 
six.  I am convinced that at our next meeting, which will be held 
during the coming year, the Community will number ten Members, 
which  will  in  certain  respects  upset  a  long-established  balance 
and  to  some  extent  leave  outside  this  large  Community  those 
democratic  States  which  have  customarily  co-operated  with  us 
within the Council of Europe. 
What  will  this  new  Europe  of  the  Ten,  of  the  European 
Economic Community,  of the  Common Market,  be?  I  have  no 
wish  to  interpret  intentions  or make prophecies,  nor  do  I  wish 
to  be rhetorical  when  I  say  that the  debate  on  supranationality 
is  now  largely  over.  Why is  this?  Because,  with  the  entry  of 
Great  Britain-which,  like  France,  is  an  old  country  that  has 
been  centralised and unified for  a  thousand years,  since  the  first 
Plantagenets  and  the  first  Tudors,  facing  two  countries  such  as 
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part in their history (I hope you will  excuse me for not mention-
ing the smaller countries,  highly civilised  though they are  )-it is 
certain  that  institutional  and  political  prospects  will  in  future 
tend towards harmonisation and-to use a well-established, though 
to  some extent improper expression-towards a  confederation  of 
constituted nations. 
This  being  so,  the  debates  which  have  taken  place  in  this 
Chamber over the years will undoubtedly take a  different course, 
and certain formal disputes which have been described as  theolo-
gical will in future be quite unnecessary. 
The  positive,  concrete  achievement  for  which  we  shall  in 
future  pool our efforts  is  the  Common Market whose aspiration, 
not  to  say  ambition,  is  to  become  the  third economic  power in 
the world.  I  say "third" because there  are  two  others,  and not 
to suggest any relative importance! 
This  state  of  affairs  gives  rise  to  a  number of  observations 
to which I should like to draw your attention. 
If this  Community is  to  expand and grow wealthy by virtue 
of a  positive  balance  of payments  and  a  positive  trade  balance, 
what is  to happen to that wealth?  The problem arises in respect 
of each of our countries and of the Community as a whole. 
On  the  one  hand,  we  can  choose  a  very  high,  "Japanese-
style", growth rate-or "Russian-style",  one  might say,  thinking 
back  to  the  time  of  the  first  five-year  plan.  Everything  earned 
would then be re-invested either in industry or in agriculture,  so 
that  in  effect  the  present  generation  will  be  working  for  the 
generations  to  come. 
No country in Europe has so far opted for such an approach. 
A  second  possibility  would  be  a  parallel  and  sizeable  rise 
in wages and salaries, in other words a rise in the general standard 
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purpose.  But economists  will  tell  you  that if Europe consumes 
everything it produces, because of the opportunities for consump-
tion which it makes available to its peoples, the growth rate will 
be affected. 
A  third approach would  be  to  improve  communal  facilities 
-bridges, motorways,  hospitals  and schools.  These  are  invest-
ments  which  affect  neither  the  growth  rate  nor  the  standard  of 
living. 
Finally-and this  must be referred to, after all-there is  the 
question of solidarity with those who have been described as  the 
victims  of  progress, by which I  mean  the  old,  the  disabled,  and 
the defenceless young. 
I  have  indulged  in  this  brief  analytical  survey  because, 
while the Common Market and the Communities are endeavouring 
to  solve  a  number  of  institutional  problems  and  problems  of 
competition, the harmonisation of growth rates, as  of wealth and 
its  distribution,  has  never  really been  studied in depth from  this 
point  of  view.  Each  State  in  the  Community,  be  there  six  of 
them today or ten  tomorrow, has  its own idea of economic pro-
gress.  The least one can say is that their ideas are not in harmony 
at the present time. 
There  remains  the  final  problem,  the  one  with  which  we 
deal in the Council of Europe more than any other:  that of  the 
political philosophy and political institutions. 
This topic was discussed at great length by an earlier speaker, 
but I  should like to present a number of objections which are of 
current concern. 
We  are  soon to  be joined in the  European Economic Com-
munity  by  our  friends  from  Great  Britain,  a  country  which 
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On the one hand, both of them are countries which in recent 
times-!  am  not  going  back  as  far  as  the  Middle  Ages-have 
played an international part by reason of the way in which they 
have evolved and progressed and, let it be said quite frankly,  by 
reason  of their colonial  past. 
Because of this international role which history has confirmed, 
both countries  are  permanent members  of  the  Security  Council, 
in  the same  way  as  the  two  super-powers,  although it might  be 
argued  that  their  economy,  their  population and  their  size  give 
them  no right  to  that privileged  position.  But it is  a  fact,  and 
neither  Great  Britain  nor  France  would  willingly  relinquish  it. 
When I say this, I am not being cynical but frank;  and the situa-
tion is  not going  to  change in the decade  to  come. 
Furthermore, as another speaker has already mentioned, these 
are  two  countries  with  a  nuclear  potential,  and  for  reasons 
connected with diplomacy,  international  treaties  and the interna-
tional  environment,  the  only  two  European  nations  who  have 
this  nuclear capability are  not yet  prepared to  renounce  it.  We 
must,  therefore,  eliminate  the  things  which  might  divide  us  and 
turn  our  efforts  to  what can  be  achieved  in  the  economic  and 
social fields, and possibly in the legal field  too-in tax, legislation 
and solidarity. 
This brings me to my final  comments, Mr. Chairman, on the 
matter  of  the  European  institutions.  There  is  a  risk  of  some 
confusion.  People  talk  about a  parliament elected  by universal 
suffrage.  But what parliament do they mean?  The parliament of 
the Six?  Of the Ten or of the Eighteen?  And anyway, are not all 
of us  here  elected  by universal  suffrage?  It is  true that we  are 
appointed at one remove, in the same way as  the French Senate, 
but there  can  be  no  denying  that we  are  the  representatives  of 
parliamentary assemblies  all  of which are elected democratically. 
If  we are to move towards the election of a parliamentary assembly 
by universal  suffrage,  in  what  way  will  it  be  elected?  Would 
the elections take place within the framework of individualStates, 
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Or in the framework of Europe as  a whole?  In that case, would 
there  be  proportional  representation  or  majority  ballots?  Will 
there  be Conservative, Christian-Democrat, Socialist and Gaullist 
parties  for  the  whole  of Europe?  I  find  it difficult  to  envisage 
what the practical  arrangements might be in such circumstances. 
There  are  a  certain  number  of  myths  which  we  are  happy  to 
cherish;  it is all very charming in theory, but in practice, I believe, 
we  shall  have  to  give  up  a  number  of  ideas  which  are  less 
inspired than they appear. 
More  important,  in  view  of  the  existence  of  the  European 
institutions-the  Council  of  Europe,  which  is  the  oldest,  the 
European Parliament and Western European Union- is  that now 
that  the  Community  is  to  be  enlarged  and  strengthened,  the 
powers,  jurisdiction  and  fields  of  competence  of  each  of  these 
institutions should be defined. 
It is  essential  that we  all  take the  opportunity at this  Joint 
Meeting  to  reflect  on  these  problems,  free  from  any  spirit  of 
rivalry  or competition. 
That is  my assessment of the situation, which I  offer for  the 
consideration of our friends  in the European Parliament and my 
own colleagues in the Council of Europe.  (Applause.) 
The Chairman (F).- I  call Mr. Judd. 
Mr. Judd.  - Mr.  Chairman  and  colleagues,  first  I  should 
like  to  join with  those  who  have  expressed  real  appreciation  to 
the  authors  of  the  reports  which  we  have  been  able  to  study 
during this  discussion  and for  the very  thoughtful  way in which 
each of them introduced his written remarks to the Assembly. 
It is  sometimes  suggested,  I  believe  in ignorance,  that  the 
only basis for  the widespread-and it is  widespread-reservation 
in Britain about possible entry to  the  European Economic Com-
munity  is  insularity,  narrow-mindedness  and  short-sightedness. 
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tions  such  as  genuine  anxiety  about  the  price  of  entry  to  the 
Community and its impact on our balance of payments, particu-
larly  in  the  light  of  the  tremendous  achievement  of the  British 
people  rather  than  any  particular  government  in  having  trans-
formed  in  the  last  seven  years  a  record  deficit  into  a  record 
surplus,  and while  of course  there  are  real  anxieties  about how 
a right-of-centre Conservative administration in Britain will intro-
duce  appropriate social policies  to protect the elderly, the unem-
ployed,  the  sick  and  those  in  a  less  strong  bargaining  position 
from the immediate economic consequences of entry-while there 
are anxieties on these domestic issues, there are profound reserva-
tions  of  much  greater  significance  which  I  believe  we  ought 
honestly to examine together in this  Assembly.  I  do not believe 
that any service to the future of EEC will be rendered by pretend-
ing that these more significant reservations do not in fact exist. 
The  first  concerns  the  prospects  for  the  very  survival  of 
Western civilisation and Western democracy.  Thoughtful people 
in Britain argue increasingly that we ought to look at the evidence 
of the fate of earlier civilisations in the history of the human race. 
because one thing all  earlier civilisations have had in common is 
their eventual collapse.  If we  are to avoid the fate of our prede-
cessors, it is  at least incumbent upon us  to look at some of  the 
causes  of  their  downfall.  Amongst  thoughtful  people  in  my 
country-and I  am  sure  this  goes  for  other countries  in Europe 
equa~ly-there  is the recognition that one cause of downfall in the 
past  has  been  an  over-centralisation,  a  top-heavy  bureaucratic 
administration  which  ceased  to  have  any  viable  basis  in  the 
society as a whole to which it was theoretically accountable or for 
which  it  was  theoretically  responsible.  This  is  seen  as  perhaps 
the  most  important  paradox  of  the  age  in  which  we  are  now 
living:  on  the  one  hand,  the  immense  unrivalled  theory at our 
disposal for centralised management and control, but, on the other 
hand,  the  inescapable  truth  that  with  the  development  of  this 
complex organisation the system has become more not less vulner-
able to  complete  disruption. 
Therefore, as several people have already argued in the debate, 
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weekends and conferences  possible alternative ways  of organising 
our society,  we  now  have to recognise  that without decentralisa-
tion, without devolution, without far more widespread involvement 
of a representative cross-section of the people in direct control of 
their affairs  wherever they may be, we  may in fact  be unable to 
avoid the same devastating end which has confronted every other 
previous civilisation. 
What  people  then  go  on  to  ask  is,  is  it  really  possible  to 
generate political momentum at one and the same time in support 
of still more centralised control, remote bureaucratic management 
based in Brussels, and also in favour of genuine decentralisation, 
involvement of wider numbers of the people.  Until the European 
Economic  Community  can  present  hard-hitting  and  realistic 
answers  to  this  particular point, I  am sure  that reservations  will 
continue to exist, particularly amongst the younger generation. 
In this  context might I  also refer to  something to  which my 
colleague,  George  Darling,  drew  attention  in  his  interesting 
remarks when introducing his report.  Mr. Darling referred to the 
particular  problem  facing  Britain  in  terms  of  moving  from  the 
tradition  of centuries  of an unwritten  constitution  to  what is  in 
effect a written constitution for an important part of our economic 
and political life. 
Mr. Chairman, might I with your leave relate to the Assembly 
an experience which I  had the other day that brought this  point 
home  to me very clearly.  I  was  speaking to some  students in  a 
sixth form  of a  school  in the  area  of  my  constituency.  At the 
end of this  meeting some of these young people came to me and 
said,  "Mr.  Judd,  we  have  been  studying  constitutional  history. 
We  understand  that  our  particular  constitution  in  Britain  is 
unwritten and is based on consensus evolved over centuries.  Now 
we  are  being  asked,  as  we  understand  it,  by  possible  entry 
to  the  European  Economic  Community,  to  move  in  one 
fell  swoop  from  a  tradition  of  an  unwritten  constitution  to  a 
new concept of a  written constitution.  How can you  justify this 
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I  believe  there  is  an  important point  here.  If the  British 
Government-a British Government of any political persuasion-
were to insist upon entry to  the Community without an adequate 
opportunity for  the people as  a whole in Britain to be consulted, 
this  might  do irreparable damage  to the confidence  amongst the 
British people in the meaning and the significance  of democracy. 
They  would  say:  we  were  asked  to  exercise  our  choice  in  a 
recent general  election  on a  whole  range of issues  which  all  are 
agreed are not as significant as this particular issue, and yet when 
it comes to this issue of far greater meaning and far greater long-
term implications, we are told that this is  something that must be 
decided  by the  experts,  political  leaders,  and  that we  cannot in 
fact be consulted. 
What  is  the  real  substance,  what  is  the  real  character  of 
democracy  in  this  situation?  I  relate  this  particular problem  to 
the Assembly, because I do not think any service will be rendered 
to our cause by sweeping it under the carpet and pretending that 
a reservation of this sort does not in fact exist. 
The  second  reservation  with  which  we  are  confronted,  and 
which I  believe we  must consider, concerns defence.  Our Italian 
colleague, in his  interesting remarks, touched on views  held by a 
great number of people in my own country.  Amongst them there 
is  a  suspicion  of a  tendency  to  emphasise  the  importance  of  a 
closely knit defence system increasingly independent of the United 
States  and  of NATO.  They  ask  how  this  will  really  serve  the 
cause  of collective  defence  and  they  question  whether  fragmen-
tation in the Alliance of this kind might not in fact hamper work 
for detente and disarmament in the international community as a 
whole. 
The third issue, which I  believe  we  have to consider as  one 
of the more serious and profound problems with which the British 
people at this juncture are concerned, is  the issue of the multina-
tional company.  A good deal· has already been said about this in 
the debate so far.  But a number of people in Britain are worried 
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cratic system, as  represented in the growth of multinational com-
panies.  They  see  this  as  nothing  else  but  a  sinister  threat  to 
democracy;  but they also see it as a fairly natural evolution in the 
story of capitalism, and they ask, if the Community has basically 
accepted  the  ethic  of capitalism,  how  will  it be able  to  counter 
this  particular trend.  They ask whether the will  to counter this 
trend is  really  there;  and,  speaking for  Socialists  at least in my 
own country, a  number ofthem ask whether by joining EEC we 
shall forego  our freedom to seek increasingly Socialist answers to 
the challenge of this grotesque development in the form of inter-
national capitalist organisation. 
The  next  problem  which  concerns  many  people  in  Britain, 
and which,  again,  EEC would do  well  to  consider,  is  related to 
the whole concept of internationalism in. the age in which we  are 
now living.  Many people in Britain-and I am sure on the con-
tinent of Europe as  a  whole-accept that since  1945  the  quality 
of  human  existence  has  changed  fundamentally  in  one  respect. 
We now have for  all  time to  live  with our potential ability as  a 
human species to destroy ourselves completely, and in this context 
we therefore have to recognise that political problems and political 
crises, wherever they exist and however remote they may appear to 
be in the world in terms of distance, are very much our problems; 
because in these conflicts and crises are the seeds of the potential 
destruction of Europe itself.  So we feel that if we are to evaluate 
the  relevance  of  EEC at this  juncture we  have  to  ask  how  far 
as  an institution it really  fosters  this  recognition  of wider world 
interdependence. 
There is also, however, concern about the frequently acclaimed 
values  of our  society  and  what  these  values  demand  of  us  in 
terms of the morality of our international action.  When it comes 
to this particular consideration people are rather distressed at the 
absence  of a  forthright  collective  voice  of EEC on some  of  the 
major  problems  facing  humanity  as  of  now.  They  notice,  for 
example,  that,  quite  rightly,  there  was  virtually  unanimous  con-
demnation throughout Western Europe of the rape of Czechoslo-
vakia and of  the  Brezhnev doctrine.  But, they ask, if this  con-76  CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
demnation is to be credible, where is the same outspoken collective 
opposition  in  EEC  to  the  abuse  of  democratic  institutions  in 
Greece and in Portugal? 
If this Community is  to have strength and moral significance 
in the world, it must speak out wherever the principles  which it 
sees at its basis are betrayed or abused.  Looking at issues further 
afield  than  Portugal  and  Greece,  this  particular  section  of  the 
community in my own country-and I  am sure  this  must apply 
elsewhere-asks, for example, where is  the voice of the European 
Economic Community when it comes  to  the struggle for  emanci-
pation waged by the peoples of some countries of Latin America 
or of Africa? 
People ask very  bluntly whether the Community collectively 
is  more concerned with expanding trade and economic co-opera-
tion with the racialist regime  of South Africa,  including a  readi-
ness  to  export  arms  to  strengthen  the  power  of  the  oppressor, 
than  it  is  with  identifying  with  the  majority  of  people  in  that 
country in their fight  for  basic human rights.  People  ask where 
is  the  voice  of EEC in relation  to  the  struggle  of the  liberation 
movements operating in the Portuguese colonies in Africa.  I  am 
only reporting to the Assembly what is  said in my country.  They 
ask:  is  all  the  running  to  be  left  to  the  totalitarian  communist 
powers  who  will  exploit  the  opportunity  possibly  for  the  most 
cynical objectives, to demonstrate themselves as the only true allies 
of the majority in the forces  of progress in this  situation? 
There is one other issue I must mention, because when people 
in my country are trying to evaluate the relevance of EEC to the 
problems  of  the  world  community  as  a  whole,  they  obviously 
look  at  the  overridingly  important  economic  and  social  crises 
confronting mankind as  a whole at present.  Where, for example, 
they will  ask, is  the indication of a  decisive and courageous res-
ponse of EEC collectively to the crisis in Pakistan?  I see that my 
Conservative  colleague,  Dame  Joan  Vickers,  has  sponsored  a 
response  here  in  the  context  of  a  particular  amendment,  and  I 
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conviction  that EEC is  genuinely  concerned about  the  problems 
of the world as  a whole, one would have expected to see  a  more 
obvious response to  a  major crisis of this kind. 
Looking at the broad appeal of the problems of the develop-
ing countries of the world, we  can take just one statistic to illus-
trate what I  am trying to put before the Assembly this afternoon. 
In a recent debate in the Council of Europe we  learned that out-
side  Communist  China  there  are  as  of  now  70  million  people 
totally  unemployed  in  the developing countries.  We can expect 
in the next decade an increase of 25  per cent or some 225  million 
people in the population of working age  of  the developing coun-
tries.  As the International Labour Organisation points out to us 
in the report submitted as a basis for discussion, here at the Coun-
cil  of  Europe in Strasbourg,  we  ignore  at our peril  the  political 
dimensions of this problem as they will affect us here in Europe. 
We must recognise this problem which confronts us, yet when 
we  look at this situation we  see that one of the main foundations 
of the Community is  a common agricultural policy which appears 
to  protect  high-cost  European  agriculture  and  to  subsidise,  to 
some extent, the dumping of surplus agricultural production from 
Europe on world markets at the expense of agricultural and rural 
development in the developing countries, which is the only method 
by which anything can be done in the immediate future to absorb 
more of their presently unemployed manpower. 
One has also to  examine the system of tariffs  which to  some 
extent still seems to penalise the export from the developing coun-
tries  of  agricultural  goods  and  processed  agricultural  goods. 
Against this it is argued that a number of countries in the develop-
ing world formerly  associated with Great Britain are already, of 
their  own  volition,  seeking  associate  status  with  the  Economic 
Community.  But the reply, surely, is  that they have no alterna-
tive.  If the  Community is  to  be  there  they  have  to have  some 
kind of relationship  and must seek  associate  status  because that 
is better than nothing.  But that does not necessarily demonstrate 
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congratulate all the countries of Europe and EEC which have been 
involved in the record levels of technical and capital assistance to 
the developing world, we  must understand, not only in the cause 
of relevant social morality in the world situation but in the cause 
of enlightened self-interest itself,  that we  have to give  far  higher 
consideration  to  economic  justice  for  the  developing  countries, 
which  is  not  just  a  matter  of  channelling  out charity  from  the 
industrialised  wealthy  countries  but reorganising  world  trade  in 
such a way that we can give those countries their legitimate oppor-
tunities without which the future, for them and perhaps for all of 
us, is certainly bleak. 
I have tried in my remarks, most inadequately, to demonstrate 
some of the wider considerations present in some British minds at 
this  juncture as  negotiations  about Britain's entry into the  Com-
mon Market reach their final  stages.  I  really  do  believe  that it 
would be a tremendous step forward if the Economic Community 
could  demonstrate  at  every  possible  opportunity  its  recognition 
of the concern which exists about these wider and more significant 
problems. 
If I may summarise my argument, I would say that the most 
difficult  question  mark overhanging the  European Community is 
this.  In an age  when  the recognition  of world-wide  interdepen-
dence  is  not only morally imperative but, more  urgently,  a  first 
priority in terms  of politically  enlightened  self-interest,  whatever 
may  be  our  ritual  utterances  in  reports  and  speeches,  can  we 
honestly  declare  that  the  driving  force  for  Western  European 
integration as  of now is an endorsement of internationalism, or is 
it really a  frustrated  nationalism and, as  such,  a  commitment to 
old-fashioned power politics and, therefore, a denial of the funda-
mental realities of the age in which we live? 
Mr. Berkhouwer (F).- Mr. Chairman, may I  ask Mr. Judd 
a question? 
The Chairman (F). - Mr. Judd, we  have no specific  special 
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Mr. Berkhouwer would like to ask you a question.  I am sure 
you  will  have  no  objection,  and no  doubt you  will  also  be  pre-
pared to answer it. 
I call Mr. Berkhouwer. 
Mr. Berkhouwer. - The honourable Member for Portsmouth 
has  just been  speaking about the  unwritten constitution.  I  have 
two small questions to put to him concerning this.  Does not this 
constitution permit Britain to enter the Common Market without 
a  general  election,  for  which he  pleaded, and if this  constitution 
does allow your government to go into the Treaty with the Common 
Market,  why  should  such  an  election  be  necessary,  apart  from 
constitutional points  of view? 
The Chairman (F).- I call Mr. Judd so that he can answer 
Mr. Berkhouwer's question. 
Mr. Judd. - Of course, there is no question about this.  Our 
unwritten constitution does permit any government of any political 
persuasion  to  take  us  into  the  European Economic  Community 
without  an  election.  This  is  absolutely  clear.  What  I  would 
argue is that I believe that there would be perhaps less damage to 
confidence in a democratic system if the British people collectively 
felt that a step of this magnitude were not being taken without an 
opportunity for  them  to  express  their  views  as  a  nation.  They 
make the point that it is rather ridiculous to have general elections 
on issues  of lesser  significance  if,  when  it  comes  to  an issue  of 
this  magnitude,  there  is  no  opportunity  to  put  their  view  on 
record.  Constitutionally,  they  cannot  gainsay  a  government's 
intention, but I think that there is a point here about the character 
and  the  quality  of  political  life  which  needs  to  be  considered 
seriously.  I  am not suggesting,  incidentally, that when  it comes 
to the  point the  present government in Britain will  not give  full 
opportunity for consultation.  All I  am suggesting is that fellow-
members of the Assembly should appreciate that, if there is  pres-
sure  in  Britain for  time  for  consultation,  this  may be  very  vital 
and  very  important  in  the  cause  of  preserving  the  quality  and 
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The Chairman (F). - Mr. Lemmrich has also asked to put a 
question. 
I call Mr. Lemmrich. 
Mr. Lemmrich (G). -Mr. Judd, regarding your explanations 
on the question  of  a  referendum in Great Britain:  this  is  after 
all an extremely weighty issue.  Can you explain to me why the 
former  Prime  Minister,  Mr.  Wilson,  did  not mention  these  very 
crucial facts  which you have advanced today when he addressed 
the  Consultative  Assembly  of  the  Council  of  Europe?  In  that 
speech  he  made  a  solemn  assertion  that  he  and  his  political 
colleagues  were  quite  serious  about  joining  EEC.  "We  mean 
business" were the words he used. 
The Chairman (F). - Mr. Judd, do you wish to answer ? 
Mr. Judd. - Certainly I have absolutely no doubt whatsoever 
that the former Prime Minister meant sincerely everything that he 
said  in  this  Assembly.  All  I  am saying  is  that,  looking  at  the 
manifestoes of the political parties in the last general election in 
Britain,  I  think  everyone,  whether in favour  of  entry or against 
entry or reserving his  position until final  terms are known, would 
agree that there is  no absolute mandate for  any political party to 
take  Britain  into  Europe.  There  were  statements  about  the 
importance of negotiation,  and I  want to  re-emphasise  the point 
which I  made in answer to  the  earlier question, which is  a  very 
real and significant one.  I am absolutely certain that constitution-
ally  any government is  within its  power,  without a  general elec-
tion, without a referendum or anything, in entering Europe.  But 
we  cannot  really  have  it  both  ways.  If  this  is  an  issue 
of overriding importance, of  great magnitude and of tremendous 
significance  for  the  British  people,  and  for  the  Community 
itself,  then  surely,  if  we  really  believe  this  to  be  so  and  we 
really  at  the  same  time  believe  in  the  spirit  and  the  essence 
of  democracy,  we  can  have  no  objection  to  emphasising 
the importance of full  consultation with the people. I  have not in 
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standing  here-said that  there  must  be  a  referendum.  What  I 
have said is  that I  believe it would be wrong of politicians of all 
parties  in  parliament in Britain  to  make  the  decision.  which in 
the end must be theirs. without having taken very thorough steps 
indeed. first  to sound the views of the British people.  Some will 
say-and I can see the smiles of cynicism in this Assembly-that 
this  is  a  sophisticated  way  of  keeping  Britain  out of  the  Com-
munity because in fact the overriding vote will be against. 
. Mr. Berkhouwer. - You want elections. 
Mr.  Judd.  - If I  may  say  so.  I  beg  to  differ.  I  happen 
to  believe that. looking at the  situation at the moment.  some  of 
those people in Britain who are advocating. as  of now. a referen-
dum. are in favour of entry. just as  some of the people who  are 
against the referendum are also against entry.  I  am fairly confi-
dent  that.  if  we  were  to  have  a  referendum.  one  result  of  this 
would  be  a  far  fuller  and  more  meaningful  discussion  in  the 
country as  a  whole  about all  the implications  of  possible  entry. 
But if we  are  not to  have  a  referendum  all  I  am saying-! am 
convinced on this;  it is  all  I  am asking for and I  cannot believe 
that there are any reservations in this Assembly about it-is that 
there must be adequate time  for  consultation.  Speaking person-
ally as a member of parliament. I want adequate time to go to my 
constituency and to  make sure  that all  the  people in it have an 
opportunity to discuss with me fully the implications of member-
ship  as  I  see  it  and  question  me  on  it.  and  I  do  not  believe 
that anyone in this Assembly could object to perhaps some delay 
while this process is  completed.  (Applause.) 
The Chairman (F).- I call Mr. Lloyd. 
Mr. Lloyd.- I  feel  that what Mr. Judd has said cannot be 
allowed to go unchallenged in this Assembly.  It is of the greatest 
importance  that  members  of  the  European  Parliament  should 
know that there are two parliamentary points of view on this issue 
within  the  United  Kingdom.  First may  I  take  this  point about 
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great issue facing the United Kingdom in the history of our parlia-
ment, going back for five  centuries, has been taken by Parliament 
alone.  The union of Scotland and England, the decision to create 
an empire, the decision to dismantle an empire, the great decisions 
of peace and war, have been taken by the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom  at  Westminster  assembled,  and  this  decision  will  be 
taken in exactly the same way. 
The  question  of  consultation  with  the  people  is  constantly 
being  put forward  by  the  critics  of  entry  as  a  reason  why  the 
government  may  not  take  this  decision.  Every  Prime  Minister 
of  the  United  Kingdom  from  1960  onwards,  including  the  last 
Prime Minister, has unequivocally in his manifesto at election after 
election, irrespective of party, notified the country of his  support 
for  the  decision  to  join  the  Common  Market  if  the  terms  are 
right.  Nothing  could  have  been  more  direct.  At election  after 
election that  statement has been endorsed unequivocally. 
That  there  is  now  a  considerable  controversy  within  the 
United Kingdom is inevitable and not surprising.  It is a function 
of delay, of the complexity of the issue.  But that we should now 
say  that there has  been no  consultation on this  enormously pro-
found  question, which has  been debated throughout Europe and 
Britain in the past fifteen years, and that the decision may not be 
taken without something which is unprecedented in British history, 
seems to me a wholly  mistaken point of view.  (Applause.) 
The Chairman (F).- I am going to call Mr. Judd once more. 
After that we shall return to our list of speakers. 
Mr.  Judd.  - I  am  deeply  indebted  to  Mr.  Lloyd  for  his 
intervention.  I  am  very  sorry  if  I  conveyed  the  feeling  that 
there  was  only  one  view  on  this  issue.  There  are  certainly  at 
least two, and probably more if we go  into all the more sophisti-
cated arguments.  Of course,  Mr.  Lloyd is  right.  But I  cannot 
let this misinterpretation of what I  said this afternoon go  unchal-
lenged.  I did not call for a referendum, and deliberately did not 
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consulted  and  for  members  of  parliament  to  be  certain  when 
they make their decision that they have had every opportunity to 
discuss with the widest possible cross-section of the electorate, in 
the  fullest  possible  sense,  the  implications  of  entry.  I  cannot 
believe  that if we  subscribe  to  the principles of democracy there 
can be any objection to that. 
Surely,  the  existing  Members  of  the  European  Community 
and other European representatives  here this  afternoon would be 
deeply concerned about a decision to enter if there was  a  feeling 
that it had been taken in spite of public opinion, without adequate 
consultation.  They would be far more concerned about that than 
if  the  decision  had been  taken  after  full  and  proper  discussion 
and discourse with the electorate as  a whole. 
I must, however, say something in defence of those in Britain 
who now argue for  a referendum.  It is  very interesting that one 
of the principal proponents of the idea of a  referendum is  a  for-
mer Labour Minister who is, and has been consistently, in favour 
of British entry to the European Community.  Those who  argue 
for  a  referendum  have  never  said  that  the  decision  should  be 
taken out of parliament's hands.  What they have said is  that a 
referendum would be an adequate way of sounding public opinion 
before parliament, as  is  the  constitutional tradition, made up its 
mind in its  own  good time  about what should or should not be 
done. 
I am sorry if my remarks have touched off controversy.  But 
I  must repeat  that it would  have  been  deplorable  if in today's 
discussion no one had even attempted to put before the Assembly 
some of the very genuine misgivings and reservations that exist in 
Britain, quite apart from  the more narrow, insular, short-sighted, 
prejudiced outlooks which we all deplore. 
May I  put this  to  all  my colleagues  here:  if you  share my 
fervent faith in. the relevance of democracy, in the right of people 
to participate in the shaping of the societies to which they belong, 
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you;  please  understand  these  points;  please  try  to  enter  into 
dialogue  and meaningful  discussion  about them,  because  that is 
the way in which we  can create  a  genuine,  meaningful,  political 
community  in  Europe.  Without  such  dialogue,  I  suspect  that 
while anything we create may exist on paper, its substance may be 
highly questionable. 
The Chairman (F).- We can now resume where we  left off 
on the list of speakers.  Personally, I  am not at all sorry that we 
have had this  exchange.  We  are here for  an exchange of views. 
The only thing I do regret is  that most of our colleagues from the 
European Parliament are at present attending committee meetings 
and other meetings and have, therefore, been unable to participate. 
I call Mr. Portheine. 
Mr. Portheine (N). -+- Mr. Chairman, I do not often have the 
opportunity of addressing you in Dutch, but I  shall do so  today. 
Following the intervention of my friend Mr. Berkhouwer and the 
ensuing discussion, I  should like to say that I agree not only with 
what was said then, but also with what Mr. Judd may have meant 
in part, although I disagree with him on very many matters. 
We  have talked about a  great many possible ways  in which 
Europe may be  built.  I  think  this  is  extremely valuable,  and I 
subscribe  in  general  to  what  has  been  said  today  and  also  to 
what is  contained  in  the  reports.  In my  opinion,  however,  the 
question  of  how  people  will  fare  in  this  Community  has  been 
unduly overlooked in today's  debate.  The question was  put by 
Mr. Judd, and here I am in agreement with him.  It is an impor-
tant question.  For if we want to build structures, if, for example, 
we  want  to  enlarge  the  Community  to  include  not only  Britain 
but other  countries  too,  then-to use  the  economic  jargon-we 
have  to  sell  this  to  the  people.  No  doubt,  Mr.  Judd  will  not 
particularly  appreciate  that  expression,  but  then  all  capitalist 
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We  can  only  "sell  it  to  the  people"  if  we  know  that  the 
various groups can be involved in the actual construction process 
that we choose.  I should like to pay a tribute to the Rapporteur. 
Mr. Darling, for setting out in his report, and especially on page 7 
under the heading "Social progress", the standpoints which various 
groups might take in respect of such an enlargement of the Com-
munity.  He states in his report that economic growth in general 
can  be  regarded  as  the  background  to  the  enlargement  of  the 
Community-and possibly as  its  banner for  the future.  He says 
that economic growth must be spread evenly throughout the Com-
munity,  by  which  he  means  the  various  national  communities. 
He then goes  on to say that often this  is  not the  case.  He also 
states  that a  great deal  has  been done,  for  example.  for  farmers 
inside  EEC,  but  at the  same  time  points  out  that a  number  of 
others  have  been  left  out in  the cold.  Those  who  are  old  and 
sick,  those with an inadequate education, may perhaps not share 
in that economic growth. 
I  agree  that  attention  needs  to  be  drawn  to  this.  But  I 
should  like  to  add  another  important group  which  Mr.  Darling 
did  not  mention,  namely  the  large  numbers  of  self-employed 
workers  in  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  outside  farming, 
who  are  so  often  forgotten  when  the  overall  picture  is  being 
surveyed.  I  want to appeal for consideration for this group.  In 
their  interests  we  must  find  ways-and  they  exist-of  taking 
important  harmonising  measures  inside  the  Community  and.  I 
hope, in the framework of the Council of Europe.  I believe that 
there is  a  great opportunity here. certainly at least for  the  Rap-
porteur himself,  since  Mr.  Darling  is  to  present a  report to  the 
Council of Europe on this matter, which is one of great importance 
to  consumers  too-general aspects  of competition,  orderly  busi-
ness practices. and fair competition. 
As  I  have  said,  it  is  also  a  matter  of  great  importance  to 
consumers.  Take,  for  example,  measures  to  control  misleading 
advertising, and action to encourage informative labelling.  I have 
been  talking  about the  small  and medium-sized  enterprises,  but 
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to  which  a  positive  approach  needs  to  be  taken.  As  I  see  it, 
this means that we must make a  more or less  solemn promise to 
that  group  that  we  shall  be  able  to  take  significant  measures 
within the enlarged Community.  And so  I  am glad, Mr. Chair-
man,  that  at  yesterday's  plenary  Assembly  of  the  European 
Parliament, part of which I  attended, it was  made clear that the 
European Commission intends  to  take  steps  in the field  which I 
have mentioned, among others, and also  that, in its resolution on 
the Berkhouwer Report on competition, the European Parliament 
refers  unequivocally to the very  special position which the  small 
and medium-sized enterprises occupy in our Community. 
I  repeat:  this  Community  must  be  made  acceptable  to 
society.  But  there  are  in  Europe  a  great  many  self-employed 
people  who  doubt the  value  of  the  Community;  they  are  both 
dubious  and  afraid.  We  must  dispel  their  anxiety  by  adopting 
a  positive  approach which is  more  than  a  match for  all  contin-
gencies.  I  am convinced  that if  we  make a  solemn  promise  on 
this  matter,  we  shall  succeed  in  dispelling  that  anxiety,  and  so 
favour the enlargement of the Community.  (Applause.) 
The Chairman (F).- I call Mr. Scott-Hopkins. 
Mr. Scott-Hopkins.- Mr. Chairman, may I  first  agree with 
you in regretting that the arrangements are such that our friends 
of the  European Community, with the  exception of  one  or two, 
find  themselves  unable  to  be  present  here  as  they  have  to 
work  elsewhere.  When  there  is  a  Joint  Meeting  of  the  two 
Assemblies,  it  seems  to  me  things  might  be  a  little  better 
arranged so  that the  two  Assemblies  can get  together,  otherwise 
it is  largely  a  waste  of time  of both Assemblies  to  hold such a 
meeting.  That being  so,  may  I  now  turn  to  the  debate  that is 
taking place. 
First, I  join my colleagues in congratulating the Rapporteurs 
on the  reports  they  have  put forward.  One  of  the  things  that 
struck me,  as  it did Mr.  Darling,  was  the  tremendous  similarity 
of the  four  reports in the  subjects  they deal with and the  points 
they highlight. _,_j._'_..  ___  _:: 
jc 
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The one on which I wish to concentrate was also touched on 
by my colleague. Mr.  Judd. who provoked the most electric part 
of the  debate  so  far  today.  I  agree  with  the  point  Mr.  Lloyd 
made concerning  the  speech of Mr.  Judd.  In my view  the  first 
part of this  speech.  although  of course  there  is  a  great deal  of 
truth in the issues he raised there concerning the method whereby 
my country joins or does not join the Economic Community. con-
cerns  matters  for  discussion  at Westminster  and not here.  The 
points  Mr.  Lloyd has  made here  I  am sure will  be made again. 
May I  also emphasise what was said by one of our German 
colleagues  when  questioning  Mr.  Judd.  The commitment of all 
the  political  leaders  is  complete  not  only  to  negotiate  but  to 
negotiate  with  the  idea of  success  and  joining  the  Communities 
should the terms  be acceptable to  them.  This is  the clear posi-
tion of the political leaders within my country.  Let us leave that 
point which is  more of a  domestic one  than one with which we 
should necessarily be dealing here. 
The main issue  we  are  discussing  here is:  where  do  we  go 
from here should the four applicant countries be able to join the 
Six?  Are we  looking forward. as has been said in the main para-
graphs of each of the reports made here. to a political integration? 
Is  there  a  possibility.  as  mentioned  by  Mr.  Nessler.  that  the 
words  "confederation"  and  "federation"  in the  future  will  have 
little meaning?  What are we really trying to aim at?  Will this be 
purely  economic?  We  heard  Lord  Gladwyn  saying  that  even 
on an  economic  basis  one cannot possibly  continue,  one  cannot 
extend beyond the existing frontiers, unless  one moves  over from 
the unanimity rule that exists in the Council of Ministers to  that 
of a  majority vote.  This is,  of course, in direct contradiction to 
what was  said at the recent meeting between Mr.  Pompidou and 
my  Prime  Minister,  Mr.  Heath.  They  came  out with  the  firm 
declaration that unanimity was  necessarily an all-important issue 
affecting  national  sovereignty  and  national  interests.  The  two 
views  are obviously irreconcilable not only in the economic  field 
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In  my  country  we  in the  Conservative  Party  when  talking 
about Europe have always been putting forward the following rea-
listic pragmatic view~  Let us start first things first, let us start with 
the economic union of our countries.  Let us work together, let us 
get this  working  and let us  use  the institutions which  are  there. 
Obviously, if one is  to move later from economic co-operation to 
monetary union, one is indeed going one step further. 
In this context I  was very glad to see in the Daily Telegraph 
of  my  country  today  that at  the  meetings  yesterday  in  Luxem-
bourg, Mr. Rippon seems  to  have come to  an amicable arrange-
ment with the Ministers of the Six  concerning the role of sterling 
in the future.  Whether it is  a twenty-year or a fifty-year phasing 
out of sterling is  unimportant in my view.  The important point 
is  that the  question  of sterling  and its  phasing  out as  a  second 
reserve  currency  by  my  country  has  been  accepted  by  the  Six 
and also  by my  country.  This  surely  will  help  us  to  move  the 
next  step  forward  along  the  path  of  co-operation,  not  only  in 
economics but also in monetary union. 
This brings me to the point raised by Mr.  Scelba as  to what 
we  are trying to do.  We  do  not believe in building up great big 
institutions  and  saying:  "Now  you  will  deal  with  the monetary 
side, the financial  institutions of the enlarged Community, or the 
political".  We  believe  that as  the need arises, so  one can adapt 
existing institutions  or invent new institutions  to deal with those 
parts which  are  necessary.  Of course,  in  the  years  ahead there 
must be close monetary union co-operation.  There must be close 
political  co-operation  amongst  our countries. 
We must work together.  We  share a common viewpoint on 
the  political  front,  but I  would  not  suggest  for  a  moment  that 
we  now should occupy ourselves with setting up a  political insti-
tution.  Many institutions exist in Europe already;  and, as  Lord 
Gladwyn said earlier, many of us  believe  they overlap too  much 
those  of WEU, the NATO Alliance,  the  Council  of Europe and 
the rest.  There are plenty of means whereby we can get together, 
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the political front but on other issues as well;  and over a  period 
of  time  there  must  grow  up  institutions  which  will  control  the 
"civil service".  as  we  call it in my country. the bureaucrats who 
are the servants of the Six.  and of the Ten as  they will be. This 
democratic control which will  be exercised. one hopes. through a 
democratically  elected  parliament in due course  of time.  will  be 
given  powers  and will  take its  own  powers  to  deal with  and to 
control the  bureaucratic machine  which  it sets  up underneath it. 
I believe that what came out of the Paris meeting between the 
British Prime Minister and the President of France was  the right 
and realistic view to take at this moment of time.  We are rather 
like children.  Six children have been working and living together 
in  the  same  house  and all  know  each  other's  faults  and habits. 
They know how they can progress. how  they can walk along to-
gether.  We are four children who are coming in from outside.  In 
many cases we  do not have a  similar language or similar customs 
although our backgrounds are the same.  It will  take  some time 
for  us  to  catch up with those  Six  who  have  been together.  We 
want to do this but we  must do it slowly and with understanding 
on  all  sides.  If  we  try  to  go  too  fast.  to  run  before  we  can 
walk. we shall stumble and probably fall by the wayside. 
I  am  a  firm  and  enthusiastic  European.  as  I  believe  my 
colleagues  in  this  Assembly  will  know.  I  have  many  reserva-
tions. as  we  all have.  Mine concern the  questions  of  timing  and 
method-what  Mr.  Judd  calls  "putting  it  over"  to  one's  own 
people.  convincing  them that one's own  arguments  are  right.  If 
this  can  be  done  at  a  steady  pace  without  building  enormous 
castles in the air. full  of bureaucrats spending their time building 
their own little edifices.  and if  we  can deal with the problems  as 
they come up. creating new institutions or adapting existing ones 
to  deal with situations as  they arise. then I  believe we  can build 
a  Europe which will  deal not only with the economic and mone-
tary future but with the political future of Europe;  and not only 
for the benefit of those existing countries who will  be within the 
Ten.  but also  for  those  countries who  will  be  on the periphery. 
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on us  as  an ancient Civilisation,  those of  Africa, Asia and  other 
parts of the world, as  well.  If we  can do that, I  for  one will  be 
very satisfied.  (Applause.) 
The Chairman  (F).  - I  call  Mr.  Blumenfeld. 
Mr. Blumenfeld (G).- Mr. Chairman, the four reports which 
have  assisted  us  in this  interesting  debate  seem  to  me  to  share 
a  very  clear  common  nucleus.  What  they  have  in  common  is 
that they repeatedly ask not only  what kind of role  Europe and 
this  enlarged  Community  have  to  play  in  the  future,  but  also 
what  conception  this  Community  will  have  of  itself  and  along 
what lines  it will  develop.  Mr. Frydenlund, our Norwegian col-
league, for example, rightly discussed the important psychological 
and  political  aspects  from  the  standpoint of  one  of  the  Scandi-
navian applicant countries, a country wrestling with a great many 
difficult  internal  problems  which  have  not been  made  easier  by 
the  fact  that  the  Commission  in  Brussels-and  I  shall  return 
to  this  point  in  my  conclusion-made proposals  with  regard  to 
the relationship between an enlarged Community and the neutral 
States which open up a whole  series of economic possibilities for 
those  States  and provide  grist  to  the  mill  of  those  who  oppose 
entry in some of the applicant countries. 
Mr. Chairman, I  should like to examine in somewhat greater 
detail that nucleus of which I spoke a moment ago, in order to see 
whether developments inside the Community are likely to improve 
the operational efficiency  of its  organs  and strengthen its  institu-
tions.  In his impressive speech during today's debate, Mr. Scelba 
used the expression "political reactivation", meaning that, in view 
of the  imminent  accession  of  Great Britain and subsequently  of 
the  Scandinavian  countries  and  Ireland,  it is  now  necessary  to 
take time by the forelock, as it were.  By "political reactivation", 
he  certainly did not mean, if I  have  understood him rightly, ,that 
new  institutions  should  be  continually  developed,  but  that  the 
existing ones,  in other words  the  Community's organs  and insti-
tutions  as  founded  on the  Treaties  of  Rome,  should  be  further 
developed.  I would add that I see no kind of political reactivation 
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present time  or to  draw up fresh  long-term  plans which may or 
may  not  reach  fruition  in  the  year  2000.  Rather,  the  vitally 
important  thing  now  is,  first  to  strengthen  the  position  of  the 
Commission,  and  secondly  to  provide  the  European Parliament 
as  quickly as  possible with a  status  or jurisdiction such that the 
European  politicians,  as  representatives  of  their  electors  or  of 
their  countries,  as  Mr.  Scott-Hopkins  has  just  explained,  may 
have  real  powers  of  control  in  executing  the  tasks  entrusted  to 
them. 
For  I  would  ask,  Mr.  Chairman,  if  individual  governments 
had Ministers  for  Europe, to  whom  would  they  be responsible? 
Quite  clearly,  only  to  their  own  Heads  of  Government  in  the 
framework  of  their  national  cabinet  arrangements  and  possibly 
also  to  their national parliaments, but, if I  have properly under-
stood the proposal in question, never to the European Parliament, 
which  after  all  is  intended  to  have  real  democratic  powers  of 
control  in  addition  to  its  budgetary  powers.  How  can  these 
things ever be reconciled? 
Mr.  Chairman,  I  frequently  have  the  impression-even 
though today's  debate  in this  Chamber will  not be  the last one, 
either for the European Parliament or for  the Council of Europe 
-that a great many of our European friends  and colleagues have 
yet to overcome an attachment to the past which finds  expression 
in references  to  the great historic events  and deeds  of a  colonial 
epoch;  or, as our friend Mr.  Judd has done, they make so much 
of  constitutional  issues  that  it  is  difficult  to  extricate  oneself 
again,  as  Mr.  Judd probably  noticed.  I  have  no wish  to  dwell 
on  this  now,  Mr.  Judd,  but  none  of  us  who  are  part  of  the 
Community  of  the  Six  have  renounced  our  constitutions.  But 
what  we  are  doing  is  to  build  a  future  together,  and  we  are 
prepared to  relinquish for good a  great deal from  the past;  and 
this  is  all  that is  being  asked of you  and your electors  in Great 
Britain. 
We  can overcome the  past only if we  are agreed about two 
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debate  so  that  I  need  do  no  more  than  list  them  once  again. 
Besides  the  question  of the  familiar  long-term plan for  develop-
ment towards  economic and monetary union,  there  is  the  simul-
taneous development of political union;  for unless the latter form 
of union succeeded in completing its  various phases  on schedule 
there  is  no  hope  of achieving  economic  and monetary  union  in 
the European Community. Everybody here knows this, I am sure, 
and the  President of the Commission  doubtless  knows  it best of 
all. 
In many  European capitals  at the  present  time  pragmatism 
is  writ large, and not only in cabinet rooms but on the parliamen-
tary benches too.  This pragmatism is  often described as  realism. 
And I  freely  admit that it is  right,  as  the  previous  speaker  has 
just  said,  to  take  one  step  at  a  time  and  not  attempt  to  take 
fences  at the  gallop  and come  a  cropper in the  process.  But in 
view of the fact that progress towards federation and the strength-
ening of the institutions of  which I  have  been talking will  inevi-
tably be a  long and difficult  process, it is  all  the more necessary 
to  create  a  flexible  system  of  European  political  co-operation, 
and over and above the political  aspect  of  course,  of economic, 
technological  and  scientific  co-operation  too.  As  I  see  it,  this 
possibility  exists  in  the  strengthening  and  continuation  of  the 
work of the Council of Europe in  its Consultative Assembly. 
This brings me to a point mentioned in a number of speeches 
during  this  debate,  namely  that  some  of  the  existing  European 
bodies. will surely now, in the wake of the enlargement, either be 
absorbed  into  the  European  Parliament  or  be  assigned  to  the 
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe for the purposes 
of parliamentary control. 
By this I  mean a whole series of European institutions which 
have  not  so  far  been  directly  referred  to  in  the  course  of  the 
debate.  OECD is  one  of them.  It seems  to  me  necessary  that 
this  "hinge"  should  be  brought quite  clearly  to  the  forefront  in 
this  discussion,  this hinge between political development and the 
further development of the European Parliament and the Council 
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I  should  like  to  mention one final  point in  this  connection. 
When  preparations  were  being  made  for  this  Joint Meeting  we 
suggested, as our colleagues in the European Parliament are aware, 
that the important subject of the political parties in a developing 
and  enlarged  Europe  should  also  be  discussed,  together  with 
the  ways  in  which  these  political  forces  might  be  deployed  at 
European level. 
I  shall  not go  into  this  subject  now.  Mr.  Nessler  touched 
upon it in connection with the  question of direct elections  to the 
European Parliament.  That is  my reason for  referring  to  it.  I 
see no other way, no alternative but for us one day-not tomorrow 
but in  the  foreseeable  future-to give  this  subject  our attention 
again, not only in this  distinguished Assembly, but in the frame-
work  of the  European Parliament,  and  also  in  that of  the  Con-
sultative  Assembly  of  the  Council  of  Europe.  We  must realise 
that patterns of power in all European States will be determined 
by  political  parties  if  we  are  to  have  a  properly  functioning 
European  Parliament.  The  embryo  we  have  at  present  must 
develop.  The sooner we make a  start, the· better and more lucid 
our judgment is likely to be. 
The  last  point  I  should  like  to  make  concerns  the  future 
relationship  between  the  enlarged  Community  and  the  neutral 
States.  In the reports, particularly that of Mr. de la Malene of the 
European  Parliament,  I  came  aoross  a  number  of  sentences 
which  I  consider  extremely  important and should  therefore  like 
to emphasise again. 
Mr. de la Malene says that the European Parliament and the 
enlarged Community should tell the neutral States quite unequivo-
cally  that  they  would  not  be  "penalised"  for  maintaining  their 
neutral  status.  And  he  adds:  "Europe  needs  neutral  States. 
They fulfil  an original function  in that they act as  a  connecting 
link between Eastern and Western Europe". 
You, Mr. Chairman, as  President of the Consultative Assem-
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that this  position as  adopted by Mr.  de  la Malene  in  his  report 
has  been  repeatedly  and  emphatically  underlined  in  resolutions 
adopted by  the  Consultative  Assembly. 
In my view. however. the Commission. which recently publish-
ed in one form or another a number of proposals on the relations 
between  the  enlarged  Community  and  the  neutral  States.  has 
failed  to  throw  sufficient  light  on  the  real  heart of  this  matter 
and has  perhaps even  overlooked it  somewhat. 
For I believe this to be a quite vital issue.  Is it not essential 
that the Community. particularly the enlarged Community. should 
specifically invite the neutral States to  take part in its discussions. 
and  not  present  them  with  a  fait  accompli?  A  fait  accompli 
would provoke precisely the reaction which we in Europe want to 
avoid.  and to  which Mr.  Frydenlund referred in his  report.  We 
must  therefore  ensure  that  those  neutral  States  which  remain 
outside  the  Community  of  their  own  free  will  are  enabled  to 
participate  in  the  decision-making  process  between  themselves 
and the Community. 
Mr.  Chairman.  the  Swiss  Government  has  in  recent  times. 
as  I  believe.  pointed  out a  whole  series  of important issues  on 
which  the  participation  and  involvement  of  the  neutral  States. 
co-operating with the  enlarged Community. is  obviously possible 
and simply cannot be passed over or excluded:  take the question 
of the law on competition. monetary questions. currency questions. 
take freedom of establishment for companies and individuals. take 
the  questions  of  scientific  research  and  technology.  Surely  all 
this  calls  for  a  codification  of the  relations  between  the  neutral 
States-including those which are not joining with Great Britain. 
the Scandinavian countries and Ireland in applying to the Six for 
membership-and the enlarged Community. 
It seems  to  me,  Mr.  Chairman. that we  must not wait until 
1975. as the Commission has suggested, to find a practical solution 
to  these  questions;  in  my  view.  the  relationship  between  the 
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codified  at  the  same  time  as  enlargement  is  decided  upon  and 
Great Britain,  together  with  the  other  applicant  countries,  joins 
the Community. 
That, Mr.  Chairman, brings  me  to  the  end of  my remarks, 
which concerned a number of points given  particular prominence 
in the reports.  (Applause.) 
The Chairman (F). - I call Mr. Lloyd. 
Mr.  Lloyd.  - Probably  the  most  useful  thing  I  can  do 
straightaway is  to  clarify  the  position  of  the British member of 
parliament, such as  myself,  on the vital  question of consultation 
with  the  British  people  on  Britain's  possible,  and  now  almost 
certain, accession to the Common Market.  My position is  simply 
this:  if I  have not made up my mind on an issue  of this  kind I 
have no right to be in public life;  being in public life, I  have not 
made  my  position  absolutely  clear  to  my  constituents,  then  I 
would be dishonest;  being in public life and having made up my 
mind and having made my position perfectly clear to my consti-
tuents  in three general  elections,  I  am  entitled only to persuade. 
I am not entitled to consult.  There is  a  vital difference between 
persuasion and consultation.  For me to consult in these circum-
stances would be a bogus action based on a bogus attitude.  That 
is my fundamental position, and I believe it to be the fundamental 
position of many British members of parliament. 
Consultation implies  an open mind, it implies that I  can be 
persuaded otherwise.  I  put this question to Mr. Judd and those 
who  think like him.  If, having  consulted his  constituents, as  he 
puts it, he finds  that, whatever his  judgment may be, their judg-
ment differs  from  his,  what will  he do,  first,  in his  constituency 
and, second, in the House of Commons?  That is the fundamental 
question at the root of that essential compromise which is  parlia-
mentary  democracy,  because  it  is  a  compromise  between  two 
extremes.  That is all I will say on that point. 
The last volume of the great Times Atlas of the World to be 
published was entitled "South West Asia and Russia".  The pre-
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"Somewhere  in  the  regions  here  surveyed  the  devout 
will  look for  the  sight of Paradise Lost in Eden;  and here 
too  the  dialectical  materialist  expects  an  earthly  Paradise 
gained  by  human contrivance.  Between  their  rival  concep-
tions  of  where  man  came  from  and  whither  he  goes,  the 
cartographer is  not concerned or qualified to  judge." 
Whither he goes is  our concern here today.  In the past five 
centuries Europe has probably done more to shape the progress of 
man-in the  view  of  some,  to  misshape  it-than any  previous 
civilisation.  The  structure  and  institutions  of  Europe  are  not 
without  their  significance,  despite  the  massive  presence  of  the 
super-powers. 
Two weeks ago, or a little more, the Science and Technology 
Committee of the Council of Europe had the privilege of visiting 
the  Hittite  Museum  in  Ankara.  There,  in  one  large  building, 
were  accumulated  the  fascinating  remains  of  seven  civilisations 
-a few  trinkets,  a  few  sculptures,  a  few  vases  and  a  deathly 
silence.  I  could  not  help  wondering  whether,  as  each  of  these 
civilisations  approached  its  doom-and Mr.  Judd had a  similar 
point of view-the City Fathers of Ephesus and Tarsus, of Samos 
and Pergamum, debated the validity and relevance of their politi-
cal  institutions.  As  each  one  was  swept  into  oblivion,  from 
which  only  the  archaeologist  could  rescue  it,  they  must  have 
wondered  where  they  had  gone  wrong.  Doubtless  they  consi-
dered many new forms  of empire  and rejected  them all  because 
their constituents would not tolerate the foreigner. 
No one would dispute the importance of  structure and insti-
tutions,  even  if  all  our historical  studies  have  revealed  so  little 
knowledge of the relationship between men and their institutions 
that  our  most  important  discovery  perhaps  is  that  history  is 
unreliable. 
But my concern this afternoon is  with another aspect of this 
problem.  I am convinced that the power and significance of insti-
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the actions of those who serve them, and it was within that context 
that I  proposed to  invite the Joint Assembly  to  examine  one or 
two  directions  in which we  must change  our criteria, if the new 
institutions of an enlarged Community are to be successful.  For 
we  cannot fly  political Concordes with the instruments of a Tiger 
Moth or DC3. 
I propose to explore three areas in which I believe the enlarged 
Community will  need  to  develop  new  criteria to guide  its  judg-
~ents.  The first  is  in  the balance  between  technology  and the 
environment.  The second is in the balance between the individual 
and the State, and the third is in the balance between present and 
future generations. 
As to technology and the environment, it is fashionable today 
to decry technology and the consequences of scientific rationality. 
However,  we  are  highly  selective  when  we  do this.  We  accept 
Pasteur and Fleming and injections from our dentists.  Even hip-
pies use jets to travel from one oasis of rejection to another.  But 
by and large only by coupling technology and scientific rationality 
with imagination and moral courage has man any chance of escap-
ing from  his  present dilemmas.  It is  not the  computers,  super-
sonic jets or satellites which should be smashed, but obsolete con-
cepts  and  criteria.  For  example,  it  is  a  fantastic  proposition 
that war of any kind could contribute anything to solving problems 
in East Pakistan, Northern Ireland or the Middle East. 
We must ask of our technology, therefore, whatrits side effects 
are,  so  that we  do  not create  large-scale  thalidomide  situations. 
But the idea of a retreat to a ,new non-technological rustic simplic-
ity is pure fantasy for the vast mass of mankind in the developed 
world.  Not even the institution of parliamentary democracy can 
escape this obligation. 
I  now  come  to  the  balance between  the  individual  and the 
State.  This brings  right to  the foreground  of our discussion the 
question  of  the  enlargement  of public  responsibility  on  which 
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and it has led to an increase in the amount of public power.  This 
has created throughout the community a sense of individual impo-
tence almost as acute within the great democracies as within more 
authoritarian regimes.  In Europe. the  effects  of the enlargement 
of  the  Community  will  certainly  lead  to some  centralisation  of 
power  and  inevitably  to  some  aggravation  of  this  condition. 
Therefore, it is  wholly right  to  say ,that this  should be a  central 
preoccupation. 
But should not we study new political techniques for reconcil-
ing objectives which require centralisation. uniformity. consistency 
and regularity with those that can be met only by the dispersion 
of decision,  the  diffusion  of  information and the  involvement of 
individuals?  These, as I  see  it, are fundamental concepts.  They 
are  understood .by  all  too  few,  and it is  the  duty  of  politicians 
to develop them much further.  It seems to me that 100 per cent 
involvement of the public will.  of public opinion. is  not the aim. 
We  are  talking  primarily  about  communication  and  persuasion. 
If we ask what percentage of the population of the modern State. 
the giant corporation. the  regional  authority.  the local  authority. 
is  involved in the  decision-making process. the answer is  proba-
bly about .001  per cent.  Therefore. let us  not be too ambitious. 
but surely it is  not impossible,  with modern communications, to 
shift that one decimal  place  to  the  left and by that of course  I 
mean an arithmetical rather than a political shift. 
In  this  the  European  Parliament  clearly  has  a  most  vital 
role  to  play.  not merely.  as  Mr.  Darling  suggested  in  his  very 
interesting report. as  a  proper authority for  all  functions  wholly 
delegated by national parliaments but indeed as  the proper body 
to take a view on which areas should and which areas should not 
be  delegated.  As  the  area  of delegation  grows.  the  Council  of 
Ministers. as  I  see  it. must look increasingly to European rather 
than to national parliaments for their authority. their support and 
their guidance. 
It is  a  fashionable view  that legislatures  are obsolete, about 
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the  last meeting  of the  Assembly when we  were  having  a  great 
debate  on  the  world's  economic  problems,  I  discovered  only 
subsqu~ntly that  750  of  the  World  Press  were  attending  Mick 
Jagger's wedding at St.  Tropez.  Quite clearly the nuptial process 
has more interest than the  political process. 
As to the first and fundamental proposition, in the first place 
it is  not true,  and what I  would  say is  that any political leader 
in the United Kingdom who thinks  that the House of Commons 
can be used  as  a  rubber stamp within the  next few  months will 
be making the greatest mistake of his life.  But, secondly, I would 
say that the tide  has  turned in a  more fundamental  sense.  The 
United States Congress  is  now  equipping itself on a  most ambi-
tious scale with a computer system not merely to pay its employ-
ees but to give members of Congress access both to federal and to 
external data banksand sources of information on a scale unparal-
leled in any parliamentary democracy throughout history.  If the 
European Parliament of an enlarged Community is  to  speak with 
the  authority which is  required, it certainly can do no less.  But 
surely ·we  must prepare  to  move  rapidly  towards  a  situation in 
which,  as  the  Council  of  Ministers  become  wholly  involved  in 
European responsibilities,  they  will  be  appointed  from  a  Euro-
pean Parliament, derive  authority from  the European Parliament 
and be answerable to it.  If European Parliamentary institutions 
remain  content  to  be  mock  Parliamentary  institutions,  as  they 
now  are,  they  will  mock  at  democracy  and  they  must  expect 
others  to  follow  their  example~  Such  attitudes  render  Europe 
no service worthy of the name of Parliament. 
The second point  I should like to make is on the need for new 
criteria  for  the  assessment  of  socio-economic  performance.  Mr. 
Darling  has  emphasised  in  his  report  that  the  Community  as 
enlarged must certainly nqt be known as a rich man's club.  I see 
no need for a continent or 'a country to be ashamed of its wealth 
provided  it  is  not  created  at  the  expense  of  others.  Poverty-
stricken  continents  are  no  advertisement  for  the  type  of society 
which  perpetuates  such  conditions,  but  we  must  look  at  these 
criteria in the most fundamental  sense~ 100  CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
May I  take one  which  dominates  our thinking  today,  gross 
national  product.  Should  this  not be  sustainable  gross  national 
product?  Should we not attach to every increase in gross national 
product  the  question  "Is  this  sustainable?"  Will  it deplete  the 
mineral resources of mankind intolerably, will it deplete, the envi-
ronmental resources  and the  human resources· of  mankind?  On 
this basis any petroleum dependent projects must surely receive a 
gamma minus.  What percentage of the earth's mineral resources 
is  any  generation  entitled  to  destroy  or  transform  irreversibly? 
We  can  be  prodigal  with  steel  for  several  millenia,  but  what 
about tin, platinum or lead? 
Another criterion  we  must  look  at very  carefully  is  that of 
crude  unemployment.  Surely  crude  unemployment  statistics  are 
almost  meaningless  today  as  a  guide  to  social  and  economic 
policy.  Should  we  not  be  beginning  to  develop  a  spectrum 
concept  of  the  effective  employment  of  resources  varying  from 
100 per cent to nil?  In the United States only the other day some 
unions  announced  that they were  going  to  endeavour to  claim a 
32-hour four-day week,  and good luck to them, but if this is  the 
likely development in  the United States today-and it will  be in 
Europe  tomorrow-then  we  are  in  effect  defining  a  permanent 
33  per  cent  paid  unemployment  situation.  That is  one  way  of 
looking  at exactly the  same statistics.  But in  the computer age 
when  mental  and  physical  drudgery  is  eliminated,  what  should 
our criteria be?  Surely they  should be much more  sophisticated 
than  those  which  are  implicit  in  any  state  of  satisfaction  that 
98  per  cent  of  the  adult  employable  population  is  statistically 
defined as employed, that is, paid to be in one place behind a pen 
or lathe rather than another chasing a football or a golf ball?  On 
the other hand, unemployment of any form of trained manpower is 
both economically and socially much more significant and serious 
than unemployment of  a  similar number of untrained personnel. 
The misure within industry of skilled but employed manpower 
may  have  a  much  greater effect  on. gross  national  product  and 
industrial morale than a much larger amount of crude unemploy-
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Finally, my appeal is to members of our evolving Parliamen-
tary institutions to be bold in experiment, to look at the substance 
rather than the form, not to be dominated by old institutional forms. 
whether federal or confederal or any other variety, but to seek new 
ways in which Europe can rediscover its genius, reform its institu-
tions, enlarge the vision of its peoples and guide itself by new and 
relevant criteria.  If  we do that, Mr. Chairman, we may yet escape 
the fate of those whose fragmentary remains pose their perpetual 
challenge to all of us in the Hittite Museum.  (Applause.) 
The Chairman  (F).~  I call Mr. Bohman. 
Mr.  Bohman.  -··Let me,  like  other  speakers,  express  my 
congratulations to the four Rapporteurs on their concentrated and 
yet very thorough reports on the problems of the enlarged Euro-
pean  Community.  These  reports  constitute  an  excellent  basis 
for  a  debate dedicated,  as  Mr.  Malfatti said, to  one of the most 
important questions of our time. 
The events  of  the  last weeks,  and especially  the conference 
between  the  French  President  and  the  British  Prime  Minister, 
have brought the negociations in Brussels to a  stage where today 
it seems impossible that a breakdown should once again disillusion 
all of us who look forward to a united Western Europe as a deci-
sive step, not only to economic and social developments, but also 
to peace and security in Europe and in the whole world. 
Against  this  optimistic  background  I  am  sorry  to  have  to 
admit that I regard as very unfortunate the Swedish Government's 
conclusion two months ago that Sweden cannot become a Member 
of the  European Community because of the assumed incompati-
bility with its  policy of neutrality. 
During the last years' debates in the Assembly of the Council 
of Europe, I  have often, sometimes as  an opponent of the former 
Rapporteur  of  the  Economic  Committee,  my Norwegian  friend, 
Mr.  Petersen,  stated  that in my  opinion  there  is  nothing  in the 
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Member of the Community, provided that Sweden would pursue 
its  traditional non-alliance policy. 
Now the Swedish Government have made Mr. Petersen right 
in his pessimistic views.  I  dare say, however, that Mr. Petersen, 
as he is a citizen of one of the Nordic countries, was not entirely 
happy  when  he ' received  this  message  of  acknowledgement. 
Usually we  do  not wash  our domestic  linen here  in  Strasbourg. 
Nevertheless,  I  feel  it  necessary  to  tell  other  representatives  of 
European countries here present that the political party I represent 
-the  Conservative  Party-does  not  agree  with  the  Swedish 
Government's  decision  in this  respect. 
In my view,  the  question  of  combining  membership with  a 
non-alliance  policy  should  have  been  tested  in real  negotiations 
between· EEC and Sweden.  Not before, but after such negotia-
tions a clear answer could have been given from both sides  as  to 
what is  possible  and what is  not  in the  Swedish  case.  By  my 
government's  decision  last  March  this  way  is  no  longer  open. 
Once again, however, it has to be underlined that Sweden's neutral 
policy cannot he compared with that of other neutrals.  Our neu-
trality~ as  Mr.  Frydenlund has pointed out, is  a  self-imposed sta-
tus.  It is not inscribed in the Swedish constitution nor dependent 
oil State agreements.  The Swedish Parliament has rejected com-
munist ·proposals  to  define  in  detail its  purport, because  such  a 
definition  could  restrain  our  freedom ·of  action  and  political 
considerations. 
Onecondition for our non-alliance policy aiming at neutrality 
ip.  war is , that it seems  credible  to  other States  concerned.  My 
compatriot,  Mr.  Bjork;  mentioned  this  precondition.  Thus  one 
of the cornerstones of our foreign  policy is  to observe this credi-
bility, not least in the eyes  of the big powers.  Of course, there 
are risk& connected with such a policy of credibility.·  Carried too 
far :it cotild tempt other States  to  blackmail Sweden in order to 
prevent it from  taking steps contrary to their interests;  and I  do 
not tot(tlly accept Mr. Bjork's interpretation in this respect.  The 
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the big  powers.  This  demands  a  certain  degree  of flexibility  in 
foreign  policy.  It is  thus up to Sweden itself to define its policy 
in relation to the various political situations which may arise. 
Consequently,  we  are  not willing  to  become  a  member  of 
any treaty with other countries or blocs of countries which would 
considerably  limit  our  freedom  of  action  in  the  foreign  policy 
field.  In other words, we are not able to assume any responsibili-
ties  which could prevent us  from  keeping or make it difficult for 
us  to keep  outside military conflicts.  Thus, Sweden  cannot take 
part in any co-operation directed against other States. 
Needless  to  say,  military co-operation is  not possible.  As to 
co-operation  in  the  foreign  policy  field,  Sweden  has  found  it 
possible to  participate in the work of the Committee of Ministers 
within  the  Council  of  Europe.  This  co-operation  has  not been 
considered incompatible with our non-alliance policy. 
Taking all  these  aspects  of  the  Swedish  non-alliance  policy 
into account, I have personally come to the conclusion that Sweden 
would  have  had a  fair  chance  to  negotiate  successfully  for  full 
membership  in  the  Community.  Unfortunately,  my government 
have come  to  the ·opposite  conclusion.  In this  context,  like  my 
compatriot Mr. Bjork, I have found extremely interesting that part of 
Mr.  Darling's  report  where  in  paragraph  11  it  asks  whether, 
further  ahead,  the  EFT  A  neutrals  will  continue  to  reject  full 
membership of an enlarged Community.  His points of view  are 
so  interesting  that it would  have  been worthwile  to quote  them 
once  again  here,  but I  will  not do  so  because  we  are  short  of 
time. 
In his interesting speech this morning Mr. Darling underlined 
the  conclusions  of  his  report  and,  according  to  him,  the  conse-
quences  of the enlarged Communities might one day lead "these 
countries  to  conclude  that  their  own  economic  (and  even their 
political) inferests would be better served if they were full Mem-
bers  of  the  Comrimnity with  a  say in the  decision~making pro-
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what seems  to  me  to be a  very realistic  aspect of  the European 
integration  work  and  of its  influence  on  the  so-called  neutrals. 
Even in this respect there are shades of opinion.between Mr. Bjork 
and me. 
The  Swedish  Government,  however,  have  now  taken  their 
decision.  It is  for  the  present a  political  fact.  We  all  have  to 
make  the  best  of  it;  and  I  wish  to  underline  that Sweden  has 
declared its  firm  interest in as  comprehensive,  close  and durable 
relations as possible with EEC. 
Some of those present heard a month ago the Swedish Minis-
ter  without  Portfolio,  Mr.  Carl  Lidbom,  speak  here  before  the 
Consultative Assembly. 
In his  speech he emphasised that 
"Sweden wishes to make a contribution to  European integra-
tion  and  believes  that  she  can  do  so.  It is  the  Swedish 
Government's desire  that the negotiations  to  be started with 
the  Communities  should  lead  to  the  conclusion  of a  broad 
agreement  within  the  framework  of  which  all  obstacles  to 
trade in industrial and agricultural products between Sweden 
and EEC will be removed."  · 
Mr.  Lidbom  concluded  his  speech  to  the  Assembly  with  these 
words: 
"For geographical, historical and cultural reasons Sweden has 
close  links  with  the  nations  belonging  to  the  Communities. 
We  have built our society on the same democratic principles 
as  have  the other countries in Western Europe.  The active 
part we  have played in European co-operation since the war 
shows how we wish to strengthen those links and ensure that 
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I  totally agree with Mr. Lidbom and I  hope that the coming 
negotiations  in Brussels  will  lead to  such a  result that the  non-
aligned  and  neutral  States  will  reach  the  most  appropriate  and 
close co-operation with the rest of Europe. in accordance with their 
various political conditions. 
In my opinion, Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome on associa-
tion opens a very wide door to close relationship between Europe 
and Sweden.  Even if my country for  political reasons has found 
it impossible to accept full  membership. it has declared its  desire 
and hope to co-operate closely over a broad field  covering nearly 
all  kinds  of  activities  which  have  hitherto  been  exerted  in  the 
Communities.  As far as I can see, there it nothing in the Treaty 
of Rome, nor in the decisions made by the Communities, to  pre-
vent  Sweden  from  applying  for  adhesion  to  EEC,  according  to 
Article 238.  In fact,  Sweden in 1962 formally asked for associa-
tion, and repeated its application in 1967. 
Even if the EEC Commission has bound certain restrictions to 
the  application  of  Article  238  concerning  countries  with  highly 
developed industry. there is. as  I  have mentioned, nothing in the 
Treaty  of  Rome  itself  on  which  such  an interpretation  can  be 
based.  For an industrial country ready to accept European inte-
gration up to. let me say. 98 per cent. Article 238 seems to present 
the best ways and means to solve our common problems. 
Let me conclude by saying that obviously it is in the interests 
of the enlarged Community to accept Sweden as a close partner in 
the work of European integration, as  the four Rapporteurs point 
out in their reports.  Another Consultative  Assembly has  earlier 
underlined that there must not be new  trade or other barriers in 
Europe through the enlargement of EEC.  The fruitful results of 
the  EFTA  co-operation,  or  in  the  field  of  the  Nordic  market. 
must not be destroyed. 
Therefore  it is  in the interests  not only  of Sweden  that the 
future negotiations should lead to a close association of my country 
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and in our hearts.  Even from the political point of view, it must 
be regarded as a common Western European interest that Sweden 
can combine a growing economic co-operation with the Communi-
ties with its non-aligned foreign policy. 
I  am  convinced  that  most  politicians  in  Europe  will  agree 
with me when I  state that the  independent foreign  policy  of my 
country  has  contributed  to  the  obvious  detente  in the  northern 
part of Europe  which  has  been  to  the  benefit  of  the  whole  of 
Europe.  Thus  it  must  be  of  common  interest  that  this  policy 
can be conducted even in a  Europe where Sweden plays  its  role 
as a real partner in an enlarged European market-a partner in a 
European  solidarity  contributing  to  peace,  economic  and  social 
development, and cultural progress all over the world.  (Applause.) 
The Chairman (F). - I call Mr. D'Angelosante. 
Mr.  D'  Anglosante  (/).  - Mr.  Chairman,  this  Assembly  is 
meeting  at a  time  when  the  subject  up for  discussion  is  one  of 
great current interest, with obvious practical implications.  It can 
thus  be  regarded  as  a  good  opportunity  to  discuss,  seriously, 
which means with a  deep sense  of political realism, the very real 
problems  facing  us  today. 
What form can the enlarged Community take, and what can 
its  function  be  in Europe?  The  answers,  if they  are  to  be  any 
more  than  meaningless  predictions  from  the  book  of  dreams, 
which all too many people prefer to  real life,  must be  based on 
what the Community is like now.  There are three recent develop-
ments  enabling us  to  express  a  consistent opinion  on this  point: 
first,  the complete separation of the debate on enlargement from 
the debate on the completion and strengthening of the Community. 
In the  course  of  the  discussion  on  the entry  of  Britain and the 
other three countries, it has  become  apparent that the  three  key 
points  of  The  Hague  (enlargement,  completion,  strengthening) 
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Second:  the manner in which negotiations have been conduct-
ed.  In Brussels  on 28  May we  discussed  a  joint report by the 
Political Affairs Committee and the Committee on External Trade 
Relations.  It was  then that Mr. Deniau, who  is  the member of 
the  Commission chiefly  responsible  for  the  enlargement negotia-
tions, said that the basis for negotiations had been the acceptance 
by the  applicant countries of the Treaty and the decisions  ensu-
ing from  it.  There had been discussion only on negative or dis-
puted  points,  and,  said  Mr.  Deniau,  there  had been  no  talk  of 
the future.  Perhaps it is because the future has not been discussed 
at  the  negotiations  that we  are  talking  about it today.  In any 
case,  on the  controversial  issues  there  has  been  and will  be  no 
detailed,  specific,  point-by-point  agreement,  but  only  general 
agreements indicating the will of the Contracting Parties to  solve 
these problems using a specific method but not in a specific way; 
this  is  so  even with the most fundamental  questions  (the  British 
contribution to the EAGGF, relations with the associated African 
countries,  agreements  with  Commonwealth  countries,  the  sugar 
problem, and relations with New Zealand). 
We  gain  the  impression,  from  what we  are  told,  that there 
has  been  no  more  than  a  politically  effective  expression  of  the 
Parties'  willingness  to  take  each  other's  situations  and  interests 
into account, but, as  I  said before, no  detailed settlement has yet 
been reached. 
One consequence of this is that the practical solution of these 
problems  is  essentially  deferred  until  future  negotiations,  to  be 
held after enlargement has taken place.  This in turn means that 
it  will  be  necessary  in  the  future,  together  with  the  countries 
joining  the  Community-the  most  important  being  the  United 
Kingdom-to  undergo  lengthy,  continuous  negotiations  to  settle 
all  those  questions  not settled  during  the  negotiations  on entry, 
including  those  which,  according  to Mr.  Deniau, are  already  on 
the credit side, namely the acceptance of the Treaty and ensuing 
decisions-including  the  problem  of  institutions-about  which 
nothing has been said so far.  If all this still remains to be done, 
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accentuation  of what has  been  of late,  and not just of  late,  its 
dominant  characteristic-continuous  negotiations  in  the  Council 
of Ministers between the various countries and national positions, 
and the compromises these negotiations generally produce. 
This practice, as  I  have said, will continue and be accentua-
ted,  so  that  we  can  see  a  trend  towards  further  erosion  of  the 
functions  of  other  Community  institutions.  We  cannot  delude 
ourselves that the European Parliament has ever played anything 
but a very feeble part in our Community, and even this has been 
gradually  weakened  still  further  by  the  overwhelming  predomi-
nance  of  the  decisions  and powers  of the  Council  of  Ministers, 
which is  contrary to  the letter and spirit of the Treaty of Rome. 
We  have  also  witnessed  a  steady  erosion  of  the  powers  of  the 
Commission,  because  the  institutional  framework  laid  down  in 
the Treaty has not worked, and instead of normative decisions by 
a  majority  we  have  had,  basically,  continuous  negotiations  for 
separate agreements on separate issues. 
If we  wish  at this  stage  to  observe  a  minimum measure  of 
political  realism  instead  of  going  on  hiding  behind  speeches  of 
rather limited meaning, we can only conclude that the institutional 
framework laid down in the Treaty of Rome has been almost if 
not entirely superseded. 
Well, what is  to be done?  We could do our duty in making 
a  contribution commensurate with the importance of the  subject 
if only we  were  able to speak seriously about institutions, but in 
reality we have not yet had any cues to enable us  to  discuss  this 
matter effectively.  We are all aware that in politics, as in history, 
exorcism solves  no  problems, nor do loose  words  which obscure 
the real situation,  veiling  it from  the people, and thus playing  a 
basically anti-democratic role. 
The third factor is  the event which marked the turning-point 
in  the  negotiations:  the  recent  meeting  between  the  President 
of the  French Republic  and the British Prime Minister.  It is  a 
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for  this  meeting  was  furnished  by  the  monetary  dispute  which 
was  then  in  progress  and  is  still  unresolved,  and  by  the  need 
perceived by the French President for a new balance in the face of 
the conflicts in that connection.  This desire to restore the balance 
must be  seen  as  typical  of relations  between  States  and entirely 
alien to a Community approach to the problems. 
This  is  indeed  borne  out  by  the  British  Prime  Minister's 
speech  in  the  House  of  Commons,  in which  he  referred  to  the 
successful outcome of his meeting with the French President and 
spoke  of  an  intergovernmental  agreement,  in  other  words  an 
agreement between  States.  In future,  then-and this  is  the first 
conclusion  to  which we  are driven-we shall  see  an increase in 
the already predominant power of the governments,  entailing,  as 
in the  past,  the  overwhelming  representation  of  certain  interest 
groups and a further weakening of social impetus, a weakening of 
the workers' forces at national level in the face of giant companies 
operating over wider territory, as well as an erosion of democracy 
in the processes of legislation and control. 
It  is this state of affairs that we must take as our starting-point, 
in order to change it if we wish, bearing in mind, for instance, that 
if democratic control is  not feasible at Community level, we must 
defend  it  at  national  level  with  all  the  means  at  our  disposal. 
The workers' interests are not guaranteed merely by virtue of the 
Social  Fund. 
Their interests  are  defended  by  preventing  the  uncontrolled 
development of the giant companies, and by recognising real trade 
union  power,  without  discriminating  against  the  political  forces 
in  which the  working class finds  expression. 
When delivering his valuable report this morning, Mr. Darling 
raised  the  problem  of  foreign  investments  in  the  Community. 
This is  a  very  serious  problem,  and I  am glad it was  raised by 
the Rapporteur, because we, too, have repeatedly stressed its import-
ance.  It has hitherto been impossible to have any serious discus-
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firms-and especially American firms-have benefited from consid-
erable protection.  The Community's regional policy, for example, 
has been under discussion  for  some  time, for  about a  year,  and 
we  are  all  aware  that  neither  the  Council  of  Ministers  nor  the 
Commission has ever had any intention so  far of abandoning the 
restrictive interpretation of Articles 92, 93  and 94 of the Treaty of 
Rome precluding aid by member States likely to distort compet-
ition;  we  are also  aware  that American firms  are  granted treat-
ment by individual States-with the compliance of the Community 
-which seriously  contravenes  the  rules  of  competition  in  fiscal 
matters,  taxes  and  the  import  of  equipment.  And,  even  more 
serious,  the Community, whose  very basis  is  free  trade, puts up 
with  the  fact  that  American  firms  in  Europe  are  prevented  by 
their  parent  companies  from  re-exporting  to  America  what has 
been produced in Europe. 
These  are  serious  and  difficult  problems,  and  the  fact  that 
Mr.  Darling drew attention this  morning  to  the need for  control 
is  a  highly  significant  step  which  we  welcome  in  the  hope that 
something may at last be done. 
As  regards  the  future  Community's external relations,  again 
taking  as  our  starting-point  what  has  been  done  so  far,  it  is 
essential,  if  we  wish  the  enlarged  Community  to  perform  that 
peace-making role to which many previous speakers have referred, 
to  settle the matter of our relations  with the Socialist  countries; 
we  must settle, first and foremost, the problem of tariff and trade 
discrimination against these countries. 
Mr.  Chairman, once  the  four  countries have  actually  joined 
the  Community and once  a  customs  agreement  with  the EFT  A 
countries has been concluded, as  envisaged in the negotiations so 
far, the ensuing situation will be that the common external tariff, 
the Community's  customs  barrier, will  form  an insuperable wall 
only for the Socialist countries.  Such a tariff might well be called 
"the  tariff  against  State-trading  countries".  Similarly  we  have 
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Community's  measures  for  facilitating  free  trade  have  been 
applied  to  all  but the  Socialist  countries.  Now these  countries, 
whatever  we  may think  of their  internal  regimes,  are  the  main 
parties with whom we  have to discuss  a  policy of peace;  and it 
profits no one, it is not good politics and not common sense, even 
with the prospect of present and future  enlargement, to envisage, 
in connection with NATO, extremist entrenchment in an Atlantic 
position  vis-a-vis  the  Socialist  countries.  We  have  all  read  the 
Lisbon communique, the NATO countries' reply to  the Socialist 
countries,  and were  all  gladdened  by  its  new  language  and  the 
new  hope it opened up for  the  peoples.  Is it conceivable,  then, 
that within the Community the old language typical of the years 
before  ~948 should still  persist, together with this  fundamentally 
discriminatory  practice?  May  I,  in  this  connection,  make  one 
comment to  Mr.  Giraudo  on  his  speech  this  morning.  He was 
the only one (at least in the written reports) to persist in demand-
ing  de  jure  recognition  by  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  Socialist 
countries.  If it were  possible  to  talk lightly in a  serious  setting 
such as this, I should ask Mr. Giraudo to what jus,  to what right, 
he is  referring, since the law on which this Community is  founded 
is  virtually non-existent, since,  apart from one or two points laid 
down  in  detail  in  the  Treaty,  the  Community  is  founded  on 
practice, on a changeable and accidental de facto situation.  I fail 
to see why the Soviet Union need be asked to give it formal recog-
nition,  which  has  considerable  political  significance,  and  which 
amounts  to  a  preliminary  condition  of  a  political  nature,  at  a 
time when de jure recognition of the Community is  still contested 
by the member States themselves. 
Secondly,  I  should like  to  say  a  few  words  (especially since 
this subject has already been raised by previous speakers) on our 
relations  with  countries  under  fascist  regimes.  It is  a  serious 
problem, and the Community and this  Parliament cannot persist 
in feigning ignorance on the pretext that it is a technical one. 
We  have  discussed  today  and  shall  continue  discussing 
tomorrow in this Chamber the problem of generalised preferences. 
There are already some who are anxious to see how these prefer-
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Two  years  ago  in  this  Parliament  we  adopted  a  decision, 
which has been respected so far, to freeze, rebus sic stantibus, the 
situation as regards association with Greece. 
News  has  reached me  today (and I  can only  hope it is  not 
true)  that  one  of  the  most  important  groups  in  this  Assembly, 
which  by  its  political  nature  could  have  guaranteed  the  main-
tenance of this position, is  now preparing to change it.  Sooner or 
later we  shall  have  to  abandon a  kind of commercial neutrality 
in order to achieve clear political positions, and we shall then see 
whether  the  preamble  about  the  political  nature  of  the  Com-
munity,  about  the  free  countries  etc.,  should  not  be  applied 
mainly to countries under fascist regimes rather than to the Socia-
list countries.  · 
As  regards  our  future  relations  with  the  under-developed 
countries, the first problem that arises is a general one, the general-
ised  preferences.  It seems  that  the  Community is  to  introduce, 
from  1 July, a system of generalised preferences which the United 
States  of America  has  already  declined  to  accept  and which,  it 
seems, will not be accepted even by Great Britain, at least during 
the transitional period. 
This brings up the problem of difference of status, which we 
must weigh up and from which we must draw certain conclusions 
concerning  the  associated  countries  with  which  the  Community 
has  made  a  number  of  highly  serious  commitments,  and  with 
which-by the way-the Community character  of  the  European 
partner of the Association should be reaffirmed once  and for all, 
overcoming once and for all the de facto situation whereby one of 
the member countries  of the Community is  favoured in relations 
with  the  associated  countries.  However,  it is  not of  this  that  I 
wish to  speak.  What I  want to point out is  that, even going  by 
what emerged from  the meeting  of the  EEC-AASM Joint Com-
mittee in Munich last week, nothing clear or specific has yet been 
decided as  regards  our relations  with the  associated countries  or 
the  relations  of an enlarged Community with  the African  Com-
monwealth countries and with other countries.  Here, too, we must 
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to develop the political framework, but we must also state frankly 
that  the  problem  at  this  stage  is  far  from  clear  and  far  from 
settled.  We  were  faced  with a  strange  situation in Munich last 
week:  in one report it was said that the Council of Ministers con-
firmed  the  need  to  defend  the  acquired  rights  of  the  associated 
countries,  whilst it was  also  said  in various  quarters  within  the 
Council  of  Ministers  that  no  such  undertaking  had  ever  been 
made, but that this sentence was  to be found in the final commu-
nique issued after the meeting between the French President and 
the British Prime Minister. 
Finally, the most important point of all:  our relations  with 
the United States.  I  say the most important point because in the 
economic  field  these  relations  are  becoming  daily  more  crucial; 
as  already pointed out by Mr. Barre, Vice-President of the Com-
mission,  at the  last session  of the  European Parliament in  Lux-
embourg,  immediate  careful  decisions  by  the  Community  are 
essential on this  issue.  These economic relations  are interlinked 
and intertwined with political relations, on which no clear, coher-
ent, interrelated view has yet been achieved. 
We are now in the midst of an increasingly serious monetary 
dispute with the United States, in which the United States do not 
agree  that Europe should refuse sic  et  simpliciter to  pay for  the 
consequences  of its  balance-of-payments instability;  they  do  not 
agree to this for political reasons, namely the United States' con-
tribution to the defence of the so-called free  world. 
We are faced with a serious trade dispute which, to my mind, 
opens  up  a  special  phase  in  world  economic  relations,  namely 
the  struggle  for  markets  within  the  capitalist  system itself.  But 
in the United States  there is  no  sign of the positive approach to 
the problem of trade relations that many of us have so far hoped 
to  see. 
Only yesterday the American Secretary of State, Mr.  Rogers, 
speaking at OECD, could do no more than propose the setting up 
of a special committee to consider the obstacles to trade relations 
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agricultural  policy  as  one  of  the  obstacles  to  normal  trade 
relations. 
This  is  a  very  serious  matter which,  as  we  know,  has  been 
with us  for  some time,  and which we  have not yet succeeded in 
answering, because, for one thing,  there are many representatives 
in  our  Parliament  who  feel  that  due  consideration  should  be 
given to American anxieties concerning the European agricultural 
policy.  But, sooner or later, something clear will have to be said 
about this  matter, and it is  against  the  background of  problems 
such as  these that we  can speak of the role of an enlarged Com-
munity in the European context. 
Mr.  Chairman,  in  conclusion  I  should  like  to  recall  that 
Europe's present make-up  should  endow it with  the  function  of 
safeguarding peace and not of accentuating the division into blocs. 
We are in favour of the disappearance of all blocs and the end of 
all agreements that foster the danger of war or stem directly from 
war situations. 
Europe  today  has  a  great  opportunity,  which,  as  I  said 
before, in connection with the Lisbon meeting, seems  about to be 
taken up.  This opportunity is  the Soviet Union's proposed Euro-
pean  Security  Conference,  which  affects  us  all  very  closely.  It 
may be said that we ourselves, the Community as it is and will be, 
are the subjects of such a conference and will  be discussed there. 
We,  too, must have something to  say about this.  We  must give 
up certain out-dated ways  of talking which, according to some of 
us, especially in the past, saw  the Community as  the secular and 
economic arm of NATO. 
To be optimistic, it can be  said that good may come of the 
new developments.  Good will  come if we  are able to  assess  the 
situation for what it is and for what some of us would like it to be, 
and to  work  on this  situation in order to  change  it not for  the 
benefit of giant companies  but for  the  benefit  of  the  people,  the 
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The Chairman (F). - I call Mr. Jahn. 
Mr. Jahn  (G). - Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, the 
devil  usually  catches  the  hindmost.  I  hope  I  shall  thwart  him 
by being brief.  I  should like to comment on just two problems: 
first,  relations  with  the  States  of  the  Eastern bloc,  and  second, 
the institutions and structures. 
The relationship with the States of the Eastern bloc is  discus-
sed in the reports drafted by our colleagues Mr.  Giraudo, Mr. de 
la Malene, Mr.  Darling and Mr.  Frydenlund.  Mr.  Malfatti also 
mentioned  this  problem.  The  desire  is  expressed  for  improved 
economic  and  political  relations  between  EEC and  the  Eastern 
States.  In itself, this is  a demand with which no one would wish 
to  quarrel.  But  how  do  things  stand  at  present?  I  am  very 
glad to have this opportunity of discussing the matter. 
Careful scrutiny reveals  that to  date there has  been no indi-
cation from the Soviet Union-in fact its daily propaganda reveals 
exactly the opposite-that it is  prepared to recognise EEC as  an 
economic  alliance,  let  alone  as  a  political  one.  It simply  does 
not fit  the Soviet concept of Europe.  If we feel  able to recognise 
different social structures, such recognition must be reciprocal.  In 
this age of political realism, as we  are always describing it, if we 
respect  COMECON then we  should be able to  expect EEC also 
to  be  recognised  as  an institution.  Any bilateral  trade relations 
which we as member States have with the Soviet Union must-and 
this has been revealed in many contributions to today's debate-be 
complemented, not to say strengthened by the foreign trade policy 
of  the  European  Community.  Co-ordination  and  co-operation 
are necessary in the field  of foreign trade policy, and here I  agree 
with my colleague Mr. Cantalupo when he says  that we  must act 
in unison.  Lord Gladwyn is  right when he says  that, in loyalty 
to  the democratic principles we  have pursued to date, we  cannot 
conclude treaties of association or preferential arrangements with 
States in the Eastern bloc.  The policy we pursue in our foreign 
trade and in our economic  relations  with the  Eastern bloc  must 
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field,  and gradually in the foreign  policy field.  But as  a  precon-
dition for this, we  must co-ordinate the overseas trading arrange-
ments of the various industries in the countries of Europe, which 
are played off  against  one  another in  different  sectors  to  such a 
point that they can hardly compete with each other. 
The aim of our Treaty is  directed towards the political goal 
of  the  unification  of the  democratic  States.  Our philosophy  is 
unequivocal;  and  it  has  been  stated  by  our  former  President, 
Mr. Scelba.  We  remain bound by it-I believe  this needs  to be 
mentioned here-whatever enlargements,  associations  and prefer-
ential treaties are envisaged, and not only in Europe but beyond 
it, in Africa and wherever we  may conclude treaties in the future. 
Our aim must  be  to  give  the  people of Europe freedom,  peace, 
security  and  justice-that is  what  the  Treaty  says,  and  that  is 
what Mr.  Scelba  emphasised again  today.  This too  is  the  basis 
for  the  normalisation  of our foreign  trading  and economic  rela-
tions with the Soviet Union. 
I  turn  now  to  the  institutions.  Mr.  de  la  Maltme  stated-
and I quote, with the Chairman's permission:  "The preparation by 
the  Community  of  a  coherent  strategy  for  its  development  in 
Europe and the  world  is  an urgent  necessity  and a  prerequisite 
for  shaping the future";  and he goes on to  say that he regards it 
as  essential  "to  equip  the  enlarged  Community  with  structures 
capable of allowing it to play its rightful part". 
We have had a great deal of discussion in recent times about 
institutions  and  structures.  I  think  we  should  summarise  the 
situation once again, as  follows:  The first  institution of the Com-
munity is  this  very  Parliament.  To endow  this  Parliament with 
authority in the sense of new legislative powers is  a  priority task 
in  terms  of  the  strengthening  of  the  institutions.  The  demand 
we  must make emphatically-and it is  also the demand made by 
our British colleagues  today, to the great delight of us all-is for 
general, direct  elections  on the  same conditions  and at the same 
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I  believe we  should beware of using  our own national elec-
toral  legislation  to  build  a  European  Parliament  which  could 
exercise no function whatever because it would have no  common 
basis. 
Now, what of the Commission?  A variety of things has been 
said about it today.  What are its responsibilities to be in future? 
Should  they  be extended  to  the  scale  of government  powers?  I 
think they should.  Many other members  agree  with me on this. 
But we  know what the  proposals  are;  they have been discussed 
here.  There  are  different  views  on  this  even  within  our  own 
ranks.  It  is suggested that Ministers for Europe might be appoint-
ed in national cabinets, who would then have a  sort of co-ordin-
ating role to  play.  The Commission and the Council do not see 
eye to eye on this at the present time.  We do not want permanent 
representatives acting as so-called deputy governments or delegate 
governments.  This has also been mooted recently, and we  know 
on what political considerations the idea is  based. 
There are others who are convinced that a confederation is  the 
way to Europe.  But what we want-and I think we should say so 
-is a  European  federation,  European unity and political  unity, 
and not new institutions, not new  structures, but something built 
according to the principles which have so far held good in demo-
cratic  government in  all  the  States  which  are  united  within  the 
Community;  a  rational order aiming  to  promote and strengthen 
the classical democratic institutions in our Community to a  point 
where we  become a  genuinely efficacious  parliament with powers 
of control which will enable us  to do full  justice to  the common 
ideal to which the Treaty binds us.  (Applause.) 
The Chairman (F).- We have come to the end of the list of 
speakers.  Mr. Frydenlund has had to leave in order to catch the 
~even o'clock plane for Copenhagen, and has asked me to present 
his  apologies. 
I see that Mr. Darling and Mr. de  la Malene are not present. 
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Mr.  Giraudo,  Rapporteur  (I).  - It only remains for  me to 
express  my  satisfaction  at  the  debate  that  has  just  taken  place 
on  the  four  reports  presented  this  morning.  The  debate  has 
been  forceful  and  varied,  and  has  once  again  underlined  the 
confidence and hope, felt both in the European Parliament and in 
the  Council  of Europe Consultative Assembly, that Europe will 
at last make more speedy progress towards its destination, which 
is  unity. 
I  should like to make just one comment, Mr.  Chairman, to 
Mr.  D'Angelosante.  I  am  sorry  that  he  is  not  here  just now. 
I  should  like  to  say-and Mr.  Jahn  has  already  pointed out-
that  when  we  expect  the  Soviet  Union  to  accept  EEC  we  are 
merely asking for an act of political realism by the Soviet Union. 
What is  there  cannot be denied,  and  the  European  Community 
does indeed exist.  Its importance and its influence on economic 
relations, trade relations and political life are very real. 
Thus  there  is,  for  our  part,  no  discrimination  against  the 
Eastern European countries, as has been maintained.  If anything, 
the  discrimination  comes  from  the  other  side.  In  any  case,  in 
the new climate which is  now  being created, we  hope that new 
opportunities  really will  be opened up  and that talks,  including 
talks  with the  countries  of Eastern Europe, may prove  possible 
in order to achieve collaboration between the peoples of Europe 
and  the  peoples  of  other  continents  purely  for  the  purpose  of 
bringing about peace on earth and with peace, progress. 
(Applause.) 
The Chairman  (F).  - Do either the President or the  Vice~ 
President of the Commission of the European Communities wish 
to speak? ... 
Mr. Barre, Vice-President of the Commission of the European 
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3. Closure of the Joint Meeting 
The Chairman (F).- In that case, we have come to the end 
of our exchange  of views,  and I  declare  the  18th Joint Meeting 
of  members  of  the  Consultative  Assembly  of  the  Council  of 
Europe and members of the European Parliament closed. 
The Sitting is closed. 
(The Sitting was closed at 7 p.m.) 